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The modern maritime entitlements over vast oceanic spaces over
the continental shelf and over the exclusive economic zone have
produced sharp disagreements among neighboring nations about their
delimitation, the definition of their borders, many of which remain
unresolved. Economic interests are only part of the picture. The rest is
nationalistic pride of the mine and the thine.
For almost half a century international law has been striving to
develop a fair and predictable regime of delimitation through two major
multilateral, if not global, treaties'. One would have expected the
process to be easy. The basis of entitlement has been clear and
undisputed from day one: extended territorial sovereignty and
appurtenance results from adjacency to a coast. What is left is only the
quasi-ministerial task of charting lines on the map by means of some
identifiable and workable methods. Yet it is only now, after many
decades of international adjudication and arbitration, 2 and after the
* Professor of Law, University of Thessaloniki, Greece; Professor of Law, Emeritus, the
Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA.
1. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereafter Geneva Convention]; United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, U.N.Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
1261, in force since November 16, 1994 [hereafter UNCLOS]. Separate articles provide
for entitlement and for delimitation both in the Geneva Convention (articles 1 and 6), and
in and UNCLOS (articles 55-71, 76-82 and 74, 83).
2. See generally Anglo-French Continental Shelf Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54 (1977)
[hereinafter Anglo-French Arbitration]; Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia
v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24) [hereinafter Tunisia-Libya]; Case
Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct.ober 12) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine]; Delimitation of the Mari-
time Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267 (1985) [hereinafter
Guinea-Guinea/Bissau]; Case Concerning The Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. Malta) 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3) [hereinafter Libya-Malta]; Court of Arbitration for the
Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon),
31 I.L.M. 1145 (1992) hereinafter St. Pierre & Miquelon]; Case Concerning Maritime De-
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conclusion of numerous agreements in particular regions, that an
intelligible regime of delimitation is starting to gel.
The blame for this delay and confusion lies mainly with the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases [hereinafter "North Sea"].3 In the first
delimitation adjudication in 1969, the ICJ [hereinafter "ICJ"],
uncomfortable with the apparent dominance of equidistance, took a
wrong doctrinal turn and set sail upon the uncharted waters of an
elusive equity. In this uncertain environment, another wrong doctrinal
turn came later, mostly in some writings, in deciding the question of
whether islands were to be treated somehow differently than
mainlands. These doctrinal turns have haunted the delimitation
process ever since. The actual borders in the cases already decided,
while on balance reasonable, were drawn despite rather than because of
them.
While the literature on these maritime zones, including the
equitable quest 4 and the island question,5 is immense, 6 this article
limitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38
(June 14) [hereinafter Jan Mayen] (important cases decided after North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases).
3. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 20) [hereinafter North Sea].
4. See, M.D. Blecher, Equitable Delimitation of Continental Shelf, 73 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 60 (1979); Vladimir-Djuro Degan, Equitable Principles in Maritime Delimitations, in 2
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT AGO 107 - 137 (1987); Robert Jennings, Equity and
Equitable Priniciples, in 1986 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27; Barbara
Kwiatkowska, The ICJ Doctrine of Equitable Principles Applicable to Maritime Boundary
Delimitation and Its Impact on the International Law of the Sea, in FORTY YEARS
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: JURISDICTION, EQUITY AND EQUALITY 119 (A. Bloed &
P. van Dijk eds., 1988) [hereinafter Kwiatkowska, Forty Years]; T. Rothpfeffer, Equity in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 42 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INTERNATIONAL RET.
81, 84 - 86 (1972); Paul Bravender-Coyle, The Emerging Legal Principles and Equitable
Criteria Governing the Deliminatoin of Martime Boundaries Between States, 19 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 171 (1988); Barbara Kwiatkowska, Equitable Maritime Boundary
Delimintation, as Exemplified in the Work of the International Court of Justice During the
Presidency of Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings and Beyond, 28 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 91
(1997) [hereinafter Kwaitkowska, Jennings]; Ruth Lapidoth, Equity in International Law,
22 ISR. L. REV. 161 (1987); Elihu Lauterpacht, Equity, Evasion, Equivocation and
Evolution in International Law, AM. BRANCH IINT'L L. ASS'N, PROC. & COMM. REP. 33
(1977 - 78). Two recent books on international equity cover the maritime dimension in
rather general terms: MASAHIRO MIYOSHI, CONSIDERATIONS OF EQUITY IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY dISPUTES (1993) [hereinafter MIYOSHI]; and
CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993) [hereinafter ROSSI].
5. We even find major monographs dedicated exclusively to the issues raised by the
presence of islands such as HIRAN W. JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF ISLANDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988) [hereinafter JAYEWARDENE]. Most of the major pieces, how-
ever, antedate St. Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen; the key pieces, however, addressed
the island question more fully and in the most acute context will inform the present arti-
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updates the implications of the two most recent and important cases,
St.Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen. Its most significant novelty,
however, lies in lifting the veils of the purported marine equity to show
that after North Sea, through a negative sorting out process, the courts
have been able to reach sensible outcomes by accommodating the
equitable qualms about equidistance through the concept of
proportionality of zones to coastal lengths, and that, therefore, the
doctrinal imbroglio created by North Sea should finally be laid to rest.
Particular attention will be paid to specific solutions, including the
mechanics of how to calculate weights and sizes and how to decide
where and how much to cut and readjust. Finally, this article will
closely examine how all of these considerations play out in the context
of islands, and will focuson some practical issues where further
clarification may be needed.
II. THE GENEALOGY OF EQUITY IN MARITIME
DELIMITATIONS: PARTING THE NORTH SEA
A. The Concerns About the Equidistance-Special Circumstances
Formula and the Turn Toward Equity
In North Sea, a divided ICJ boldly played down the role of the
cle.
Major earlier works include CLIVE R. SYMMONS, THE MARTIME ZONES OF ISLANDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1979 [hereinafter SYMMONS], and DEREK W. BOWETT, THE LEGAL
REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979) [hereinafter BOWETT]. See also
HARITINI DIPLA, LE REGIME JURIDIQUE DES ILES DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA
MER (1984), and HUESEYIN PAZARCI, LA DELIMITATION DU PLATEU CONTINENTAL ET LES
ILES (1982) [hereinafter PAZARCI]. For related chapters in treatises, see M.D. EVANS,
RELEVANT CIRCUMSTATNCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION (1989), [hereinafter EVANS], at
133-151; R.D. Hodgson, Islands: Normal and Special Circumstances, in LAW OF THE SEA:
THE EMERGING REGIME OF THE OCEANS (J.K. Gamble & G. Pontecorvo, eds. 1974)
[hereinafter Hodgson]; and D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, chaps.
16 & 18 [hereinafter O'CONNELL]. For a comprehensive recent review of state practice,
see Derek W. Bowett, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Bound-
ary Delimitations, in I.M.B. 130 - 151 [hereinafter Bowett IMB].
In the periodical literature, special mention should be made to Donald E. Karl, Islands
and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf- A Framework for Analysis, 71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 642 - 673 [hereinafter Karl], slightly updated in Donald E. Karl, The Delimitation of the
Aegean Continental Shelf. Equitable Principles and the Problem of Islands, in FOR. POL'Y
INSTIT., THE AEGEAN ISSUES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Ankara) [hereinafter Karl, TPI].
6 See for example, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 2-262 (Jonathan I.
Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993) [hereinafter IMB], for a recent composite pic-
ture of the issues, factors, and argumentation in the division of maritime spaces, and for
references to the bibliography generally. See Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in Interna-
tional Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 227-56 (1994) [hereinafter
Charney, Progress], for an update of this work.
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manageable rule of equidistance as the natural law of the continental
shelf,7 a rule which had been incorporated in Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention, modified by the exception of special circumstances.8 To be
sure, the ICJ recognized its virtues as a convenient method capable of
being employed in almost all circumstances, and stressed that no other
method has the same combination of practical convenience and
certainty of application. 9 However, its utility had to be evaluated each
time, at least in cases of adjacent coasts, under the applicable equitable
principles, in view of all relevant circumstances, in order to reach
reasonable results.
It is not an exaggeration to compare the birth of this marine equity
in North Sea to Athena springing from the head of Zeus without much
gestation. Any conceivable precedent was thin and opaque. Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention, with equidistance as its centerpiece, resulted
from a lengthy and laborious process by the International Law
Commission, and met with world-wide approval, or at least
acquiescence. 10 There had not even been a thought of putting into the
general rule a criterion such as equitable principles because it could not
produce a line on a map. Indeed, the ICJ itself recognized in North Sea
that in the pre-Convention proposals a workable methodology had been
viewed as an essential prerequisite of delimitation." Nevertheless, the
majority focused selectively on a few concerns expressed during the
deliberations, and on the possibility of reservations,12 interpreted the
7. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 37-46.
8. Examples of such circumstances were the exceptional configuration of the coast,
as well as the presence of small islands or navigable channels. It is apparent that these
examples originated in the traditional law of the territorial sea, where it had been
recognized that the median line could be diverted to preserve the unity of a navigable
channel (thalweg), to ignore uninhabited rocks or islets, or to respect straight baselines or
adjustments in the general direction of the coast. See II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 216, 300
(1953). Such circumstances would operate less forcefully under the regime of the
continental shelf, which does not impose full sovereignty rights and where national
security and navigational considerations are not the main issue.
9. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 22.
10. For a summary of this process, see Evans, supra note 6, at 8-15, and ROBERT D.
HODGSON & ROBERT SMITH, BOUNDARIES OF THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA:
CONFERENCE OUTCOMES AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION 183-85 (1977). See also
Etienne Grisel, The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the
International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
562, 570-573.
According to Lauterpacht, "It appears that the basis of the Court's approach [that such
delimitations must be established by reference to equitable principles] is a single sen-
tence in a report of a committee of experts [cartographers] nominated by the International
Law Commission in 1953 to provide... technical assistance." Lauterpacht, supra note 4, at
35.
11. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 53.
12. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 48-55, 62-69. Cf. I 1953 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
100, 123-126; Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 22-26; (separate opinion of Judge Sha-
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special circumstances exception as originating in equity,' 3 and jumped
to the conclusion that some undefined equitable principles have always
underlain the regime of the continental shelf, seeking inspiration
directly from them. The main support for this was supposed to be the
Truman Proclamation of 1945 [hereinafter "Declaration"], 14 where the
United States [hereinafter "U.S."] had extended its continental shelf to
200 miles, and had declared that the boundaries with the neighboring
states would be determined on the basis of equitable principles.
However, this blanket unilateral reference to unspecified principles in
the Declaration had been little more that a gesture of reassurance to
the international community that this novel major appropriation of the
open seas will respect the legitimate rights of other states on the basis
of equality.1
5
A good number of the judges in the ICJ expressed their dismay over
this adventure into a process with no discernible practical choices in
sight.16  Many commentators have also criticized this process.' 7
habuddeen).
13. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 55.
14. Id. paras. 47, 86. See Proc. No. 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to
the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea-bed of the Continental Shelf, Sept. 28, 1945,
10 Fed. Reg. 12303, 3 C.F.R. 1943-48, Comp., p. 67. See also id. Ammoun, J., separate
opinion, para. 39 for some additional examples. On the evolution of the policy of the
United States, see WHITEMAN, 4 DIG. INT'L L. 752 (1946).
15. Incidentally, the international significance of the Truman Proclamation is quite
limited, since its main purpose was internal, that is to draw a line between federal and
state jurisdiction in this field. See WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIAL 558 (1969); see also Elizabeth M. Borgese, Boom, Doom and Gloom
Over the Oceans, 11 S. DIEGO L. REV. 543 (1974).
16. Judge Tanaka deplored the use of nebulous criteria such as equity or
equitableness, which just beg the question. The rule of law and not anarchy must prevail.
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 172, 185, 195-96. He, as most of the dissenters, favored
equidistance, which is "practical, appropriate, objective and clear," reflecting proximity,
propinquity and contiguity, indeed inherent in the very concept of the continental shelf
and teleologically deducible from it, leading to just and equitable apportionment." Id.. at
180-182, 186. He was not persuaded that coastal irregularities produce legally-
recognizable distortions. Id. at 186-89. Judge Koretzky was concerned about the
vagueness, subjectiveness and arbitrariness of the term, going beyond the restricted
connotation given to it in the common law countries. The Court should not be addressing
questions of a political nature. Id. at 165-70. Equidistance is the direct and inevitable
consequence of the premises of the continental shelf right. Id. at 158-161. Judge Sorensen
expressed concern that equity breeds uncertainty in "a field where legal certainty is in the
interest not only of the international community in general, but also -on balance- of the
states directly concerned." Id. at 257. For inequity we need a separate standard of
evaluation Id. at 255. Cf. Ammoun, J., separate opinion, at 32 (stating that "the
Judgment arrives at the obvious truth that it is necessary to be just, and does not give
much indication to the parties, each of whom considers that its own position is equita-
ble.")
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However lacking in authentication, was this recourse to equity in North
Sea at least wise like Athena and helpful in resolving disputes fairly?
The ICJ cited three basic ideas for the delimitation of the continental
shelf: (1) negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement; (2) do not
encroach on natural prolongation; and (3) apply equitable principles,
taking all circumstances into account and employing appropriate
methods, including equidistance,1 8 in order to arrive at a reasonable
result.19 The duty to negotiate does not provide much guidance on
content and outcome and the ICJ's attachment to natural prolongation
proved to be futile as will be discussed later. Will the third idea of
equitable principles, relevant circumstances and reasonable results
work?
B. The Difficulties with the Equitable Doctrine of North Sea
1. A Good Beginning: Staying with Equity-Within-the-Law
North Sea started out correctly by providing the proper framework
of the applicable law. The ICJ was indeed committed to the idea that
the most fundamental of all rules of law relating to the continental shelf
was that the entitlement of each state was an extension of its territorial
sovereignty over land, existing inherently ab initio and ipso facto by
virtue of its coastline.20 A state without a coast has no continental
shelf.21 Thus, the ICJ disclaimed any intention of using delimitation to
produce just and equitable shares by a wholesale refashioning of nature
or to remedy natural inequalities. 22 Marine equity did not implicate
either abstract justice2 3 or results ex aequo et bono.24 In other words,
the ICJ unequivocally limited itself to equity within the law,
disclaiming any recourse to equity as fountainhead of the law, or as the
source of just results directly rather than through positive law. Equity
within the law denotes a method of effectuating the law necessitated by
the priority of first principles over rules, and by the impossibility of
17. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 219-228 (1994) [hereinafter
HIGGINS]; EVANS, supra note 5, at 241; Jennings, supra note 4, at 27, 31-35; Michel
Virally, Panorama de Droit International Contemporain, in 5 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE
HAGUE ACADEMY 157-160; Wolfgang Friedman, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases: A
Critique, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 229, at 236.
18. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 85.
19. Id. para. 90.
20. Id. para. 19.
21. Id. para. 91.
22. Id. paras. 18-19, 39, 91.
23. Id. para. 85. See also para. 32 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion).
24. Id. para. 88. Cf. para. 84.
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anticipating a total solution for every conceivable situation because of
the complexity of facts and the generality of rules.
North Sea was on solid ground by distancing itself from any form of
equity without the law. No international tribunal has ever asserted
general authority to use equity on its own to make law, or to contradict
the positive law. 25 Many commentators have eloquently exposed the
perversions of instant, instinctive judicial justice, no matter how well-
intentioned, 26 and they need no belaboring here. The practice of
visceral jurisprudence is particularly objectionable in international
adjudication, where states zealously protect their sovereignty. No
central government is entrusted with a general police power and armed
with an executive branch. The tribunals have no general jurisdiction to
remedy the ills of society, but are under a strict obligation not to make
policy, but only to apply the existing law within the narrow terms of the
submission of the dispute before them. In this environment, equity
cannot be a roguish thing measured by the chancellor's foot.
27
The most authoritative international text on treaty interpretation,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [hereinafter the "Vienna
25. The ICJ even avoids referring to any equitable power praeter legem, i.e. merely to
supplement and fill in the gaps of the law, let alone contra legem. It is also clear that
whatever international equity may be relevant, it has never taken the coloration of mercy,
or a similar notion of benevolence. On the other hand, international law itself admits,
under the rubric of autonomy of the parties, broad authority to contending parties to
avoid its permissive, substantive norms and select criteria which may be extra-legal, e.g.,
the relative interests, needs and aspirations of the parties or quasi-legal, and/or to bypass
its adjudiciatory procedures and submit their dispute to an agreed-upon process. Article
38 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice recognizes that the Court has ex
aequo et bono power based on prorogation, although it has not as yet exercised it for fail-
ure of submissions. The reasons for such action may vary: considerations of expediency,
when coupled with trust in the wisdom and impartiality of the decision maker, may sup-
port a speedy, informal process; mediation and reconciliation without adversarial argu-
mentation may be deemed more suitable to the preservation of long-term relationships; or
even the law on a particular point may not be sufficiently developed and articulated as
yet, and the dispute cannot be postponed. In terms of format, an equitable decision of this
type may contain only an operative part of just results perceived directly, or it may also
include the reasoning that led to it. The necessity for this kind of a process is even
greater in international than in domestic law, both because of the greater gaps within it,
and because of the failure of most states to accept generally the compulsory jurisdiction of
international tribunals, leaving negotiation as the only other alternative when interna-
tional law appears to favor one of the parties.
26. See, e.g., RONALD DWARKIN , LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); D.N. Mac Cormick, Formal
Justice and the Form of Legal Argument, in ETUDES DE LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE 103-118
(Chaim Perelman, ed. 1976); LON N. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-38, 96-108, 145-
163 (1969); JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 46-47
(SPENCER W. SYMONS, Ed., 5th Ed. 1941);. RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION 60 (1961). Cf. John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 19-
24.
27. THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDON 61 (Samuel Harvey Reynolds ed., 1892).
1998
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Convention"],28 contains no explicit reference to anything resembling
fountainhead or direct-results equity.
29
2. Trouble Starts : How Can Equity-Within-the-Law Help Here?
(a) The Need for Particularization
The ICJ was aware that the mere invocation of equity was not
enough and that a particularization and a practical approach were
necessary:
[I]t is a truism to say that the determination must be equitable;.. .it
would.. .be insufficient simply to rely on the rule of equity without
giving some degree of indication as to the possible ways in which it
might be applied in the present case.
30
For this task, the long history of equity within-the-law could have
helped. Such equity, which goes at least as far back as Aristotle, has
influenced legal practice through the Roman praetors and the English
chancellors for many centuries, and has found its way into the modern
codifications. In operation, it appears within positive law in the form at
the one end of overiding general principles and at the other of
particularizing interpretations, respectively preceding and following the
formal, strict and general rules. Another main function of such equity
is procedural, aiming to devise remedies giving fuller effect to the
norms of positive law.
28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679.
29. Of course, it is possible for nations to transfer international-law-making powers
to international organizations, as was done to a very limited extent with the United Na-
tions. In recent years, a noble but controversial and inconclusive attempt to construct a
new economic order, pursued mostly through the U.N. General Assembly, has invoked
some equity in the international distribution of wealth. At this stage, however, such eq-
uity has not taken a concrete form, but remains an aspirational and abstract goal of
states seeking to create advantageous relations in the future through multilateral agree-
ment. See generally Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International
Law (Some Aspects), in 162 HAGUE COLLECTED COURSES 245, 245-318 (1980); MOHAMMED
BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 127; ROSSI, supra note 4,
at 199-204. See also M.W. Janis, The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law, 9
BROOK.LYN J. INT'L LAW 16, 16-22 (1983).
A similar invocation at a comparable level of futurism has been included in the U.N.
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Nov. 12, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/34/664, 18 I.L.M. 1434 (equitable sharing in the benefits de-
rived from outer space resources giving special consideration to the interests and needs of
developing countries). See also Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 702 (1972).
30. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 92.
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Translating these intangible qualities into working tools of the
legal process, however, remains a most difficult process. The primary
danger is that equity will be transformed from a Panacea to a Pandora:
the gods would have given her a box containing not only all the gifts of
the world, flexibility and fairness, but also the winds of its destruction
through variability and arbitrariness, the two implacable enemies of
justice through law. In other words, the invocation of equity within the
law is not equivalent to a talismanic incantation to be followed by
whatever outcome a court wants to adopt. On the contrary, it must be
accompanied by a detailed, reasoned explanation, available for scrutiny,
of why a literal application of a rule is excessive, insufficient or
inconsistent by reference to its purpose or comes into conflict with an
identifiable overriding principle, coupled in each instance with a
justification of the proposed deviation or supplementation as the best
rectification of the perceived defect. In addition, any creative remedy
must be justified as a better technique of effectuating the purpose of the
law.
The problems of using equity in international dispute resolution
have been noted in the masterful study of C. Wilfred Jenks, who
reviewed arbitral practice and cautioned that equity's role was qualified
by four limiting factors. First, equity has been applied in claims cases
related primarily to loss and damage incurred by private persons who
are desirous of financial compensation rather than to the larger issues
which may arise in the course of international adjudication. Second,
there have been serious ambiguities relating to interpretation and to
hierarchy between equity and the other sources of international law.
Third, the actual performance of tribunals whose mandates included
reference to equity has been less than satisfactory. Fourth, it is not
clear whether and how particular decisions did in fact apply equity.
31
Against this background, the ICJ in North Sea was required to
proceed cautiously to devise a delimitation formula which was
consistent with the continental shelf positive right as the ICJ perceived
it. Given the prevalence of equidistance, the ICJ had to explain why
the exceptional adjustment through the special circumstances window
was insufficient to take care of any equitable concerns. The
combination of a presumptive rule with a qualified exception is quite
common in legal texts, subject to standard methods of interpretation.
32
31. C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 335-336,
411-412 (1964). For the limited use of equity in international arbitration; see also ROSSI,
supra note 4, at 59-86; Lapidoth, supra note 4, at 166-168; Louis F.E. Goldie, Reconciling
Values of Distributive Equity and Management Efficiency in the International Commons,
in THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ON THE NEW NATURAL RESOURCES 335, 338-339 (Rene-
Jean Dupuy ed., 1983); and George Schwarzenberger, Equity in International Law, in
1972 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 346-369.
32. See Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 126, pointing out that under
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Unfortunately, this was not done in any systematic, principled and
articulate way. We must not hesitate to criticize the ICJ for this
failure, which has burdened the delimitation process ever since. Let us
take up the three equitable considerations, principles, circumstances
and results, proposed by the ICJ in North Sea separately, starting with
equitable principles.
(b) What Equitable Principles?
The idea that there are some fundamental maxims within a legal
system which may qualify positive legal rights is well established. 33
More to the point, it would appear that international law itself
incorporates such principles either inherently or through the general
principles of law of nations. Indeed, we do sometimes find references to
customary international law, the burden of proof of the existence and importance of "spe-
cial circumstances" lies on their proponent (Briggs, J., separate declaration). The distinc-
tion is important and supports the primary status of equidistance.
33. In Roman law, the effects of fraud, duress and mistake in transactions were ne-
gated through equitable principles. These principles also included notions such that vol-
untary transactions should be interpreted and implemented in good faith, and the inten-
tion of the parties should prevail even if there are irregularities as to form (doctrine of
bonitary ownership and enforcement of the fideicommisum); that unjust enrichment must
be reversed; that a condition of rebus sic standibus should be implied in bargains; and
that unconscionably unequal bargains should not be enforced (doctrine of laesio enormis).
See Peter Stein, Equitable Principles in Roman Law, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL
SYSTEMS 75 (1973).
The prevailing terminology in the Roman, and later in the Germanic, legal systems quite
often avoided the word "equity" in these contexts, referring instead to "the general princi-
ples of law." A typical and central example of such principle is the notion dolus omnia
currumpit (fraud corrupts all), which tempers the strict norms of pacta sunt servanda
(promises must be kept), and caveat emptor (let the buyer beware).
By and large, modern continental legislators have enacted most of these innovations into
positive law, and even have incorporated and expanded the foundational principles them-
selves, e.g. through the doctrine of "abuse of right," within the codes, especially the Civil
Codes and the Codes of Civil Procedure, so that now not only is their legitimacy beyond
question, but also the reconciliation between the spirit and the letter of the law has be-
come mandatory.
It is these general principles that were at the heart of equity practice in England over the
centuries, and were later exported to the four corners of the Anglo-American world. In-
deed, there are striking parallels between the principles of Roman aequitas and those of
English equity. To the preceding enumeration, the clearer protection in English Equity of
reliance interests through the concept of estoppel and the crystallization of various max-
ims such the clean hands doctrine, the reciprocity notion articulated under the tenant of
discussion of "he who seeks equity must do equity" and the like. For a fuller discussion of
the operation of equitable principles in both systems, see Ralph A. Newman, Equity in
Comparative Law, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 807, 807-48 (1968). See generally Ralph A.
Newman, Equity in the Law of the United States, in EQUITY IN THE WORLD'S LEGAL
SYSTEMS 82-109 (1973).
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equitable maxims and to doctrines such as estoppel, unjust enrichment,
clean hands, laches, non-contradiction, and prevalence of substance
over form. Equity's locus classicus in international law is the
celebrated separate opinion of Judge Manley Hudson in Diversion of
Water from the River Meuse,34 where he referred to the hardly
controversial principle of equality between the parties, and where he
applied the equitable doctrine of clean hands (or 'he who seeks equity
must do equity') to reject the Dutch claim. 35 The task of the ICJ in
North Sea on this issue, therefore, was to name, to defend and to apply
any equitable principles or maxims relevant to delimitations. Quite
appropriately, the ICJ in fact did consider the possibility of using of
estoppel against Germany, but found that there was no factual support
for it.36 The only other equitable principle that qualified and that the
ICJ considered was "equality." The ICJ refered to the obvious notion
that equal things should be treated equally, but at this level of
generality this meant little more than that equal coasts should get
equal shares of shelf. This begged the questions of what makes one
coast equal to another, and of how this equality is to be implemented in
drawing the lines. The ICJ gave a major clue by treating equidistance
as appropriate for states with opposite coasts because basically it
produces an "equal division of the particular area involved."37 What
then made the results of equidistance unequal in adjacencies? Since
equality cannot operate in a vacuum, it was then incumbent on the ICJ
to identify those features of the coast (the source of the right) that were
relevant to delimitation, and that distinguished opposite from adjacent
coasts. This meant that a prior particularizing interpretation of the
continental shelf right was needed. In other words, a second-level
equitable operation had to be conducted.
That equitable principles by themselves offered no help here should
come as no surprise. Their typical function is to limit the excessive or
inappropriate exercise of already existing rights, not to define and to
delineate them in the first place.38 The basic irrelevance of free-range
34. Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. BeIg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
70, at 76-78 (June 28).
35. The clean-hands principle surfaced later in decisions such as Military and Para-
military Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 393-394 (June 27) (Judge Schwebel dis-
senting). A similar kind of equity surfaces in international arbitration, where the com-
promis sometimes refers the conjunctive or disjunctive to "justice," "equity," "public law,"
"good faith," or even "international law" or the "law of the nations." For examples, see
MIYOSHI, supra note 4, at 21-70.
36. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 30. See generally I.C. MacGibbon, Estoppel in In-
ternational Law, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 512 (1958).
37. Id. paras. 57, 79-80.
38. While "equity" in general is not recognized as a formal source of international
law, and has been deliberately excluded from Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, we do encounter in the cases some references to the general
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equitable principles in maritime delimitations has now been confirmed
by UNCLOS. The formula that eventually found its way into Articles
74(1) and 83(1) speaks of delimitations:
on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the
maxims of equitable nature. For an overview, see Mark W. Janis, Equity in International
Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (1992). See also Rothpfeffer,
supra note 4, at 82-87; OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
49-65 (1991); Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 801, 808-825 (1976); Mark W. Janis, The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law, 9
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7, 8-13 (1983); and Lapidoth, supra note 4, passim. For an admiring
view, see Louis B. Sohn, The Role of Equity in the Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice, in MELANGES GEORGES PERRIN 303-312 (B. Dutoit & E. Grisel eds.,
1984). Whether such maxims have already become part of customary international law or
keep finding their way into international law through the gate of the general principles
recognized by the nations of the world is an interesting theoretical question with little
practical consequence here. Another such question is whether these maxims trace their
roots to the venerable common law (and Roman law) tradition of equity. While this an-
cestry is historically more than obvious, it is technically correct to say that the search for
them is not confined to such tradition. See ROSSI, supra note 4, at 121-124.
Sections 102 and 903 of the recent RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1987) contain some typically ambiguous language on these
theoretical issues. Section 102, Sources of International Law, Comment (in) reads as fol-
lows:
Equity as a general principle. Reference to principles of equity, in the
sense of what is fair and just, is common to major legal systems, and
equity has been accepted as a principle of international law in several
contexts [giving, however, only the example of maritime delimita-
tions]. That principle is not to be confused with references to "eq-
uity"... in traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence ....
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987),
cmt. m. See § 903, Reporters' Note 9.
Reporters' Note 9 to 102 recognizes, however, that: "The principle of equity is frequently
invoked in discourse between states but there are few references to equity as a legal prin-
ciple in international judicial decisions" [citing only the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case of
1974 and the maritime delimitations]." In addition, in Reporters' Note 9 to 903, it is
stated that a decision ex aequo et bono:
should be distinguished from application by the Court of the basic
principles of equity that are part of customary international law ....
In two cases related to maritime boundaries [Tunisia-Libya and Libya-
Malta], the Court was authorized by the parties to apply, and did ap-
ply, equitable principles.
This language raises more questions than it answers. Is there one principle of equity or
many principles of equity? Beyond the "fair and just" truism, are there any special char-
acteristics of equity as to content and function? Indeed, is there any difference between
legal and equitable principles? Is party agreement required for the application of equita-
ble principles? Be that as it may, there is little doubt that certain general maxims,
whether labeled "legal" or "equitable", do apply in international adjudication. What is
important here is to get an understanding of the nature and scope of these principles or
maxims and of their function within international law.
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International ICJ of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
Thus, the high winds 39 of equitable principles, that risked
mistaking "obscurity for profundity, '40 blew away.
(c) What Relevant Circumstances and Reasonable Results?
Perhaps the next considerations, relevant circumstances and
reasonable results, can help particularize our interpretation by
identifying those particular features of the coasts that matter so that
equality has something to measure and to calculate.
Aristotle was the first major philosopher to propose and to explain
how this type of particularizing equitable process works. The notion of
equity (epeikeia) as an enemy or an antagonist of the law is alien to
Aristotle. Equity is not better than the law, but only better law. 41
Equity goes beyond the words of the statute only to make redress of its
imperfection traceable to its generality, 42 which is inevitable because it
is virtually impossible to draft a text which will anticipate all potential
sets of facts.43 Equity only puts the law on the intended track; it does
not correct it.44 The exercise of discretion is perverted where it leads to
deliberate departures from the law, and to the substitution of
unmediated intuitions. The ideal statute should aim to cover
everything, leaving as little discretion as possible to those who apply
it.45 Thus, Aristotle views the judges not as creators of substantive law
through equity, but only as procedural effectuators of pre-existing
norms.
Aristotle falls back to his famous doctrine of teleological
interpretation on the crucial question of how to make the transition
from the generality and incompleteness of the law to the appropriate
specific rule and to a reasonable result. The rule is but an instrument
for the implementation of a purpose. Its spirit may be discovered by
39. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1212, para. 36 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
40. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. at 139, (Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
41. Aristotle, Ethics, in COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE E. 14.1137b. 9 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aristotle, Ethics].
42. Id. at 27.
43. Id. at 14-15. Compare Aristotle, Rhetoric, in COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE A.
13.1374a. 26-33 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aristotle,Rhetoric] with Aris-
totle, Politics, in COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE C. 12.1282b. 1, C. 16.1287a. 23 (Jona-
than Barnes ed., 1984) [hereinafter Aristotle, Politics] ("[Tihe judges should decide about]
what the statutes are incapable of covering with precision because it is not easy to cover
everything through general rules").
44. Aristotle-Politics, supra note 43, at 12-13, 22, 26. See also Aristotle-Rhetoric, su-
pra note 43.
45. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, supra note 43, at 1353b. 31-33. Cf. Plato, Laws, 820.C &
934.B; Plato, Politics, 291 & 295.
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focusing "not on the statute but on the legislator; not on the words but
on the mind of the legislator; not on the act but on the intention; not on
the part but on the whole."46 This search for purpose and for context
does not stop at the specific statute (equity of the statute), but extends
to the legal system as a whole.
Aristotelian teleology opened the door beyond the letter of the rules
to the overall requirement of crafting specific remedies in order to give
the purpose of the law its fullest effectuation. This was at the heart of
subsequent equitable practice.47 Aristoteleian epieikeia and the Roman
and Anglo-American practice point the way to the proper uses of equity
within international law. No lesser authority than Hugo Grotius
thought of equity in the same spirit.
48
The Vienna Convention uses a similar process in treaty
interpretation. Article 31.1 provides that:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose.
Article 31.2 defines context very narrowly to cover prior related
language and action by the parties, and Article 31.3-4 gives weight to
subsequent actions and expressed intentions of the parties as well as to
46. Aristotle-Ethics, supra note 41, at E. 1374b. 11-15.
47. The Roman classical aequitas codified into a jus honorarium the extraordinary
remedies developed through the praetorian formulae. The rigidity and technicality of the
jus civile, which recognized only one form of legis actio, was moderated by the judicial
creation of additional remedies. These were either supplementary and more convenient,
(specific performance and additional remedies to recover possession), or novel, (enforcing
the possessory rights not only of an owner but also of a pledge-creditor), or even creative
(recognizing the rights of legatees under an informal will as against the heirs in intes-
tacy). See H.F. Jolowicz, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION To THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 98
(1952). See also Sir Henry Maine, ANCIENT LAW 618-22 (1931).
In all these instances, the extraordinary remedy was intended to give effect either to the
purpose of the related rule or to reflect certain principles that permeated the entire legal
system. In England, as concerns remedies, the rigidity of the writs and forms of action
was moderated by the availability of a host of forms of relief, (specific performance, rescis-
sion, reformation, restitution, constructive trust, accounting) including orders which re-
strained the person, such as injunctions and mandates, rather than remedies that were
enforceable only against property. See HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY & RONALD HARLING
MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY 3-45 (13th ed. 1985); and J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 83-100 (2d ed. 1979), for an overview regarding legal remedies.
48. The letter of the law must be adjusted to reflect its purpose when it becomes de-
fective in application because of its generality:
For since all cases can neither be foreseen nor expressed, there is ne-
cessity for some liberty for excepting cases which he who has spoken
would except if he were present. But this is not to be done rashly; (for
that would be for the interpreter to determine the acts of another); but
on sufficient indications.
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS, BOOK TWO, ch. xvi, para. 26 (1901).
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the relevant rules of international law (broader context). Other than
plain meaning and context, this language at most imports good faith
and teleology, but does not give free-wheeling authority to resort to
some form of generic justice or equity.
In this spirit, before a feature of the coast can be characterized as
relevant, and before a result can be qualified as reasonable, they must
be connected to the source of the right, the coastal extension of
territorial sovereignty. Likewise, the sole ultimate requirement in
UNCLOS of an equitable solution suggests again that any particular
rules should not be applied blindly ignoring or contradicting the basic
concept and purpose of the related maritime rights.
49
In delimitations, it bears repeating that we are dealing with a
limited, geography-based, property-type right existing ab initio and ipso
facto. The sole issue is appurtenance to a coast. Any form of
distributive justice has no place here, and the invocation of some
magical equity is hardly useful.Occasionally, we also see the exercise of
some remedial discretion in determining the amount of damages or
reasonable compensation for claims of loss or nationalization. 50
(d) Equidistance Versus Natural Prolongation, Natural
Resources and Coastal Length
The ICJ in North Sea identified three items which could have
qualified as potentially relevant objective features of the coast, and
therefore could be treated as relevant circumstances : 1) undersea
continuation of the land mass (natural prolongation, especially geology
and geomorphology); 2) the location of natural resources; and 3) length
of the coastal front. In the abstract, all of these features could have
been evaluated in equity as against the distance from the coastline
criterion, which undergirds equidistance, in terms of the essense and
purpose of the continental shelf right. In the concrete case factual
matrix of North Sea, however, it was quite apparent that only the
coastal length factor had to be weighed against equidistance. Indeed,
the only concern of the ICJ was that under equidistance, Germany, a
state with a sea frontage comparable in length to that of the two
adjacent states, 51  would get a much smaller and grossly
49. The term 'reasonable' result used in North Sea is more apt than 'equitable' solu-
tion as it suggests more clearly the instrumental function of testing the outcome against
the purpose and nature of the right, rather than evaluating it under some external or
subjective criteria. But see North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 36 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion)
(criticizing this resort to the morally neutral notion of 'reasonable').
50. See Rossi, supra note 5, at 81-83; Thomas M. Franck & Dennis M. Sughrue, The
International Role of Equity-as-Fairness, 81 GEO. L.J. 563, 564-569 (1993); Lapidoth, su-
pra note 5, at 167-169.
51. ROSsI, supra note 5, at 89, 91, 98.
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disproportionate share because of its concavity. 52 This is because
simple distance automatically magnifies the slightest irregularity of the
coastline in adjacent delimitations.5 3 The greater the irregularity and
the greater the distance the more unreasonable the results.5 4 This
exaggeration of the consequences of geography created distortions
leading to inequity. 55 Thus, the ICJ was persuaded that the surface-
distance-proximity 56 approach did not fully incarnate here the
legitimate projections of the coast. It is these distortions that should be
corrected by searching for a reasonable result, taking into account the
relevant circumstances. 57 The coast-length proportionality correction
would have completely taken care of the ICJ's concerns, and there was
no need to refer to anything else.5 8 But the majority insisted on
addressing all three considerations, and most of the North Sea opinion
is in the nature of dicta, and confusing dicta at that.
First, the ICJ's fixation on an undefined concept of natural
prolongation 59 created considerable ambiguity in an area where
guidelines were needed. Furthermore, treating natural prolongation as
a separate consideration outside the equitable formula, thus suggesting
a two-track approach, added another burdensome layer to the process.
Second, the reference to the unity of the deposits of the shelf to avoid
prejudicial or wasteful exploitation of straddling resources 60  as
something to negotiate about,61 maked good practical sense. However,
it was accompanied by an ambiguous statement suggesting that where
52. See for example, Thomas M. Frank & Dennis M. Sughrue, The International Role
of Equity-as-Fairness, 81 GEO. L.J. 563, 576-580 (1993); Paul Reuter, Quelques reflections
sur l'equite en droit international, 15 REV. BELGE DR. INT'L 165, 174-75 (1980), for the
view that proportionality is the only legacy of North Sea.
53. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 87.
54. Id. Germany had produced a chart showing that a 100-mile straight coast, which
under equidistance normally would have received five times as much continental shelf as
a parallel, equally straight coast of 20 miles to 200 miles, would lose close to 1/3 of it
(about 6,000 square miles) if the latter coast had just a five mile protruding headland.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den./Neth.) 1993 I.C.J. Pleadings 2, 29.
55. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 89(a), 91.
56. See id. paras. 39-43 (discussing the not always clear distinction between 'adja-
cency' and 'proximity').
57. Id. para. 90.
58. Some of the judges held even stronger and clearer views about this being the key
corrective factor to equidistance. See id. para. 15 (Morelli, J., dissenting) (stating that a
remarkable disproportion' between length of coastline and continental shelf share is of a
gravely inequitable nature'); id. para. 4 (Bustamante y Rivero, J., separate opinion)
(wishing that proportionality be treated not just as a factor but as an obligatory principle,
and he would have also counted as part of the shelf the seabed under the territorial sea).
See id. at 92 (Nervo, J., separate opinion); see id. paras. 43, 51, 56 (Ammoun, J., separate
opinion).
59. Id. para. 85.
60. Id. para. 97.
61. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 97; see also id. paras. 94, 95, 101(a)-(d).
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the areas appertaining to the parties where resources are located
overlap, failing agreement, either such areas must be divided equally or
they must be jointly explored, especially to preserve the unity of a
deposit. 62 Some judges disagreed, denying that the location of seabed
resources has anything to do with the lines of demarcation; 63 this is
generally supported by state practice. 64  Now the voluntary joint
exploration of straddling deposits presents no problems. 65  The
alternative language about equal division, however, certainly cannot
mean that when there are deposits anywhere in the overlapping areas,
they should be divided in such a way as to attribute them in shares
equal in size. 66 If that were the case, a tiny island facing a large
landmass would get up to half of the deposits and possible shelf, which
is a reductio ad absurdum. The plausible way to read this contextually
is to connect it to the ICJ's commitment to natural prolongation. Where
natural prolongations overlap and where resources are located within
this overlap, they should be divided equally. Third, by understating the
importance and the sufficiency of the coast-length proportionality
adjustment, which would have taken care completely of its concerns in
the case, the ICJ was led to overstate the shortcomings of equidistance
and thus justify letting loose the genie of equity tout court. Fourth, the
suggestion that there was no limit to the potentially relevant
considerations in such a concrete field of law generated doubts on
whether we were not turning to abstract and distributive justice after
all, despite loud disclaimers, rather than applying the standard
interpretive particularization that was really needed.
Backing out of the commitment to a futile search for natural
prolongation was relatively easy and painless for the courts, and does
not deserve much comment. However, finding the way out of the
doctrinal imbroglio generated by the high-sounding but diverting
62. Id. paras. 99, 101 (c)(1-2), see also id. para. 101(d)(2) (identifying natural re-
sources as a factor to be taken into account).
63. The location of natural resources is in principle irrelevant unless 'decisive cir-
cumstances' require otherwise. They are a 'disturbing factor to the detriment of equity'.
Id. para. 5 (Bustamante y Rivero, J., separate opinion). Submarine resources are irrele-
vant. Taking these resources into account in the drawing of boundaries would amount to
an apportionment of the shelf, not its delimitation. Id. para. 53 (Ammoun, J., separate
opinion). See also id. at 168 (Koretsky, J., dissenting opinion).
64. Barbara Kwiatkowska, Economic and Environmental Consideration in Maritime
Boundary Delimitations, in IMB. 75, 106-07. (1993)[hereinafter Kwiatkowska].
65. See Bletcher, supra note 5, at 65. For examples of related state practice, see
Kwiatkowska, supra note 64, at 86-96.
66. See Ammoun, J., separate opinion, North Sea, 169 I.C.J. 3, para. 51 and Ko-
retzky, J., dissenting opinion, Id. para. 168. Cf. Gulf of Maine 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 195
and Munkman at 91. Only Jessup, J. argued expressly in favor of the general 'principle' of
joint exploitation not only of resources extending across a boundary line but also of those
lying in still undeliminated areas. Id. para. 82 (Jessup, J., separate opinion).
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references to equity has proven extraordinarily difficult. Indeed, the
best that has been accomplished even to the present day is not express
disavowal but simple shrinkage of equitable discussion to the vanishing
point. In the next sections, I will first give samples of the misbegotten
equitable doctrine of the post-North Sea cases. Then I will show how
the courts were generally successful over time and place in overcoming
it. Finally, through the interpretive particularization of an already
defined and strict regime of continental shelf and exclusive zone, I will
convert the concepts into lines on the map. Equidistance reemerged as
the dominant method in fact, if not in law, and all competing
considerations other the length of the coastal fronts were rejected on
short order. State practice by and large followed a similar path.
III. STRUGGLING WITH EQUITABLE DOCTRINE IN THE
DELIMITATION CASES AFTER NORTH SEA
In the seven important cases following the North Sea adjudication,
culminating with St. Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen, the courts
persisted in the unequivocal rejection of any intention to refashion
geography, to share resources or to depart from the coastal front. At
the same time, the pattern of ritualistically proclaiming the importance
of equitable principles and of relevant circumstances, and of pursuing
equitable results within the law, or any combination thereof, continued.
The connection, however, between these doctrinal positions and the
outcomes was anything but clear. Let us focus now on the equitable
doctrine of these cases.
Eight years after North Sea, in the Anglo-French Arbitration, the
ICJ, invoking relevant circumstances and equitable principles, 67
repeated the proposition that "an equitable delimitation... cannot have
as its object simply the awarding of an 'equitable' share... to each
Party,"68 thus at least suggesting that it was applying only equity
within the law.69 The ICJ made certain statements that sounded too
close to 'I know inequity when I see it,'70 without connecting them to the
67. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 97.
68. Id. para. 78.
69. See also para. 245.
70. "[lit is manifest from a mere glance at the map that... the Channel Islands re-
gion presents particular features and problems .... [Therefore] the equities in the region
[must be balanced]." Id. paras. 180, 187.
For serious criticism of the equitable doctrine of the Court, see Brownlie, supra note 29, at
287:
[The equitable principles of the Court] amount to no more than a bun-
dle of highly impressionistic ideas about the 'distorting effect', so-
called, of islands. Employed in this way, 'equitable principles' became
merely faint indication of the reasoning, or the unreasoned premises,
on which judicial discretion can be excused ....
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eventual outcome. Later in Tunisia-Libya, the ICJ had been invited "to
take account of equitable principles and the relevant circumstances
which characterize the area, as well as the recent trends admitted at
the Third.Conference of the Law of the Sea."71 Under this carte blanche,
the ICJ majority, consisting of seven of the thirteen judges, made some
vague statements about the cardinal importance of equitable princi-
ples, 72 and about the legal concept of equity being a direct emanation of
the idea of justice, binding on the ICJ as a general principle directly
applicable, but emptying it of content by disassociating it from the
Roman-English tradition. 73 The ICJ continued on this inconclusive
track with the statement that, under equity, "a court may choose among
several possible interpretations of law the one which appears, in the
light of the circumstances of the case, to be closest to the requirements
of justice."74 But is this not the task of every court applying all law
anyway? Furthermore, how can we give meaning to the requirements
of justice and the circumstances of the case here except by reference to
the preexisting context and the purpose of the law of maritime rights
and delimitations? What do we add or gain by calling this process
equitable? The ICJ ultimately purported to apply equitable principles
seeking equitable results.75 But how do the principles relate to the
results? Well, here is what has been aptly called by a noted publicist a
startling conclusion76:
The result of the application of equitable principles must be equitable.
This terminology, which is generally used, is not entirely satisfactory
because it employs the term equitable to characterize both the result to
be achieved and the means to be applied to reach this result. It is,
however, the result which is predominant; the principles are
subordinate to the goal. The equitableness of a principle must be
assessed in the light of its usefulness for the purpose of arriving at an
equitable result. It is not every such principle which is in itself
equitable; it may acquire this quality by reference to the equitableness
of the solution.77
See also Blecher, supra note 5, at 87-88.
71. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, at 21. See, however, the cautious treatment of this
broad mandate by the Court. Id. para. 24.
72. Id. para. 44.
73. Id. para. 71.
74. Id.
75. Id. para. 70.
76. See HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 225. Such language suggests "first the judgment,
then the evidence." Krateros M. Ioannou, Some Preliminary Remarks on Equity in the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, in THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 104 (C. L. Rozakis &
C. A. Stephanous, eds. 1983).
77. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahirya), 1982
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Does all of this tell us how to find out whether a result is equitable?
Can it be equitable if it does not derive from equitable principles?
Conversely, is it possible for equitable principles to produce inequitable
results? Well, the ICJ concluded later:
[I]t is clear that what is reasonable and equitable must depend on its par-
ticular circumstances. There can be no doubt that it is virtually impossible to
achieve an equitable solution in any delimitation without taking into account
the particular relevant circumstances which characterize the area.
78
The relevant considerations must be balanced up.7 9 Wait a minute!
Are we not back at square one? How do we know through equity what
circumstances are relevant and how much they weigh?80 Dissenting
Judges Oda, Gros and Evensen questioned the meaningful applicability
of such equity in the case. Judge Gros pointed out that North Sea
provided not only a goal, "equitable delimitation.. .which intrinsically is
merely to pose the problem without providing the solution," but also the
rules and methods for reaching it,81 and criticized the ICJ for contenting
itself "with some generalities on the equidistance method without
giving the reasons why it would unquestionably 'lead to inequity.
'8 2
Indeed, "this lack of a systematic search for the equitable has produced
a result the equity of which remains to be proved."8 3 Only the "presence
in the area ... of geographical features, the effect of which is
disproportionate to their relevance" should be taken into account.8
4
Judge Evensen quoted Maitland to the effect that "equity came not to
destroy the law but to fulfil it."85 In other words, you cannot use equity
unless there is prior law: "equity principles cannot operate in a
void .... [In North Sea and the Anglo-French Arbitration] the
I.C.J. 18, para. 70.
78. Id. para. 72.
79. Id. para. 71.
80. In his separate opinion in Jan Mayen Judge Weeramantry tried to give an exam-
ple of an equitable result: equidistance when there is a vast difference in the length of the
coasts. para. 34. See also paras. 35-42. This should instead serve as a perfect example of
why this kind of terminology and distinction is unhelpful. Both from the coast and length
of the coast may be relevant considerations in the delimitation of the continental shelf,
deriving from its very definition. To the extent that they produce different results and
must be balanced up. What does this have to do with equitable principles not producing
equitable results? The confusion inherent in the Weeramantry approach become more
apparent in another of his passages, "The stress upon the need for an equitable solution
and the rejection of any solution which, though reached in accordance with equity, is in-
equitable, is thus one which has philosophical support." Id. para. 109.
81. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 10. (Gros, J., dissenting opinion).
82. Id. para. 11.
83. Id.
84. Id. para. 13.
85. Id. para. 12 (Evensen, J., dissenting opinion).
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equidistance principle was applied as a juridical starting point for the
application of equity."8 6 Judge Oda characterized the equitable
references as amounting to a truism, to the "principle of non-principle,"
leading to a line not supported by any considerations.8
7
Gulf of Maine comes next, involving the single boundary of the
continental shelf and the fishery zone between Canada and the United
States [hereinafter U.S.].88 The U.S. argued natural prolongation and
historical fishing, distinguishing also between primary and secondary
coasts. Canada proposed instead equitable equidistance, excluding
certain U.S. coasts, acquiescence and economic repercussions. The
Chamber basically rejected all of these contentions, 89 but could find
nothing specific in international law effectuating the equitable criteria
and methods.90 For example, the principle that "delimitation must be
effected by agreement or recourse to a third-party" produces no
answers. 91 Well, then, where are we going to find some guidance?
Perhaps in the prior cases and in the literature. But the Chamber was
committed to the idea that "each specific case is, in the final analysis,
different from all the others... it is monotypic. '92
At the same time, while there has been no systematic definition of
the relevant equitable criteria, here are some examples: (a) the land
dominates the sea; (b) equal division of the areas of overlap; (c) non-
encroachment and no cut-off; (d) proportionality to the length of coast
lines; (e) preservation of vital existing fishing patterns; (f) optimum
conservation and management of living resources; and (g) lines which
reduce the potential for future disputes.93
One thing is immediately apparent. There is no connection
between these criteria and what is known as equity. Their content is
different from that of the traditional equitable principles, and their
function is neither to override nor to remedy the unintended effects of a
rigid rule. Indeed, they constitute mere attempted particularizations of
the concepts of the maritime zones in question. Incidentally, the
86. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 12.
87. Id. paras. 1, 38, 155 (Oda, J., separate opinion). For a similar view, see Jonathan
Charney, Ocean Boundaries Between Nations, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.582, 586-87. For a de-
tailed exploration of the views of Oda as judge and publicists in this field, see Barbara
Kwiatkowska, Judge Shigeru Oda's Opinion in Law-of-the-Sea Cases: Equitable Maritime
Boundary Delimitation, 15 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 225-294.
88. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 79, 98-99, 112.
89. Id. paras. 36, 57-59, 104-107, 108, 126-153, 166-172, 178-182, 237-238.
90. Id. paras. 81, 110-111.
91. Id. paras. 90, 112.
92. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 81.
93. Id. paras. 110, 157. It is interesting to note that the Chamber treated equidis-
tance not as a principle but only as a method implementing the first two of these princi-
ples. Id. paras. 159, 178.
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Chamber recognized real equitable principles in the discussion of
estoppel, acquiescence and modus vivendi.94 Judge Gros was quite
eloquent in his doctrinal challenge to this equitable weathervane.
95
Coming to the equitable solution, the Chamber suggested that the
method itself is not equitable, but solely instrumental. 96 The examples
of method included (a) median line, (b) lateral equidistance, (c) line
perpendicular to the coast where the territories meet, (d) line
perpendicular to the general direction of the coast, (e) boundary
prolonging the existing division of territorial waters, and (f) boundary
prolonging the direction of the final segment of the land boundary or of
its overall direction. 97 Thus, contrary to Libya-Tunisia, the equitable
solution has no meaning of its own, but only effectuates the relevant
criteria. The solution was also subjected to an ultimate test of not being
radically inequitable, meaning "likely to entail catastrophic
repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the
population of the countries concerned."98  We may again wonder
whether anything was gained by using the equitable label. The
Chamber then turned to the old chestnut of looking to the facts and
circumstances of each case.99 This sounds fine, but what does it mean
that "the equitableness [of a criterion] can only be assessed in relation
to the circumstances of each case, and for one and the same criterion it
is quite possible to arrive at different, or even opposite, conclusions in
different cases?". 10 0 It is all well and good if it refers to the obvious fact
94. Id. para. 152.
95.
[I]f there is any legal concept to which each attaches his own meaning,
it is equity ... [Elquity does not consist in a successive search for
equality, proportionality, result; each of these considerations is a way
of applying equity, it is a choice made in the manner of applying the
law, and not an accumulation of equities which there is nothing to for-
bid supplementing with such others as one may glimpse in that frame
of mind. One must not narrow down the law of delimitation to two
words, agreement plus equity, only to equate that with judicial discre-
tion .... By introducing disorder into the conception of equitable
principles, and freedom for the judge to pick and choose relevant cir-
cumstances and criteria, the Court [in Tunisia-Libya has], given eq-
uity in maritime delimitation this doubtful content of indeterminate
criteria, methods and corrections which are now wholly result-
oriented .... Equity discovered by an exercise of discretion is not a
form of application of law ... It is no more conclusive to say that a re-
sult is equitable than to say that it is just, if the judge doe not refer to
an order of equity or justice.
Id. paras. 27, 29, 37, 39.
96. Id. para. 199. See generally id. paras. 159, 191.
97. Id. para. 159.
98. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 237.
99. Id. para. 158. See generally id. para. 81.
100. Id. para. 158.
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that the same criterion may produce different outcomes in different
circumstances, and if the Chamber had in mind such truisms as, for
example, that short coasts generate shorter shelves than longer coasts
or that a criterion that deals with islands is irrelevant in an island-free
delimitation. But we must raise an eyebrow if the idea is that the very
same criterion, for example, proportionality or even more specific ones
such as 'the land dominates the sea' is sometimes equitable and
sometimes not. Such statements would not only be implausible but also
circuitous and question-begging. Obviously, we would then need
another set of standards to help us decide what makes a particular
criterion equitable in a particular context. It is also disturbing that the
Chamber, in the same spirit of doctrinal escape, emphasized that
maritime delimitations are monotypical, which "preclude[s] the
possibility of those conditions arising which are necessary for the
formation of principles and rules of customary law giving specific
provisions for subjects like those just mentioned."' 01
In Guinea-Guinea/Bissau, two neighboring African states
submitted to arbitration the delimitation of their three maritime zones
by a single line. Natural prolongation, 10 2 old treaties, 10 3 economic
factors and security' 04 were conceded or found irrelevant. The
submission called for the application of international law, and it was
agreed that the key objective was to find an equitable solution. 10 5 How
can this be achieved? This can be achieved by recourse to "factors and
methods based on considerations of law."'0 6 Which ones? The Tribunal
merely emphasized that each case of delimitation is a unicum, and
referred to the "characteristics peculiar to the region."'
07
In Libya-Malta, the standard was the "rules and principles of
international law."'08  Libya argued that this means equitable
principles, relevant circumstances and equitable results which in this
case led to natural prolongation and reasonable proportionality to
coastlines. 0 9 Malta countered with "international law in order to
achieve an equitable solution," which in this case translated to
equidistance. 1 0
In terms of doctrine, this is a landmark case because the ICJ finally
101. Id. para. 81.
102. Id. paras. 116-117. See generally id. para. 19.
103. Id. para. 86.
104. Id. paras. 121-24.
105. Id. para. 89.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. at 16.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id.
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began the process of extrication from the morass of equitable theory."'
To be sure, it started with certain banal quotes about equity from North
Sea and Tunisia-Libya.112 In the same breadth, however, in some
memorable phrases, the ICJ transcended them and stressed the need
both for predictability and for reasoned decision-making, thus
rehabilitating the importance of recognizable principles of general
application and raising doubts about the uniqueness of each case and
the possibility of seeking equity through ad hoc results. 1 3 The ICJ also
rejected the notion that: "[T]here is no legal limit to the considerations
[which may be taken into account]. . . it is evident that only those that
are pertinent to the institution of the continental shelf ... will qualify
for inclusion.' '114 Some of the other judges also strongly supported these
views. Some judges even held the opinion that the majority did not go
far enough. 115 The decision was accompanied by voluminous separate
and dissenting opinions and declarations." 6 Finally, the ICJ made clear
that these so-called maritime equitable principles are mostly negative,
saying no more than do not mess with geography: do not refashion
geography, do not compensate for the inequalities of (objective) nature,
do not engage in distributive justice, and do not encroach on another's
shelf.117 Furthermore, the equality of states does not mean equal shares
of shelf,118 and neither natural prolongation nor economic factors
count." 9
The impact of the redescription of the issues in Libya-Malta in
111. Id. paras. 26-29.
112. Id. para. 45.
113. Id. paras. 45-46, 76.
114. Id. para. 48.
115. "The judicial task is to make the law more determinable by objective criteria, and
thus make more predictable to potential parties .... Facts and circumstances to be taken
into consideration must be as objective an intelligible as possible." Id. para. 114 (Mosler,
J., dissenting opinion.). Judge Oda suggested that referring to equitable principles, equi-
table results and relevant circumstances 'merely amounts to an uninformative rear-
rangement of the terms of the. .. question." Equity "at most...can be held to proscribe the
frame of mind in which the negotiators should approach their task." Id. para. 33 (Oda, J.,
dissenting opinion). Marine Equity is not a means of pursuing world social justice. Id.
para. 66. Judges Rouda, Bejaoui, and de Arechaga, had the following reflections in their
separate opinions on the "praetorian subjectivism" of the equity in maritime delimita-
tions: '[The] "fundamental norm" ... of the equitable result.. is as uninstructive as it is
all embracing .... [E]quity.. though a highly respective legal concept is inequitably
measured with a "human" yardstick... and remains mysterious.' Id. para. 37. On the
other hand, Judge Sette-Camara, in a separate opinion, was not comfortable with this
"over conceptualization of the application of principles." Id. at 63.
116. Seventeen judges sat on the case. Six judges wrote or supported separate
opinions, three judges filed dissenting opinions and there was one declaration. Thus, the
main opinion reflected the views of the plurality of the Court.
117. Id. para. 46.
118. Id. para. 54.
119. Id. para. 25.
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terms of the maritime rights themselves rather than in equitable
verbiage has been felt in the two major subsequent cases of St.Pierre-
Miquelon and Jan Mayen, where the majority opinions barely use the
"E" word beyond a decorative function. In St.Pierre & Miquelon, the
composite fundamental norm of equitable principles or criteria, relevant
circumstances and equitable results was mentioned, 20 only to be soon
forgotten, the ICJ making clear that "[g]eographical features are at the
heart of the delimitation process," 12 1 and are proceeding to specific
applications.
On the heels of St.Pierre-Miquelon came Jan Mayen, with a similar
dilemma of a tiny island claiming a vast segment of the ocean as its
shelf and fishery zone against a massive opposing mainland. The ICJ
adopted a modified median line. Did equity provide any guidelines?
We will look in vain in the majority opinion for any real equitable
discussion. Indeed, the single reference that qualifies is a quote from
Libya-Malta stating that only pertinent considerations count which,
coupled with a promise to consult the practice of states and the cases,
suggests that free-wheeling equity must be reigned in to avoid
arbitrariness and to strengthen predictability.' 22 The basic approach of
the ICJ was merely to add the equitable label to whatever factual
factors were chosen on their own merits. Judge Schwebel articulated
an even more jaundiced view of equity, and expressed concern that the
ICJ used the equitable labels at will to divide certain fishing resources
in a manner as supportable as any of its alternatives. The anti-equity
language in his separate opinion is quite potent:
[I]f what is equitable is as variable as the weather of the Hague, then
this innovation [equal access to certain areas] may be seen as, and may
be, as defensible and desirable as another 123 .. , the obscure measure
of adjustment of the median line between Libya and Malta appears to
have had the benefit of inspiration, if divine, then from Roman
gods124 ... the authority to seek an equitable solution by the
application of a law whose principles remain largely undefined affords
the ICJ an exceptional measure of judicial discretion125 . .. the ICJ
120. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, para. 38.
121. Id. para. 24. Judge Weil, in a dissenting opinion, criticized the Tribunal for
adopting a position amounting to "I know an equitable result when I see it" which is con-
trary to the principles and corrective equity of Libya-Malta, Anglo-French Arbitration and
North Sea. In his view, the Result her constituted an injustice committed in the name of
equity. Id. paras. 29-30. His apparent substitute principle of drawing a line far enough
to assure "a sufficient maritime territory" and not too close to "threaten sovereign inter-
ests" is, however, vulnerable to a similar charge.
122. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 57-58.
123. Id. at 120. See also Judge Oda's dissent, id. paras. 1, 90-100.
124. Id. at 125.
125. Id. at 128.
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leavens its Judgment with a large infusion of equitable ferment ... and
so concocts a conclusion which does not lend itself to dissection or, for
that matter, dissent.126
On the other hand, in Judge Weeramantry's separate opinion in
Jan Mayen we are exposed to the lengthiest yet most judicial
elaboration of equitable doctrine. This constitutes a challenge that
must be addressed. 127 That opinion is mostly a learned treatise on
equity in general, as well as in international law and in maritime
delimitations, exploring in detail its historical and conceptual
dimensions. The question that needs to be answered, however, is
whether this doctrinal discussion had anything to do with the issues of
the case. The approach of Judge Weeramantry was more or less the
following. First, he cited the multiple equitable labels used by the ICJ
in the past to embellish its particular choices. 128 But there was no
examination of whether the label affected the choice of what was
relevant and where to draw the line. 129 Second, he called equity the
creative force which animates the life of international law, citing the
concept of international mandates and trusts, good faith, pacta sunt
servanda, ius cogens, unjust enrichment, rebus sic standibus abuse of
rights, 30 prescription, reciprocity, equality in court,' 3' estoppel,
fairness, reasonableness, 1 32 use of one's property as not to harm oth-
ers, 33 as well as the audi alteram partem rule, 34 and the notions that
equity looks to the intent rather than to the form, and that a person
must not act contrary to his own representation on the faith of which
others have acted. 35 However, do these lofty concepts give us any
guidance on how to address the main controversies on the drawing of
maritime boundaries? Third, he tried to distinguish maritime equity
from absolute equity and ex aequo et bono, but only at the level of
rhetoric. 136 Particularly disturbing is his proposition that relevant
circumstances means all conceivable factors unless a rule of law
excludes them, 137 rather than the other way around. Fourth, he
126. Id.
127. Judge Ajibola also separately engaged in an abstract dithyrumb for equity. Id. at
280-314.
128. Id. paras. 60, 62-65, 68, 70, 75, 87, and 90-92.
129. Id. para. para. 5-10.
130. Id. paras. 16-17.
131. Id. para. 84.
132. Id. para. 110.
133. Id. para. 145.
134. Id. para. 25.
135. Id. para. 48.
136. Id. paras. 20, 52-64.
137. Id. para. 26. However we find a contrary statement in para. 150: "The decision
whether a matter has relevance or not would naturally be dependent also on any applica-
ble rules of law, for, the equity the Court is here using is not Equity not equity contra le-
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repeated in many places that not only equitable principles but also
equitable procedures and results are important. Fine, but which ones
are relevant here, why, and how do they work? Fifth, he cautioned
against viewing equity in the Roman and Anglo-American tradition as
corrective of the insufficiencies and rigidities of the law, and viewed it
rather as a general principle. 138 But and if we detach it from this
tradition, not only do we diminish its international function but we also
empty it of content. While we cannot fail to admire Judge
Weeramantry's erudition and concern, we must not forget the dangers
to justice posed by indeterminate, subjective concepts and processes.
These dangers are all the more real if they are combined with the
notion of instinctive distributive justice under various guises, 139 with
which Judge Weeramantry flirted despite ambiguous disclaimers. 140
The crystallization over time of the elements of the maritime zones
within their own frame of reference enables us to describe and to
implement the rights directly and with greater precision, which will
both encourage submissions to adjudication and facilitate the task of
the judges. The factors named by Judge Weeramantry, such as
proportionality to coast lengths, equidistance, security, population,
economic need, prior conduct of states etc., are best dealt with on their
own terms. The equitable icing adds little, if anything.
In conclusion, it took more than a quarter century of mostly wasted
effort to realize that there was not much equity out there, and that the
boundaries of the continental shelf should be delimited directly on the
basis of internal criteria through a logical and teleological interpretive
particularizing process. At most, equity provided an umbrella of
gum."
138. Id. paras. 43-51. But see id. paras. 133-135.
139. Examples :
[The] additional juristic basis for checking a result for its equity or
inequity comes from the "sense of injustice" which has an ancient
history in the philosophy of jurisprudence'(para. 41); '[as] principles
relating to an equitable sharing of resources become more urgently
required, this route for the entry of equity will perhaps assume
increasing importance in developing the law of the sea' (para. 85);
'[a]lthough justice by its very nature is incapable of comprehensive
formulation, injustice by its very nature is often a matter of instant
detection' (para. 105); equitable... sharing of resources... is playing
an increasingly important international role, (paras. 118-120); the
relevant considerations' cannot be limited to the purely geographic' or
'geophysical' (paras. 185, 210) and population or economic factors may
be taken into account even if changeable (paras. 150, 211-219).
140. See, e.g. id. para. 60 (equity not ex aequo et bono); id. para. 62 (we should not
disregard the letter for the spirit of the law); para. 121 ("equity in the sense of distributive
justice and redistribution of wealth in not involved in [this] case").
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justification and a time lag for the courts to search for a consensus on
the components of the maritime zones and on the factors which
teleologically and practically were more consistent with the underlying
maritime rights. This process explored the implications of geographical
appurtenance without filtering them through some magical equitable
potion. UNCLOS restored the primacy of positive international law,
and preserved equity only in the exceptional form of a test of the
ultimate solution, thus placing it in the Aristotelian teleological mold.
IV. THE CURRENT SCENE IN DELIMITATIONS - BACK TO THE
FUTURE OF EQUIDISTANCE WITH OR AGAINST
PROPORTIONALITY
Starting with a brief resume of the current status of what was
rejected and what has been preserved, I will focus mainly on the
specifics of how and where to adjust, the old monster equidistance, the
white knight of equity, to the requirements of proportionality which
have not yet been explored sufficiently in the literature. I will then
consider how all of this affects the position of islands, and especially
how it plays itself out in the Aegean.
A. Clearing Up the Debris: The Rejections
1. No to Factors Unrelated to Coastal Geography
In the spirit of equity within the law, the cases progressively
limited the delimitation factors first to geography and then only to
coastal geography. As aptly put by a leading commentator:
The black letter of the law, however, has not been swallowed up in the
black hole of equity. The jurisprudence has winnowed and shed light
upon the circumstances relevant to delimitation. The legal basis of
title remains central to the idea of an equitable result. Geography
retains - or rather, has regained - its primacy over all other factors.
And natural boundary concepts have been laid to rest, probably for all
time.14
1
A state without a coast has neither continental shelf nor exclusive
economic zone. A coastal state standing alone and without a neighbor
within 200 miles is entitled to the entire shelf and zone. All coasts
count the same: there are no primary or secondary ones. States with
equal coastal geography receive equal shares.
141. Leonard Legault & Blair Hankey, Method, Oppositeness and Adjacency, and Pro-
portionality in Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
BOUNDARIES, supra note 4, at 203, 206 [hereinafter Legault & Hankey].
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This conception led to the unequivocal rejection of the following
non-geographical considerations:
(a) Demographic, social or general economic factors, which, in any
event, are ephemeral and changeable.
142
142. There was no reference to these factors in North Sea or the Anglo-French Arbi-
tration. In Tunisia-Libya, variable economic factors such as poverty and need were re-
jected. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 106-107. In Judge Oda's view, such issues as
well as the size of the population involve "global resource policies, or basic problems of
world politics which not only could not have been solved by the judicial organ of the world
community, but stray well beyond equity as a norm of law into the realm of social organi-
zation". Id. para. 157 (dissenting opinion). With the "catastrophic consequences" proviso
(para. 237), Gulf of Maine also supports the proposition that economic, social etc. consid-
erations are irrelevant. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.J.J. 246, paras. 59, 157, 196, 234-238. In
Libya-Malta, relevant circumstances did not include economic factors such as the absence
of energy resources, developing requirements and fishing activity. Libya-Malta, 1985
I.C.J. 13, para. 50. To the same effect see GuinealGuinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, paras.
122-123. In St. Pierre & Miquelon, the separate agreements on fisheries among the par-
ties had taken care of the issue of access to them eliminating the issue of "catastrophic
consequences" (Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, paras. 85-87) and the economic de-
pendence and needs were not otherwise to be taken into account. Id. para. 83. Cf. Judge
Weil (dissenting opinion): "It goes without saying that a maritime delimitation line cannot
be dictated by the concern to apportion resources .... In short, the boundary is where it is
and the resources are where they are." Id. para. 34. Particular socio-economic and cul-
tural factors and the size of the populations were excluded from the relevant considera-
tions in Jan Mayen. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 79-80.
On the other hand, Judge Weeramantry considered as "juristically untenable and not in
conformity with the flexibility of equity ... the general proposition that population of
economy are irrelevant because ... they may change with time". Id. para. 211 (separate
opinion). See also id. paras. 212-219. For a similar view, see id. para. 14 (Judge Fischer
dissenting).
For a comprehensive and accurate review of these issues, see Derek W. Bowett, The Eco-
nomic Factor in Maritime Delimitation Cases, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT AGO, su-
pra note 5, at 45. Kwiatkowska's doubts on this reflect her strong doctrinal preference for
resorting to economic and social considerations de lege ferenda. She delphically states:
[The inclusion of economic consideration into circumstances relevant
to maritime delimitation (to an extent broader than the courts so far
admit)] ...is advocated in this chapter on the basis of the assumption
that the courts' present restrictive approach may be subject to evolu-
tion toward the latter, more liberal, approach. Would that assumption
prove incorrect, there still seems to exist an additional, unstated al-
ternative. In particular, the possibility could not with certainty be ex-
cluded that, in spite of a formal rejection of the relevance of economic
factors, the courts do and will continue to take such factors into ac-
count in the delimitation process. Such assumption would seem to be
supported by the difference between the courts' role in making the law
and the court's role in applying the law.
Kwiatkowska, supra note 5, at 106-107.
On the other hand, considerations of distributive justice rather than the delineation of the
seaward projection of coasts are reflected in the UNCLOS regime of sharing certain re-
sources within the exclusive economic zone and on the ocean floor. The Convention im-
poses significant "equitable access" obligations on coastal states for the benefit of certain
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(b) Historical practice and usage,1 43 with the exception of the
"catastrophic-repercussions-historical-dependence" proviso for fish-
ing.1 4
4
The emphasis on coastal geography further led to the equally clear
rejection of the following non-coastal considerations:
(c) The size, shape or depth of the land territory behind the coast.
145
other states with respect to certain surplus living resources within their exclusive eco-
nomic zone. See FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 49-69
(1989), for a detailed study of this access right.
While such "sharing" obviously opens the door to considerable discretion, the use of the
equitable label does not constitute an invitation for the decision makers to develop their
own intuitions. The Convention takes a major step toward specificity by identifying the
key economic and geographical criteria of distribution.
Similarly and in a related field, the Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Water-
courses (U.N. Doc. A/42/10 (1987)) seeks to regulate the distribution of a scarce resource,
directing that international watercourse systems in state territories shall be used in an
equitable and reasonable manner. The relevant criteria are then identified with specific-
ity: geographic, hydrographic, climactic factors, social and economic needs, existing and
potential uses, conservation, protection, development and economy, the availability of al-
ternatives, etc. For a description of the scheme of the Convention, see Stephen C. McCaf-
frey, The Law of International Water Courses: Some Recent Developments and Unan-
swered Questions, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 505 (1989).
It is debatable whether the equitable label used in these contexts in helpful. This sharing
reflects adjustments in the exercise within a defined area of an indivisible joint, although
not identical, right, while maritime delimitations draw the lines that separate divisible
rights. While it might be argued that the equitable characterization is more apt where
the legislative motivation is distributive of resources rather than merely definitional of
geographic appurtenance, the reference to predetermined and identified, albeit broad, cri-
teria suggests that we are again dealing with particularizing interpretations consistent
with the logic and purpose of the related regimes and that a more direct approach is indi-
cated.
143. Gulf of Maine,1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 237. Cf. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras.
73-78. For the comparable views of Oda, J., see para. 98 of his separate opinion.
144. There was no reference to these factors either in North Sea, or in the Anglo-
French Arbitration. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3; Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54. In
Tunisia-Libya, the Court did examine historical factors but only in the context of past
conduct of the parties on a theory of estoppel and gave some incidental weight to them.
Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 81-102, 105, 116-21. In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber
considered the historical development of the land boundary between the two countries as
irrelevant. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 42. In Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, the Tri-
bunal made partial use of a treaty-based "southern limit" as the line in support of the
conduct of the parties and its coincidence with the land boundary. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau,
24 I.L.M. 267, paras. 105-06. In Jan Mayen, the Court concluded that the conduct of the
parties in other delimitations between them had not established a binding precedent. Jan
Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 82-86.
It should be pointed out that we are discussing here only continental shelf and exclusive
zone delimitations. The role of historic rights, however limited, in territorial and archi-
pelagic waters is another matter.
145. There was no reference to these factors in North Sea or the Anglo-French
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(d) Whether the coastal land territory is entirely surrounded by
water (island), or whether it belongs to a landmass (mainland). This
last topic will be explored in-depth in a subsequent section.
2. No to Physical Natural Prolongation
The second seminal determination was to abandon the idea of the
physical natural prolongation for the continental shelf and, by
extension, the exclusive economic zone. Thus, the characteristics of the
ocean floor, such as geomorphology and geology, nature of the sea-bed
and the subsoil, direction and angle of the slope, and the character of
the water column, such as depth and content, have been treated as
irrelevant. As a consequence, where distance counted, it was measured
not on the seabed, but on the surface of the water. In the Anglo-French
Arbitration, the ICJ downgraded the natural prolongation idea and put
the emphasis on geography rather than on geology or geomorphology.1
46
In Tunisia-Libya, the parties, reading North Sea as basically a natural
prolongation case, equated equity with prolongation which, however,
they interpreted differently.1 47 The ICJ disagreed with this approach,
sounding the death-knell for natural prolongation by treating it not as a
physical fact but as a legal concept, as a label for all the other relevant
considerations.' 48 This continued in Libya-Malta, 149 and it is safe to
assume that natural prolongation belongs to the past. A noted publicist
has characterized natural prolongation as an "unfortunate device" and
a "pure figment of the ICJ's imagination.""150 The joint delimitation of
continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, if not the absorption of
the former by the latter in subsequent cases, and the measurement of
the lines uniformly on the surface of the water have sealed the fate of
natural prolongation.
Arbitration. In Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, the Tribunal rejected any test of proportionality to
the respective landmasses. Id. at 118-120. In Libya-Malta, relevant geography did not
include the size of the landmass behind the coast. Id. para. 49.
146. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 107, 194.
147. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 39. Judge de Arechaga criticized this ap-
proach, taking the position that "equitable principles have pride of place and apply from
the start to the whole area subject to delimitation and not just to marginal or overlapping
segments of that area." Id. paras. 13-17 (de Arechaga, J., separate opinion).
148. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 40-61, 66-68. See also the sepa-
rate opinion of Judge de Arechaga, where the concept of the continental shelf is fully dis-
associated from any geological or geomorphological facts. Id. paras. 37-64 (de Arechaga,
J., separate opinion).
149. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 30-36.
150. Robert Jennings, The Principles Governing Maritime Boundaries, 397, 406 in
FESTSCHRIFT FUER KARL DOEHRING (1989).
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B. The Preservations and Refinements
1. The Rehabilitation of Equidistance
Distance from the coast on the surface of the water has re-emerged
as the dominant consideration, with equidistance as the primary
implementing equality rule. 151 A full review of all the cases will
become quite repetitive, so only some highlights will be pointed out in
the notes. 15 2 I n the text, it suffices to refer to the boost that
equidistance received in the last case, Jan Mayen. The ICJ determined
that the median line occupies an important place in the practice of
states. In addition, the ICJ determined that, in opposite coast
situations, it "produces, in most geographical circumstances, an
equitable result." It began the delimitation with a provisional single
median line as "entirely appropriate."'15 3  It also warned against
resorting to an open-ended list of special or relevant circumstances to
undermine consistency and predictability, 15 4 and examined the fishery
zone in the same vein.
155
Confirmed by its overwhelming prevalence in state practice,
156
equidistance reflects acceptance of the inherently equal and equitable
nature of the median line, treated in fact and often in law as the
appropriate line, especially the starting line, subject to some
adjustment for proportionality of shares to coast lengths. While it is a
natural for opposite coasts, it will not produce distorting effects in
adjacencies either if the respective coastlines are streamlined in terms
of relevance, direction, configuration and projection.
It is important to stress at this point that the verbal distinctions
between high-level, primary (sole, obligatory, final) equidistance, and
151. See George P. Politakis, The 1993 Jan Mayen Judgment: The end of Illusions?, 41
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Politakis]; KWIAKOVSKA, FORTY YEARS, supra note 5, at
95; Jennings, supra note 150, at 408; Kenneth Highet, Whatever Became of Natural Pro-
longation, in RIGHTS TO OCEANIC RESOURCES 87-100 (Dallmeyer & De Vorsey eds., 1989);
Shigeru Oda, The Delimitation of a Single Maritime Boundary-The Contribution of Equi-
distance to Geographical Equity in the Interrelated Domains of the Continental Shelf and
the Exclusive Economic Zone, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT AGO 349-362 (1989).
152. See Politakis, supra note 151, at 95.
153. Jan Mayen, supra note 2, paras. 49-53, 56, 64-65 (citing North Sea, supra note 3,
paras. 57-58 and Libya-Malta, supra note 2, para. 62); see e.g., Politakis, supra note 151,
at 16-17.
154. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 57-58.
155. Id. paras. 47, 53, 71, 90. Oda, J., explained in detail his opposition to treating
the fishing zone under the standards applicable to the exclusive zone. Id. paras. 6-23
(Oda, J., dissenting opinion).
156. See e.g., Charney, Progress, supra note 64, at 245; Legault & Hankey, supra note
141, at 221.
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lowly, secondary equidistance (provisional, possible) have now lost most
of their significance since the elimination of most of its competitors
makes its dislocation virtually impossible. Furthermore, the theoretical
discussions about its classification as a norm, a principle, a method, a
consideration, a factor or even a technique are largely inconsequential.
Under whatever name and form, when it stands alone its message is
quite clear: other things being equal, the equality of the shares derives
from the equality of the distances. The only significant reasons for
deviation revolve around the disproportionality issue to which we will
now turn.
2. The Intermediation of Proportionality to Avert Gross Disparities
Between Zones and Lengths of Coastlines
In international law, the concept of proportionality as an aspect
of equality has played a very limited role. Basically, it has been used
only to implement the remedial notion that action taken to effectuate a
right or power must not be excessive. Typical examples involve
proportionality in the use of force and in the restriction of human
rights.15
7
Its emergence as the principal instrument to contain the potential
inequitable results of equidistance in making the final cuts of the pie of
the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, reflects not so
much the application of principle as the recognition that a substantive
factor other than distance from a coast on the water, namely the length
of such coast, should also be taken into consideration. In other words, it
is not the commitment to proportionality but the recognition of the
relevance of the coastal length that explains this development.
The concern about gross disproportionality of shelves to coastlines
was there from the very beginning. In North Sea, its role was pivotal in
underwriting the concavity argument. 158  A reasonable degree of
proportionality between shelves and lengths is a reasonable result
dictated by equitable principles. 15 9 Most of the judges who dissented or
who wrote separate opinions were equally, if not more, concerned about
this problem of disproportion.160
157. See HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 230-236.
158. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 87, 91, 98. The exact language of the majority
opinion at paragraph 91 deserves to be quoted: "What is unacceptable in this instance is
that a State should enjoy continental shelf rights different from those of its neighbors
merely [because of the convex or concave form of the coastline] although those coastlines
are comparable in length."
159. Id. paras.89, 90, and 98. See Legault & Hankey, supra note 141, at 217.
160. 1. Bustamante Y Rivero:
[Tihe conclusion is inescapable that the State which has a longer
coastline will have a more extensive shelf. The Judgment ... men-
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The need to avoid unreasonable disprortionality was instrumental
in configuring the outcomes reached in the cases after North Sea. In
the Anglo-French Arbitration, the ICJ stressed that "proportional-
ity .... is clearly inherent in the notion of a delimitation in accordance
with equitable principles."'161 While proportionality may not be relevant
in all contexts, 162 and is not an independent source of rights, 163 the dis-
proportionate effects of a considerable projection of an attenuated por-
tion of the coast must be abated. 6
4
Both parties in Tunisia-Libya referred to a "reasonable degree of
proportionality.. .between... shelf.. .and length of.. .coast."'16 5  The
ICJ added that it is "indeed required by the fundamental principle of
ensuing an equitable delimitation between the states concerned,"'166 and
gave it certain weight in assessing the equitableness of the lines drawn
on the basis of other criteria. Proportionality was also recognized in
some of the other opinions. Concurring Judge de Arechaga accepted it
in the form of a "test to be applied ex post facto... not a relevant cir-
cumstance or independent factor in itself."167 For Judge Oda, equidis-
tance was equitable because it satisfied the requirement of proportion-
ality. 168 On the other hand, Judge Gros took the position that the ICJ
went too far because proportionality is only the verifying factor, and not
tions this element as one of the factors to be taken into consideration
for the delimitation of a shelf; the Court nevertheless did not confer
upon it the character of an obligatory principle.
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 59.
2. Padilla Nervo: "The distorting effect caused by the application of the lateral equidis-
tance line, when it cannot be accounted for by the length of the coastline, justifies the ap-
plication of the special circumstances principle." Id. para. 92.
3. Ammoun: "The Federal Republic is justified in rejecting... a share which.., would
be out of all proportion to the respective lengths of coastal frontage of the parties." Id.
para. 43.
4. Morelli:
In my opinion, the gravely inequitable nature of the result to which
the application of the criterion of equidistance in the present case
leads must be recognized, this inequitable character consisting in the
remarkable disproportion between the area of the continental shelves
pertaining to each of the three States on the one hand and the length
of their respective coastlines on the other ....
Id. para. 15.
161. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 98-99; see id. paras. 99, 250.
162. Id. para. 99.
163. Id. paras. 101, 250.
164. Id. para. 249.
165. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 37.
166. Id. para. 103.
167. Id. para. 117.
168. Id. para. 176.
VOL. 26:3
LIFTING THE VEILS OF EQUITY
even a method. 169
In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber employed as a principal method an
equal-division geographical approach reflecting the same consideration
as equidistance,' 70 but also made corrections in all sectors based on the
auxiliary criterion of proportionality to the length of the respective
coastlines.' 7' In the first segment, the Chamber sought to avoid the
disproportionally distorting effect of certain rocks and low-tide eleva-
tions under equidistance, as well impractical zig-zaggings. 172 In the
central area, it took a look at the Gulf, and concluded that it was "obvi-
ous that the length of the coasts belonging to the United States .. is
considerably greater than that of the coasts belonging to Canada,"'173
considered this difference notable, and gave it some weight as a special
circumstance. 174 Not to recognize this circumstance of undeniable im-
portance would be a denial of the obvious.' 75 The Chamber then totally
corrected the median line only in this short segment to reflect exactly
the proportionality ratio in the entire area. The shift also had some in-
direct effect on the third segment,' 76 with significant impact on the divi-
sion of Georges Bank, the apple of discord.
Nevertheless, the Chamber did not justify this last consequences as
a proportionality adjustment, but only as a reflection of the general ge-
ography. 77 The division of the overlapping areas in the triple-line-
delimitation case of Guinea/Guinea-Bissau was complicated both by
treaties, 178 and by the determination of the Tribunal to place it within
the context of past and future delimitations with the other neighboring
states.' 79 Still, the Tribunal determined that the coasts of the parties
were about the same length, and considered whether the line, con-
structed on other grounds, required adjustment for reason of propor-
tionality to the length of the coastlines. The answer was in the negative
since the division ended up equal. 8 0
A major portion of the opinion in Libya-Malta is devoted to an
elaborate discussion of the factor of proportionality, which arises from
the equitable principle that nature must be respected.18l First, the ICJ
169. Id. para. 17.
170. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 178, 188, 201, 210, 212.
171. Id. para. 185.
172. Id. paras. 202, 209, 213.
173. Id. para. 184.
174. Id.
175. Id. para. 218.
176. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras.223-26.
177. Id. para. 226.
178. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 106.
179. Id. paras. 108-09.
180. Id. para. 120.
181. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 55-57.
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rejected Libya's far-reaching and novel proposition that proportionality
be used as independent criterion, thus leaving it in an auxiliary
status.18 2 However, the ICJ suggested that where disproportion is very
great, as here, proportionality may be employed not only at the end to
test the result obtained on other grounds, but also in the initial stage of
seeking the overall methodology. 8 3 It is, however, significant that a
good number of judges questioned the relevance of proportionality
altogether, especially in this context. 8 4 In St.Pierre & Miquelon, the
ICJ made positive reference to proportionality, 185 but rejected the
notion that the ratio of coastal lengths should itself be determinative of
the respective areas, 186 and sought its own solution in the form of
concrete lines, apparently taking into account proportionality, but
without quantified particularization. 8 7 0 n the other hand, Judge
Weil, in his dissenting opinion, attacked proportionality as providing a
sham equity in situtations where it might operate blindly and
mechanistically on largely arbitrary data. At most, only a great
disparity counts and only as one relevant circumstance and a posteri-
ori.88  An important contribution of this case to the doctrine of
proportionality is that it did not accept the Canadian contention that
"particular segments of a coast may have an increased or diminished
projection, depending on their length. The extent of the seaward
projection will depend, in every case, on the geographical
circumstances .... " 189 In other words, a mile of coast is a mile of coast,
whether it is part of a long or a short coast, and whatever the ratio of
the competing coasts.
Finally, Jan Mayen, as the last word from the ICJ on the subject,
deserves our careful attention:
182. Id. para. 58.
183. Id. paras. 66-67. See Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and de Arechaga, who also stressed
the great importance of proportionality. Id. paras. 20-34.
184. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Oda both disputed the use of proportionality in
the initial stage and questioned its applicability in a situation of opposite coasts where no
major distorting circumstances, for example, concavity were involved. In addition, he at-
tacked the failure of the Court to particularize and explain the application. Id. paras. 13-
28 (Oda, J., dissenting opinion). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Valticos cautioned that
the proportionality factor should not be used in opposite situations not involving any ab-
normalities. He also wondered whether it was possible to quantify it without relying on
subjective judgments. Id. paras.19-22 (Valticos, J., dissenting opinion). Judges Mosler
and Schwebel were even more unequivocally against proportionality here, arguing that
the difference in the length of the coasts was already reflected in the way they projected
into this large area. Id. at pp. 112, 173-75 (Mosler & Schwebel, J's., dissenting opinions).
185. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, para. 45.
186. Id. para. 63 (citing Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 58, 66).
187. Id. paras. 60-65.
188. Id. paras. 20-23 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
189. Id. para. 45.
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[T]he law does not require a delimitation based upon an endeavor to
share out an area of overlap on the basis of comparative figures for the
length of the coastal fronts and the areas generated by them.190
The ICJ also rejected the notion that proportionality requires a
direct and mathematical application of ratios. 191 But when the shares
are "so disproportionate... it has been found necessary to take this
circumstance into account in order to ensure an equitable solution."'
192
Indeed, the first and main Jan Mayen rule was that equidistance and
proportionality appeared only as a moderating factor to test the results
reached under other geographical methods. In view of the nine-to-one
ratio of lengths, the median line was moved somewhat toward Jan
Mayen. 193  Some judges who were committed to the primacy of
equidistance considered proportionality as too indeterminate and
subjective to be of much help.
9 4
The ascendancy of proportionality as a corrective equitable factor of
equidistance has been noticed and generally applauded by
commentators,' 95 but not without some dissent, mostly resulting from
its indeterminacy.' 96  The practical significance of the distinction
between proportionality operating at the initial stage of delimitation,
and proportionality being used only as a final test of a result reached
under other methods is not as important as it sounds. This is so
because only gross disproportion counts, and the adjustment will be
similar regardless of stage.
3. How About the Location of Natural Resources, Non-
Encroachment and No-Cut-Offs?
Before consecrating the marriage of equidistance with
proportionality as monogamous and pursuing its practical applications,
we should consider whether any other factors may still play some
equitable role.
190. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 64. The primacy of equidistance both as leading
to equitable results and as reflecting the practice of states is emphasized in paras. 64-65.
Id.
191. Id. para. 69.
192. Id. para. 65.
193. Id. paras. 65-69. Some writers viewed the minor movement as downgrading 'to
the vanishing point' the 'tyranny of coastal ratios.' See, e.g., Politakis, supra note 153, at
1.
194. See id. at pp. 3-11 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion).
195. See e.g. Legault & Hankey, supra note 141, at 217-221; Charney, Progress, supra
note 6, at 241-243. See also O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 724.
196. See HIGGINS, supra note 17, at 230 and 236
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(a) Natural Resources
The entire logic and system of the maritime zones, based on
territorial appurtenance and coastal geography and excluding
distributive justice and other economic factors, suggest that the
resources fall where they may. What about the situation, however,
where the geographic boundary line is to be adjusted in response to a
non-precise localizing criterion, such as proportionality to the length of
the coastlines? Since the decisionmaker enjoys a degree of flexibility in
deciding where to cut, 197 may the location of resources be given some
weight? In what way?
As explained previously, the technical preservation of the unity of
resources proposed in North Sea through joint exploration or other
means of avoiding waste makes good sense where they straddle the
natural boundary. With the now extinct factor of natural prolongation
which undergirded it,198 at most this factor may still have some
analogical applicability only in situations where the ICJ, under the
current theories of identifying an overlap, (i.e. proportionality or
avoidance of catastrophic repercussions), has some flexibility to adjust
the line drawn within the fringe area. In the post-North Sea cases,
there were some references to this factor. But the ICJ only explicitly
took this factor into account in the last case, Jan Mayen,199 where it
relied on proportionality to divide a certain area on Jan Mayen's side of
the equidistance line. Within that area, the ICJ divided Zones 2 and 3
two-to-one. But the ICJ split the comparatively smaller Zone 1, which
contained most of high stakes of the dispute, the capelin, on the basis of
a median line to provide Greenland equitable access to that resource. 200
Some judges severely criticized this for its obscurity and apparent
arbitrariness. Judge Oda wondered whether we compare the interests
of all Danish versus all Norwegian fishermen. Why limit this
197. See Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 90.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 62 et seq.
199. See Malcom Evans, Less Than an Ocean Apart: The St. Pierre and Miquelon and
Jan Mayen Islands and the Delimitation of Maritime Zones, INT'L & COMP. L.J. 678, 692-
693, [hereinafter Evans]. In Tunisia-Libya, the Court left open the possibility that the
location of existing oil wells may be an element to be taken into account to achieve an eq-
uitable result. Id. para. 107. This, however, can be explained in terms of the prior action
and conduct of the parties. In Gulf of Maine, the case where the fishing grounds of Geor-
ges Bank were clearly at the heart of the dispute, the Court excluded such location as a
relevant factor of delimitation. Id. para. 232. See also para. 237. Cf. Gros, J. dissenting
opinion, para. 48. The way that it adjusted the line for proportionality, especially its
outer-zone projection, however, may be interpreted as sensitive to its impact on resources.
In Libya-Malta, we find a vague dictum to the effect that natural resources in the shelf
might constitute a relevant circumstance to be reasonably considered. Id. para. 50, citing
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 101 (D2).
200. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 91-92.
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consideration only to a small part of the area? Why equal division?201
Judge Schwebel was stunned by this apparent intrusion of distributive
justice, and was quite sarcastic in his opposition:
While the ICJ may be commended for the simplicity of its conclusion, a
principled consistency with its earlier case-law is less
conspicuous .... [I]n this, the most critical holding of the Judgment on
the real assets at stake, the ICJ jettisons what its case-law, and the
accepted customary law of the question, have provided [cites and
quotes from past cases].
202
It is in this context that Judge Schwebel made reference to the
equitable being as predictable as the weather in the Hague! Judge
Fischer was also critical of the introduction of this new type of median
line, arguing in the other direction that economic considerations
supported an even larger share for Greenland. 20 3 A limited reading of
this action in Jan Mayen would consider it as a variant of the
catastrophic repercussions theme of radical inequity relating to
fisheries as articulated first in Gulf of Maine.20 4 A more plausible and
geographical interpretation would focus on the fact that these resources
were on the fringes of the equidistance-cum-proportionality line, and
were divided on the theory that, in that narrow range, when in doubt,
cut in half.
205
All of this boils down to the conclusion that in principle the location
of natural resources in the shelf or economic zone is irrelevant to their
delimitation, subject to the catastrophic repercussions proviso. When,
however, resources happen to be located on or about the equidistance-
cum-proportionality line, there is some judicial discretion to adjust the
line to reflect the internal considerations of delimitation overall. This,
of course, excludes either equal shares, as such, or shares out of a hat.
In case of doubt, however, an equal split would not be inappropriate.
201. Id. paras. 92-95.
202. Id. at 118. (Schwebel, J, separate opinion).
203. Id. paras. 15, 21 (Fischer, J., dissenting opinion)
204. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 75. See e.g., Jan Mayen, supra note 2;
KWIATKOVSKA, Jennings, supra note 45, at 105-06. Professor Charney criticized the
Court for the reference to population which may be misunderstood to revive the socio-
economic factors. Jonathan I. Charney, Panel, The Law of the Sea: Recent Delimitation
Cases, AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 1, 13, 17 (1993). See also Charney, Progress, supra note 4,
at 237-39. Such factors had been specifically repudiated by the Court. Gulf of Maine, su-
pra note 2, paras. 79-80
205. See e.g., John P. Kozyris, Remarks, The Law of the Sea: Recent Delimitation
Cases, in AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 15 (1993).
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(b) Non-Encroachment and No-Cut-Offs (Security?)
Our first observation must point out the question-begging, if not
tautological, nature of both these considerations, casually mentioned in
some of the cases. Indeed, non-encroachment appears merely to state a
legal conclusion, that one should not cross into areas that already
belong to another. It does not address the question of what belongs to
whom. It was used for the first time in North Sea in exactly that sense:
thou shall not intrude into another's prolongation, with nature
providing the boundary. The demise of natural prolongation has taken
the wind out of the sails of this derivative idea of non-encroachment. It
has persisted, however, in the form of the related but not identical
notion of no-cut-off. Unlike non-encroachment, which is aimed at
intrusion into one's own, the no-cut-off idea reflects a connection
concept: it is intended to prevent interference with access. It stands to
reason that such a concept argues primarily for the unity of allocated
shares, 20 6 and, where proportionality adjustments are being made, the
technique e.g. of 'equiratio',20 7 gives it maximum effect. The references
to no-cut-off suggest also two other possible but problematical uses.
First, we do find language in some cases to the effect that the
boundary should not be drawn too close to the shores of a state. 208 But
this begs the question since, by definition, assuming that equidistance
or a similar geometrical method has been used, the same line is equally
close to the shores of the other state. Indeed, St.Pierre & Miquelon
recognized that a cut-off is the typical and unavoidable consequence of
drawing lines between competing seaward projections. 209 If only certain
projections, for example frontal or primary projectors versus radial or
secondary projectors, are preferred as a matter of law will this cut-off
notion assume a meaning of its own. But these distinctions have been
decisively rejected. 210 A related but much narrower idea would give
206. See Bernard H. Oxman, Political, Strategic and Historical Consideration, in IMB
3, 22-30 (1993), for the state practice of occasional mutually-beneficial readjustment of the
boundaries to that effect.
207. See infra notes 269-272 and accompanying text.
208. See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 196; Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M.
267, para. 92. In Tunisia-Libya, Judge de Arechaga referred to the "equitable principle of
nonencroachment ... in front of or close to the coasts of a state, based on distance from
the coast." Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 69, 72, 75. See generally Elisabeth Zoller,
Recerche sur les methodes de delimitation du plateau continental: A propos de l'affaire
Tunisie-Libye, 86 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 645, 668-670 (1982)
(criticizing Tunisia-Libya on the grounds of ambiguity and subjectivity). See also Mark B.
Feldman, The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case: Geographic Justice or Judicial Com-
promise?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 219, 229 (1983) [hereinafter Feldman]
209. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1169, para. 67.
210. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 36, 108; St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at
1166-67, paras. 57-59; Cf. at 1171, para. 73.
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priority, in proportionality adjustments, to a port over a rocky
promontory. 211  Perhaps this no-cut-off notion is not merely a
geographical construct, and a quite problematic one at that, but is
connected to considerations of national security. This is suggested in
Libya-Malta,212 Guinea/Guinea-Bissau,13 and Jan Mayen,214 where the
emphasis was given to lines being drawn far enough off the coasts of the
parties. However, here again it is quite likely that the security needs of
one state are reciprocated by those of the other so that the end result is
again the median line. Furthermore, the extension of the territorial sea
up to twelve miles and the perfection of the modern means of detection
as well as of warfare make the security argument rather obsolete.
Second, no-cut-off may be deemed to refer to access to the high seas
from the zones of each of the competing states.21 5 The problem with
this possible interpretation is not only that it may be inconsistent with
both equidistance and proportionality, but depending on geography that
makes little sense in terms of the nature of the maritime rights at issue.
Indeed, neither the continental shelf nor the exclusive economic zone
rights allow the state to interfere with navigation and passage of any
kind, so that access to other areas is assured no matter where these
delimitation lines are drawn.
(c) Conclusion
While there have been some incidental references in cases and in
literature to the location of natural resources, to non-encroachment and
to no-cut-offs, these factors have not been given much weight. Indeed
they have never operated by themselves. It is only where an
adjustment of the line is to be made for other reasons that they may
derivatively play a tangential role. At most, within the realm of making
211. See, e.g., Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 244; Tunisia-Libya, 1982
I.C.J. 18, para. 75 (de Arechaga, J., separate opinion). See also St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31
I.L.M. 1145, para. 29 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion). In Libya-Malta, Judges Ruda, Bed-
jaoui and de Arechaga, expressed the view that in situations affected by the coastal pro-
jections of third states, the projection of the two delimiting states should not be radial, in
the shape of a trapezium, but frontal, in order to avoid cut-offs. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J.
13, paras. 2, 4-15. (Ruda, J., Bedjaoui J., and de Arechaga, J., separate opinions). This
limited practical suggestion does not detract from the force of the basic principle of equal
treatment of all coasts and projections.
212. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 51.
213. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 124.
214. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 81.
215. Indeed, the objective of preventing cut-offs supports the position that, even where
the size of the zones of each party is quite different, each zone should touch the median
line. For example, in North Sea, Germany wanted its slice extended all the way to the
point where it met the median line with the opposite states of England and Norway.
North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 15. In the final negotiation, this claim was honored.
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proportionality adjustments, a court may exercise some remedial
discretion to adjust the line drawn in a manner that preserves and
allocates straddling resources according to the internal shelf-zone
criteria; and that prefers the geographical unity of shares and frontal
projections and links with the median line or with the open seas or with
significant localities, which should satisfy any external legitimate
security considerations.
C. Synthesizing Equidistance with Coast-Length Proportionality
Once equidistance is placed on the surgical table to make cuts are
to harmonize it equitably with coastal lengths and to take in any
tangential considerations, the considerations of how much and where to
slice require both quantification and some organizing principles. 216 A
major problem in synthesizing the two methods is that either by itself
can, by and large, produce a total delimitation, so that some type of
balancing and prioritizing between them becomes necessary. Another
problem relates to the different quality of these two methods.
Equidistance as a geometric method is rather concrete. The discretion
in selecting basepoints and drawing baselines is manageable. On the
other hand, the operation of proportionality is less reducible to sizes
and lines. In St.Pierre & Miquelon, Judge Weil spoke eloquently of "the
uncertainties and dangers of the proportionality test in its quantified
form." Is the length of the coasts to be measured following the slightest
sinuosities and the deepest indentations, or is it to be measured
according to more or less arbitrary general directions? What are the
contours of the relevant area? These operations have "this in common
with love or Spanish inns: each finds in them what he brings to
them.' 217  The courts have been meandering through various tech-
niques, raising concerns that the lines are being drawn
impressionistically, if not randomly. For example, in the relatively
straightforward opposite-coasts Libya-Malta case, which ended up in a
moderate adjustment of the median line, the majority appeared to be
jumping to its conclusions, no fewer than nine judges filed separate or
dissenting opinions or declarations. In another simple geographical
situation, Jan Mayen, ten of the fifteen judges on the ICJ filed separate
or dissenting opinions or declarations!
216. See Legault & Hankey, supra note 141, at 206.
217. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1206, para. 24 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
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1. Determining Relative Importance and Weights
(a) Priority of Equidistance
The first thing that stands out is that reasonable proportionality to
coast length is not equal in rank to equidistance. No case used it as the
sole, the initial or even the provisional method. In no case was the
outcome due primarily to it. It appears in no treaty or comparable text.
Its principal function has been to test the result obtained through some
other method or at most to qualify the application of such other method.
Furthermore, the negative emphasis on disproportion, rather than on
proportionality, as such, and the requirement of some magnitude, if not
grossness, together with the qualification of reasonableness, suggest
that this factor is of the safety-valve type, intended to moderate only
serious offenses to the equality principle.
21 8
(b) Opposite v. Adjacent Coasts
A second distinction is that proportionality fades in opposite, versus
adjacent, coast delimitations. 219 This differentiation is obvious when we
compare how proportionality was used in Libya-Malta and Jan Mayen
with its role in the mixed contexts of Tunisia-Libya, Gulf of Maine and
St.Pierre & Miquelon.
(c) Third-State Claims and External Projections
Where the delimitation does not cover the entire area within the
218.
[T]o take into account the extent of the respective coasts... is ...
mainly.., a means of checking whether a provisional delimitation es-
tablished initially on the basis of other criteria ... satisfactory ....
[A] maritime delimitation can certainly not be established by a direct
division of the area in dispute proportional to the respective lengths of
the coasts.. . but ... a substantial disproportion ... call[s] for an ap-
propriate correction.
Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 185.
219. See e.g., North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 57-58; Anglo-French Arbitration, 16
I.L.M. 54, paras. 99, 182; Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 197. In its first case deal-
ing exclusively with opposite coasts, the International Court of Justice reiterated this
primacy of the median line and commenced the delimitation on this basis before making
any adjustments. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 62. The dissenting judges would
have made no adjustments for proportionality, unless there was abnormal configuration
of the relevant coasts, id. para. 19 (Valticos, J., dissenting opinion); criticizing the 'un-
specified impressions of equitableness,' id. para. 120 (Mosler, J., dissenting opinion); em-
phasizing that '[i]t is doubtful whether the test of proportionality has any place in the de-
limitation between purely opposite states,' id. para.184 (Schwebel, J., dissenting opiniion).
See also BOWETT, supra note 6, at 164
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200-mile radius, due to the potential claims of third states in the region,
such Italy in Libya-Malta, the ratio of coast to zones may arguably be
beyond reasonable calculability. 220 In addition, where some coasts also
project outside or beyond the delimitation area, it may become
necessary to determine how much they are already being used up or
partially satisfied. There are some hints in some separate opinions in
Jan Mayen that the more the coasts are satisfied elsewhere, the lesser
the necessity is of adjusting for disproportionality.
22 1
(d) Determining and Quantifying Gross Disproportion and
Making Corrections
Starting with opposite-coast situations in chronological order, the
result in the Anglo-French Arbitration is very difficult to quantify. The
mainland coasts were comparable in length and dominated the
delimitation, 222 and over 90% of the total space would have been
allocated the same way under either proportionality or equidistance.
The Channel Islands would have more than doubled their alotted share
under equidistance, but would probably have received less if
proportionality were the only factor. Comparable figures come out of
the Atlantic region. The ICJ endorsed a localizing approach in that
proportionality "does not relate to the total partition of the area of shelf
among the coastal States concerned, its role being rather that of a
criterion to assess the distorting effect of particular geographical
features,223 and made the related cuts in the areas of the shorter
shores, those of the islands.
In the more recent opposite-coast cases, the grossness calculations
and the sizes of the corrections are easier to decipher, and are more
precise. In Libya-Malta, pure proportionality would have produced a
Libyan share eight times larger than that of Malta, while under
equidistance the shares would have been comparable in size. Thus, the
grossness factor was about eight. The ICJ first shifted the median line
to some extent in the direction of Malta, and then tested the outcome
for reasonable proportionality, rejecting any predetermined
arithmetical ratio and concluding that no further reduction was
appropriate because, under "a broad assessment of the equitableness of
the result," there was no evident disproportion.224 While this entire
220. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 74. See also id. para. 15 (Judge Oda dissent-
ing opinion).
221. See Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 92 (Oda, J., separate opinion); id. at 142
(Shahabuddeen, J., separate opinion).
222. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 181.
223. Id. para. 250.
224. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, paras. 74-75. Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and de Are-
chaga wanted the line to move up a bit further, in essence giving Malta a three-quarters
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process was affected both by the proximity of the Northern littoral of
the Mediterranean (Italy)225 and the intrusion of potential claims of
third states, 226 and while the ICJ's explanations about the dimension of
the shift were not very revealing,227 Malta ended up with roughly three
quarters of what it would have had in the delimitation area without
this shift. The ratio of shares to coast lengths in the delimited area
ended at roughly three to one, 228 so that a disproportion of more than
two to one was apparently found acceptable. In other words,
equidistance was given more than twice the weight of proportionality.
In Jan Mayen, under equidistance the shares of the overlap 229
would have been comparable whereas the coast-length ratios were
slightly over nine to one. 230 Such substantial disproportion called for
some correction, 231 by moving the median line to ensure an equitable
solution. 232 Since the coast of Greenland received extra satisfaction
elsewhere in the form of about two-thirds of one-quarter of the area
outside the overlap, 233 the grossness factor was roughly over seven,
comparable to the one in Libya-Malta. On that basis, Denmark claimed
the full 200 miles of the 254 miles between them. 234 The ICJ rejected
effect. Id. paras. 31, 35-38. Judge El Khani also would have supported a larger shift. Id.
at 59.
225. Id. para. 72.
226. Id. para. 74.
227. Id. para. 73. According to Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion:
I cannot agree that the Court's cryptic references to the length of
coasts, the distance between coasts, the scarcity of basepoints, and the
general geographical context, suffice to justify the selection of the line
of delimitation it has chosen in this case. Nor do these arrested allu-
sions conduce towards building the sense of consistency and predict-
ability at which the Court and the law so rightly aim.
Id. at 187.
228. Judges Ruda, Bedjaoui and de Arechaga, in a separate opinion, claimed that the
Court's line produced a 2.38:1 ration (id. paras. 35-38), whereas Judge Schwebel put it as
3.8:1. Id. at 186. Judge Oda suggested a way of using equidistance in trapezoids and cov-
ering more total area between the two states to produce shelf ratios of between 2.3:1 and
4:1. Id. paras. 16-17 (Oda, J., dissenting opinion).
229. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 18-21, 59.
230. The Court used two methods, both following straight lines across the coastal
fronts and producing results close to 9:1. The first counted the length of the fronts from
one end to the other along a single line (ratio: 9.2:1) and the second followed the succes-
sive baselines which had produced the median line (ratio: 9.1:1) Id. para. 61.
231. Id. para. 66.
232. Id. paras. 65-69.
233. Judge Oda argued that the median line should not be shifted unless there is dis-
proportionality in the total areas allocated, not only in the overlapping regions. Id. para.
92 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
234. Id. paras. 62, 70. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Fischer would have honored
the Danish claim on a theory of proportionality. Id. at paras. 12-13.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
that claim and divided the area on the Jan Mayen side of the median
line, treated as disputed, apparently for proportionality, first one to
two. Another small segment was then added to the Greenland part in
zone one to equalize access to the fishing resources. Thus, a total
disproportion of the magnitude of at least three to one was tolerated. In
terms of this difference in results, it is fair to conclude that equidistance
weighed at least twice as much as proportionality.
Turning to the adjacencies or composite situations, in North Sea
equidistance would have produced a German share one-third the size of
the others, with the coastlines being comparable in length. The ICJ
considered this split inequitable. 235 Germany argued for a share larger
by about 65%, still lagging considerably in total area. Following
negotiations, Germany ended up with an even lesser share by roughly
one third.236 In rounded figures, a grossness factor of close to two
prevailed. The other cases were factually more complex, and the
division of the delimitation area into sectors enabled the courts both to
differentiate between opposite and adjacent areas, and to locate the
corrections in distortion areas, even though typically the proportionality
expost test operated in a total fashion (i.e. to verify the equitableness of
the entire shares allocated to the parties). This selective location
approach also makes the incorporation of the tangential considerations
related to division of natural resources and no cut-offs possible . In
Tunisia-Libya, the dividing lines which awarded approximately 60% of
the entire sea-bed to Tunisia and 40% to Libya were found to satisfy the
proportionality test where the coast lengths stood in the approximate
ratios of 69-31 along the actual coastlines, and 66-34 across the coastal
fronts.237 The only correction to the median line that was not related to
historical or to past-conduct reasons occurred in the opposite-coast
segment, by giving the Kerkennah Islands half effect. Without it, the
Tunisian share would have increased by less than 10%. The Tunisian
island of Jerba, located closer to the coast and ignored in drawing the
baselines, was treated as if it were a promontory attached to the coast
and was given comparable effect under proportionality. In these
circustances, it is virtually impossible to quantify a grossness factor. If,
as is apparently the case, the ICJ was thinking only of the lengths of
the opposite-coast segments, the correction is consistent with the
magnitudes tolerated in the other cases.
In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber had started using in all three
segments a process which basically drew median lines. Only in one
235. North Sea, 1969 L.C.J. 3, para. 91.
236. Treaty Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North
Sea, Jan. 28, 1971, 857 U.N.T.S. 131, 155 reprinted in 1970-71 I.C.J. Y.B. 117.
237. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 131. See Feldman, supra note 208, at 219-
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segment did it engage in an empirical, common-sense kind of
proportionality adjustment exactly in the total coastal ratio of 1:1.32. A
look at the map shows that the effect of the correction was felt mostly in
the outer region and that, in total terms, it added less than 10% to the
total United States share. The Chamber did not consider what the total
share ratios would have been before and after the correction.
Guinea/Guinea-Bissau ended up with equal shares for equal lengths
under a special kind of median line, so there was no disproportion to be
accounted for. In St. Pierre & Miquelon, the relevant coasts stood in the
ratio of over 15:1,238 and, under a rough equidistance, the grossness
factor came close to four. In one of the two sectors, a reasonable and
equitable zone for the islands met "to some degree the reasonable
expectations of France."23 9 It extended to the end of the contiguous zone
(24 miles) up to the median line, and operated close to equidistance for
about half the frontage. In the other sector, where the narrow coast of
the islands faced the open sea, a 188-mile frontal projection of the
islands beyond the territorial sea was recognized in parallel with
Newfoundland. The radial projections of both were prevented in order
to avoid a cut-off effect.240 In the remaining small segment of the
easterly projection of St. Pierre, the line was fixed at 12 miles without
explanation or discussion.241 The ICJ finally examined the lines under
both the catastrophic-repercussions-radical-inequity and the coast-
length-disproportionality tests, and found them satisfactory. The ratio
of the shares came to about 16.4:1, thus certainly showing no
disproportion to the 15.3:1 coastal length ratio. In total figures, the
islands received about one quarter of their shares under equidistance.
Thus, the ICJ relied principally on proportionality in drawing the lines.
The ICJ hinted, however, that if only the opposite coasts counted, the
correction would have been different.
242
238. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1162, para. 33. Judge Gotlieb, in a dissenting
opinion, disagreed with the measurements, claiming a minimum 21.4:1 ratio. He com-
plained that the Court did not use the same degree of generalization for the coasts of each
party. Canada used 12 straight lines to reach 514.4 miles for its own coasts, for an aver-
age line of 42.9 miles, whereas the Court used three lines to measure the coast of the is-
lands for an average line of 9.95 miles. Breaking up the Canadian coast the same way
would have pushed up the Canadian figure. Id. paras. 8-17 (Gotlieb, J., dissenting opin-
ion). It was generally agreed that measuring along all sinuosities was not proper. Id.
para. 12.
239. Id. para. 69.
240. Id. paras. 70-71. Judge Weil, in a dissenting opinion, strongly opposed the dis-
tinction between frontal and radial projections. In his view, this strange concept has no
support either in state practice or in the cases. The outer limits of maritime jurisdiction
are commonly determined by the "arcs of circle method" on a given radius in all direc-
tions. Id. paras. 11-14.
241. Id. para. 71. Judge Weil wondered why an additional 12-miles zone was not rec-
ognized on the same basis as in the first sector. Id. para. 7 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
242. Id. paras. 72-73.
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These quantifications of grossness and correction may appear
somewhat brusque and simplistic, and may reflect more the outcome of
the cases than the doctrine, but they have decent explanatory power.
While any proposed figures may be challenged in a musical-chairs
fashion, the real question is whether it makes better sense to affix some
numbers on the slices of the pie and debate and defend them, than to
rely on chance and intuition.
By way of conclusion, the cases by and large support the
proposition that, given the priority and equitableness of equidistance,
the disproportion is not gross and needs no correction unless the result
between coasts and shares obtained under equidistance in the
particular region or sector is in excess of twice the coastal ratios in that
region or sector. All of the cases except St.Pierre & Miquelon can be
cited for at least that number. The fact that the French mainland was
too far to reinforce the claims of the islands may be part of the
explanation in St.Pierre & Miquelon. In any event, the later case of Jan
Mayen, with the ICJ behind it, gave substantially more weight to
equidistance than to proportionality in a similar situation. An auxiliary
proposition is that even where a correction must be made, it is limited
in that it does not seek to bring the ratio down to the non-grossness
level but only to moderate it. Another important point is that the
sectorization practices adopted by the courts enable them, in a micro-
geographic context, to localize a disproportionality at the initial stage,
and to correct it only there within the above parameters, as was done,
for example, in the Anglo-French Arbitration. Of course, this does not
preempt the ultimate use of the proportionality test for the total
picture. Finally, it would seem that the greater the distance between
the competing coasts, and therefore the more room to spare, the heavier
the weight of the proportionality factor.243 It should be remembered
that the ICJ's concern about equidistance in North Sea centered on the
magnification of its effect in the outer regions. This is also reflected in
the different standards for the territorial sea under UNCLOS.
243. For example, in Libya-Malta, the shift was facilitated by the great distance be-
tween the coasts. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 73. Judge Mbaye, in a separate
opinion, took issue with this. Id. at 100-102. See also Schwebel, J., dissenting opinion, at
182. On the other hand Judge Valticos' separate opinion agreed with the majority. Id.
para. 23.
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2. The Mechanics of Adjusting Equidistance for Disproportionality
and Other Factors
(a) Establishing and Streamlining the Relevant Maritime Fronts
and Defining Their Projections
Recognizing the maritime front as the sole source of right is a
crucial, but only a first step toward boundary demarcation. The
relevant coast needs to be identified in terms of abutting on and facing
toward the area to be delimited. While this process is highly outcome-
determinative, in all cases except St.Pierre & Miquelon there had been
no major consequential disagreement on which coasts counted.
Next, choices must be made as to how the fronts project onto the
maritime spaces. Appurtenance calls for the allocation of the maritime
zones to the states in front of whose territory they lie. The frontal
projection of the coasts does not mean that they project only or
preferentially in the direction perpendicular to the general direction of
the maritime front. The basic rule is that every coastal front, regardless
of its length and orientation, projects equally in all directions up to 200
miles. The U.S. argument in Gulf of Maine that primary coasts project
more than secondary ones, or should be otherwise preferred, was
rejected by the Chamber,244 and has not resurfaced. In St.Pierre &
Miquelon, the ICJ was equally unreceptive of the notion that shorter
coasts have diminished projections than longer ones under relative
reach. 245  But in making adjustments for other reasons such as
proportionality, frontal projections may be preferred over radial ones in
certain sectors, for example, on a 'cut off rationale, as was done in that
case.
(b) Pursuing the Details of Adjustment for Proportionality
(i) Measuring Lengths and Counting Sizes: Straight Lines v.
Sinuosities and Total v. Related Sea-Beds and Water
Columns
Judge Weil's doubts in St.Pierre & Miquelon on the math of
proportionality, which incidentally undermine its very validity, are
eloquent, albeit exaggerated:
How is [the] length [of the coasts] to be measured: by allowing for
the slightest sinuosity and calculating the perimeters of the deepest
244. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, at 36, 108.
245. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, paras. 43-45, 57-59.
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indentations and the longest promontories, or by following a general
direction that is more or less simplified and thus necessarily arbitrary?
And how should the contours, and hence the size, of the relevant area
be defined?.
246
However, without some such math we are chasing rainbows. Judge
Weil identified the two key proportionality issues. One, how do we
measure the coastal length? Two, what counts as a 'share'of the shelf?.
More particularly, does the share also include the sea-bed and the
water column of the territorial sea and the internal waters?
Streamlining the coasts starts, if possible, with the establishment
of their general direction, 247 and then of various basepoints at key
locations, joining them by drawing straight baselines, often divided into
sectors. 248 This is particularly evident in the drawing of the median
line. 249 The waters inside the baselines are treated as internal.
In North Sea, the ICJ assumed that "the length of [the] coast [will
be] measured in the general direction of the coastline" for
246. Id. para. 24. For his attack on 'the arithmetical equity of coastlines and areas' as
'blind and mechanistic proportionality' see id. para. 21.
247. See North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, paras. 89, 91, 98; Anglo-French Arbitration, 16
I.L.M. 54, at 251; Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 76, 93, 120 and paras. 77-102 (Are-
chaga, J., separate opinion); Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, paras. 97-98 (giving
the islands full effect in determining the crucial "coastal configuration and orientation");
Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 70. See also Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 61.
It should be pointed out that establishing the general direction of the coast does not nec-
essarily mean that the dividing line must be parallel to it and even less to the abutting
land frontier. In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber rejected perpendicularity to the direction of
the coast where the two territories met or to the general direction of the coast, on the
ground that they were useful in drawing the dividing line only where the territories of the
two countries "lie successively along a more or less rectilinear coast, for a certain distance
at least." Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 175-76. However, it did draw perpen-
diculars in certain limited contexts.
248. See F. AHNISH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND THE
PRACTICE OF STATES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 11-30 (1993), for a brief but informative
discussion on baselines [hereinafter AHNISH]. See generally Louis B. Sohn, Baseline Con-
siderations, I.M.B. 153-161 (1993); Peter Beazley, Technical Considerations in Maritime
Boundary Delimitations, I.M.B. 243-262 (1993).
Article 7 of UNCLOS provides for the discretionary deployment of straight baselines, from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, across the general direction of the
coast, where the coastline is deeply indented or there is a fringe of islands in its immedi-
ate vicinity. The system, however, has been used more broadly. Most states of the world,
with the significant exception of the United States of America, Japan and Greece, use
basepoints to draw straight baselines, and typically also the breadth of the continental
shelf and the exclusive zone are measured from the same baselines. See Jayewardene,
supra note 6, at 43-79, for the use of straight baselines regarding islands.
249. As stated in North Sea, "[Where the median line is used], the establishment of
one or more baselines.., can play a useful part in eliminating or diminishing the distor-
tions that might result [from coastal anomalies]." North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 98.
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proportionality purposes. 25 0 This suggests straightening in front of the
sinuosities, but not necessarily with straight baselines. Tunisia-Libya
is the first case where the inclusion of the other waters in the
calculation of the size of the shares would have made a big difference, in
this instance against Tunisia. Here we find in the opinions significant
references to both of these issues. While conceding that the continental
shelf, in the legal sense, does not include the sea-bed areas below
territorial and internal waters, the ICJ noted that the coastal state does
enjoy sovereign rights for the purpose of exploiting their natural
resources. Since, for proportionality purposes, the lengths of the coasts
were measured in full and not along straight baselines, it was also
appropriate to include those additional areas in the shares . The only
absolute requirement of equity is that one should compare like with
like.251 The ICJ undercut the cogency of its approach, however, by
emphasizing that this inclusion was not strictly required by
international law but was legitimized by the 'relevant circumstances' in
the case, including the fact that the parties here had not been
calculating their own related waters in the same way and in similar
configurations. 25 2 The ICJ measured the length of the coastlines once
along straight lines following the coast, but apparently technically not
straight baselines and once apparently along the sinuosities, coming up
with comparable results: 31:69 and 34:66.253 In the end, the ICJ
compared these extended lengths with the extended shares and found
them satisfactory.
254
In Gulf of Maine, the Chamber added up the total relevant
coastlines of Canada and the United States as measured along the
coastal fronts in straight lines in a number of segments, 255 not following
all their sinuosities. A major issue was how to measure the coasts of
the Canadian Bay of Fundy, whose wide mouth fronted on the Gulf.
The Chamber counted it as part of the Gulf up to the point where it
narrowed, so that it contained only maritime areas lying no more than
250. Id. para. 101(D)3.
251. Id. para. 104. Judge de Arechaga agreed in a separate opinion, "[that not to in-
clude those areas] would be to commit the sin of formalism; to allow that form of inequity
which the Romans called subtilitas, that is to say, an exaggerated adherence to the strict
letter of the law when equity demands a broader approach for the purposes of compari-
son." (Valticos, J., separate opinion). Id. para. 120. On the other hand, Judge Evensen
was quite critical, especially of the inclusion in the shares of the internal low-depth wa-
ters. Id. para. 23. Including the territorial waters in the calculation had originally been
suggested by Judge Bustamante y Rivero. (Bustamante y Rivero, J., separate opinion) Id.
para. 4.
252. Id. para. 103.
253. North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3, para. 131. See also Judge Evensen, dissenting. Id.
para. 23.
254. Id. para. 131.
255. Id. para. 221.
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12 miles from the coast. 256 Consequently, its coast up to that point, plus
a line across the mouth of the Bay there, was included in the
proportionality calculus. 257 This inclusion had materially favorable
consequences for Canada. The Bay added only 7% to the entire sea area
but apparently increased the length of the Canadian coast by 93%!258
The straightening of the coastal fronts was adumbrated in Libya-
Malta's perception that proportionality requires that "coasts which are
broadly comparable ought not to be treated differently because of a
technical quirk of a particular method of tracing the course of a
boundary line."259  The coasts were measured in straight lines to
produce the figures of 194 and 24 miles.
260
In St.Pierre & Miquelon, the ICJ measured the respective coasts
"by segments, according to their lines of general direction," not
following their sinuosities which would have favored Canada. 261 Judge
Gotlieb took the ICJ to task for relying on longer line segments for
Canada and shorter ones for the islands, thus reducing the disparity in
the ratios; 262 and Judge Weil referred to the elusive and arbitrary ways
of measuring lengths and shares to challenge proportionality
altogether. 263 With regard to the size of the shares awarded, the ICJ
relied on experts who calculated the relevant area, which was allocated
16.4:1 to Canada. 264 Finally, in Jan Mayen the measurement of the
relatively straight and parallel coastlines did not present a problem. 265
While there is some ambiguity on how to calculate the lengths of
lines, and especially the size of shares, for purposes of the
256. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 31.
257.
[Tihe fact that the two coasts opposite each other on the Bay of Fundy
are both Canadian is not a reason to disregard the fact that the Bay is
part of the Gulf of Maine, nor a reason to take only one of these coasts
into account for the purpose of calculating the length of the Canadian
coasts in the delimitation area. There is no justification for the idea
that if a fairly substantial bay opening on to a broader gulf is to be re-
garded as part of it, its shores must not belong all to the same State.
Id. para. 221.
258. Id. at 356 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion). Schwebel argued that the Chamber
should have considered the fact that in the past Canada had claimed that the entire Bay
contained 'internal waters.' Furthermore, the Chamber was accused of being inconsistent
by not making the same fine distinction in calculating the length of the inner coast of the
Massachusetts Bay. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, paras. 354-55.
259. Id. para. 56.
260. Id. para. 68.
261. Id. paras. 8-17 (Gotlieb, J., separate opinion).
262. Id. paras. 8-17 (Gotlieb, J., separate opinion)..
263. Id. para. 24 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion)..
264. Id. para. 93. Judge Gotlieb challenged in great detail the Court's position on
what constituted the relevant area. Id. paras. 34-37 (Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion).
265. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, paras. 89-93
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proportionality calculus, a couple of things stand out as sensible and
grounded in the cases. First and foremost, there must be congruity
between the criteria that determine lengths and those that define
shares. If territorial and even internal sea areas are included in the
shares, then the coast lines that generate them should also be included
in the lengths, and vice-versa. On the merits, the explanation offered in
Tunisia-Libya, the only case that dealt explicitly with issue, of why the
territorial and internal waters may be included in the size of the shares
is sketchy and unconvincing. The definition of the shelf and the
exclusive zone could not be clearer: areas "beyond ... the territorial
sea." 266 Internal waters are defined as those "on the landward side of
the baseline of the territorial sea."267 By what logic are those spaces to
be counted in determining the size of the shelf and zone shares? To be
sure, the coastal state has exploitation rights in these sea-beds and
water columns. But these rights not only arise from a different source,
but they have different content: they are not shelf and exclusive zone
rights, and they trigger the exercise of higher or full sovereignty.
Furthermore, the sovereignty over these waters preceded by centuries
the recognition of the new rights to extended maritime spaces. Thus,
the titles differ in all important respects. The only community is
factual: they all relate to areas under the surface of the water. This
should not suffice to justify penalizing a state for the geography of its
coasts. Second, the coastlines may be divided into sectors and/or be
measured in segments, reflecting the directions of the front and
reducing indentation, with localized straightening, to avoid disparities
between the shares of territorial belts and the shelves. Indeed, we find
here perhaps the kernel of an idea that could prove quite useful as a
surrogate in taking account the length of the fronts. Assuming that we
use the same standards and methods for establishing the territorial
belts and for minimizing the internal waters, a reasonable test of
proportionality should be that the median line has produced shelf and
exclusive zone areas which are not grossly out of line with the total
ratio of territorial belts. In any event, whatever approach is chosen
should apply in a neutral fashion, equally and consistently to the coasts
and shares of all parties.
(ii) Where to Draw the Lines: Symmetry?
Jan Mayen addressed the issue of symmetry in some detail. To
explain why a small segment of the line was moved in a different
manner than the others, the ICJ stated:
So far as the continental shelf is concerned, there is no requirement
266. UNCLOS, arts. 55, 76.
267. Id. art. 8.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
that the line be shifted eastwards consistently throughout its length: if
other considerations might point to another form of adjustment, to
adopt it would be within the measure of discretion conferred on the ICJ
by the need to arrive at an equitable result. For the fishery zones,
equitable access to the resources of the southern part of the area of the
overlapping claims has to be assured by a substantial adjustment or
shifting of the median line provisionally drawn in that region. 268
This now confirms what was implicit in all important cases, that
the line need not be moved equally along its entire length and that
varying approaches can be used in different sectors, taking into
account, if and as appropriate, whether the shelf and/or the zone is
delimited, and taking into account tangential considerations such as
location of natural resources, non-encroachment and no cut-offs.
Within each sector, however, the tendency is to move in a consistent
manner. Total symmetry is not present where some reduced effect or
enclaving is attributed to some coasts, such as in St.Pierre & Miquelon.
On another issue, we may even detect a preference for adjusting in
favor of frontal versus radial projections, although the nature of the
projection does not affect the dimensions of the calculation.
The availability of judicial remedial discretion in line-drawing does
not mean, however, that it should be exercised arbitrarily or at random.
It should be presumed that, in the absence of any articulated and
sufficient factors justifying a departure, symmetry should be the rule as
more consistent both with the notion of appurtenance based on distance
and with neutrality.
(iii) Where to Draw the Lines : Why Not Equi-Ratio?
Practical wisdom requires an effort for the unity of shares and the
avoidance of odd shapes or zig-zag lines. Furthermore, if there is one
field in which an equitable solution is most useful and consecrated, it is
in the fashioning of flexible remedies for concrete needs. The
asymetrical and protruding mushroom shape of the French zones in
St.Pierre & Miquelon makes little sense. To be sure, the ICJ wanted to
demonstrate that islands have full rights by giving them some 200-mile
zones. The differentiation of methods by sectors, here semi-enclaving,
there equidistancing, is also within reason. But why not devise some
technique to construct zones that make geographical sense?
One sensible method for synthesizing equidistance and
proportionality is equiratio, developed by a Dutch hydrographer, 269
268. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, para. 90.
269. Wijnand Langeraar, Maritime Delimitation: The Equiratio Method A New Ap-
proach, MARINE POL'Y 10, 3-18 (1986).
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which works both where a small island faces a massive nearby coast,
such as in St.Pierre & Miquelon, and in difficult adjacent state
delimitations. In the former situation, equidistance normally creates a
parabola which keeps opening as we move backward toward the open
sea. Under equiratio, the 1/1 equidistance parabola can be replaced by
an ellipse maintaining a constant ratio of distances from the nearest
points of the baselines, the dimensions of which can be changed
according to a scale, such as 9/10, 4/5, or 7/10, to reflect a
proportionality correction. Another way of describing equiratio is to
state that the distance part of equi-distance is transformed from 1:1 to
9:10, for example. Applying this technique to Libya-Malta, a .74/1
equiratio would have produced a line very close to the one constructed
by the ICJ,270 which can be interpreted as giving the proportionality
factor a 25% weight. A 9/10 equiratio comes close to explaining the
outcome in North Sea, as finally negotiated, and in Libya-Tunisia,
giving full weight to the islands.27' The beauty of equiratio is three-
fold. First, it helps us bring out to the open and explain what the courts
did both in terms of quantification and of where the lines were drawn.
Thus, we are on the way of constructing guidelines for future
boundaries. Second, it largely by-passes the confusing and unprincipled
apparent discrimination against islands while it does a better job in
effectuating the rationale behind those attempted distinctions. Third, it
provides a model for drawing viable and sensible lines, especially
curved, oval ones, around islands, with or without enclaving, avoiding
rather grotesque shapes such as the one in St.Pierre & Miquelon.
272
When additional considerations must be taken into account,
appropriate deviations may be made ex post.
V. SPECIAL ISSUE : THE STATUS OF ISLAND COASTAL FRONTS
The second doctrinal wrong turn in delimitations, largely due to the
confusion generated by the first one, the escape to equity, concerns the
treatment of islands. Here, we are confronted with what appears as a
major and irreconcilable contradiction. On the one hand, the
international treaties and the cases uniformly recognize the equal
status and rights of all coastal territory, including that of islands.273 On
the other hand, we find in some cases what appears to be the short-
270. Id. at 16-18.
271. Id. at 8-14.
272. The way that dissenting Judge Gotlieb discussed the drawing of borders in St.
Pierre & Miquelon suggests that he would have been receptive to the equiratio technique,
albeit in less generous terms. See St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1186-1189, 1191,
paras. 29-38, 47
273. However, rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life are ex-
cluded. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 121.3.
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changing of minor or small islands through lesser effect, movement
back or enclaving. State practice reflects similar results. Is there
perhaps some equitable way of reconciling these two positions?
At the outset, one is hard put even to articulate a logical or policy
reason for why the extent to which a particular territory of the coastal
state is surrounded by water should be relevant in determining its
continental shelf and economic zone rights. Remember, these rights
derive from, and depend solely on, appurtenance on the territory having
a coastal front. All islands have coastal fronts. These coastal fronts
face equally toward the areas to be delimited. Of course, depending on
the respective coastal fronts, the shares of islands, like the shares of
other territory, may be different (that is larger or smaller) than those of
a particular mainland or of another island. For example, even under
equidistance, the share of Jan Mayen came to about only one-half the
size of the share of Greenland. This was unrelated to the island-
mainland characterization. Is there any other basis for the lesser
treatment of island coastal fronts? Why should it matter whether, for
example, Malta is separated by sea from or is connected to the northen
littoral?
In addition, setting islands apart creates serious practical problems
of administration. To begin with, what is an island? The major
continents of the earth are technically islands. Should Malta be
classified as island but Cyprus or Great Britain or Greenland or
Australia not? Should a promontory surrounded 90% by water be
treated in a similar way?274 Another difficult problem is whether all, or
only some, islands should be diminished. If only some should be, which
ones, why, in what way and how much? In other words, are some
islands more equal than others? 275 In particular, should it matter
whether an island, but not other territory, is politically independent?276
274. See Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 244.
275. The wide shelf areas with plenty of islands which exist in many places on earth,
also indicate that it would be a very difficult task in practice to establish criteria for dis-
tinguishing between islands entitled to a shelf of their own and other islands. Lars Delin,
Shall Islands Be Taken Into Account When Drawing the Median Line According to Article
6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf?, 41 NORDS. INT. RET. 205, 208 (1971).
276. The references to political independence appear inconclusive. In the Anglo-
French Arbitration, the Court stated that the Channel Islands "only as islands of the
United Kingdom, not as semi-independent States," Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M.
54, para. 186, have "their own entitlement to continental shelf separate from the United
Kingdom." Id. para. 190. In Libya-Malta, Malta's argument that as an 'island State' it
had some sort of special status was rejected. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 53. See
Bowett, supra note 6, at 133-34, for a discussion on the ambiguities of Anglo-French Arbi-
tration and Libya-Malta. The most unequivocal statements against different treatment
appear in St. Pierre & Miquelon:
In the view of this Court there are no grounds for contending that the
extent of the maritime rights of an island depends on its political
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After so many adjudications and settlements over a long period,,
most of which involved islands, and with the help of so many relevant
texts, the time is ripe to move beyond the ad hoc indeterminacy of
impressionism. It is time to search for the rhyme and reason of any
special rules applicable to islands, as well as, some method of carrying
them out.277 Many future delimitations involve islands in complicated
geographical patterns, 278 and some guidelines are desperately needed.
The literature on this topic is a bit dated, as it was written mostly
before St.Pierre & Miquelon and Jan Mayen, the major island cases,
and it tends to be mostly descriptive. For lack of a better explanation,
some commentators sought the reason for the different treatment of
islands in their location, in how close they were to the coasts of their
own versus the other states. Is this the right path?
A. The Conventions
First, both Article 1 of the Geneva Convention and Article 121.2 of
UNCLOS solemnly recognize that islands enjoy equal status and equal
continental shelf and exclusive zone maritime rights with any other
configuration of territory.
This position received a boost when all attempts by delegates from
certain nations at the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, which
produced UNCLOS, to reduce, circumscribe, and even eliminate, in
status. No distinction in this respect is made by Article 121, para-
graph 2 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea or by the corre-
sponding provisions of the 1958 Conventions ....
St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, para. 49.
However, non-independence may affect the mechanics of drawing the lines since the in-
clusion of an island, as of any other non-independent territory, in an overall delimitation
may have an impact, for example, reflecting considerations of proportionality to the total
coast lengths. It should also be mentioned here that the past debates, especially in UN
contexts, on the special status of islands under 'foreign' control located near the coasts of
states freed from colonial domination, which remain in any event inconclusive, have no
impact on the general issue of island maritime entitlements. See SYMMONS, supra note 6,
at 57-60
277. Compare, Charney, Progress, supra note 4, at 256, n. 153, stating that:
There are grounds to demur [to Judge Weeramantry's argument in
Jan Mayen that it is too early for conveyance toward more determina-
tive law]. In the last 50 years, there have been more separate interna-
tional adjudications and arbitrations on this subject of public interna-
tional law than any other. Furthermore, approximately one-third of
the potential maritime boundaries have already been settled by
agreement or otherwise. If now is too early, when would it be time?
278. Many of the Central East Asian maritime boundaries can be so classified. See
e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the
Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 724-749 (1995).
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certain contexts, island rights were resoundingly rejected. 279 These
proposals focused primarily on location and the more drastic ones would
have eliminated tout court the entitlements of islands situated closer to
another state:
Islands which are situated on the continental shelf of another state, or
which on the basis of their geographical location affect the normal
continental shelf or EEZ of another state shall have no economic zone
or continental shelf of their own.
280
Turkey had also made a separate complex proposal eliminating the
rights of smaller islands providing that an island:
situated in the economic zone or the continental shelf of other States
shall have no economic zone or continental shelf of its own if it does not
contain at the least one tenth of the land area and population of the
State to which it belongs'. 281
A subsequent proposal, which addressed the broader category of
non-adjacent islands but which was more limited in scope and reach,
provided that the maritime spaces of such islands:
shall be delimited on the basis of relevant factors taking into account
equitable criteria .... These equitable criteria should normally relate to
(a) the size of these normally formed areas of land (b) their
geographical configuration and their geological and geomorphological
structure (c) the needs and interests of the population living thereon (d)
the living conditions which prevent a permanent settlement of
population (e) whether these islands are situated within, or in the
proximity of, the maritime space of another state (f) whether, due to
their situation far from the coasts, they may influence the equity of the
delimitation.' (emphasis added).
28 2
Note that all of these criteria (size, geomorphology, needs and
interests of population, living conditions, and even location as such)
have been either explicitly rejected, or have not been taken into
consideration in the prior cases. This stance is even more clearly
reflected in the subsequent cases. UNCLOS did not even include any
provisions that qualified the maritime rights of islands in the context of
279. See generally SYMMONS, supra note 6, at 94-100 (discussing the early phases).
These early proposals were intended to promote national interests rather than to reflect
an opinio juris and not one of them was incorporated in or affected in any way the final
text of UNCLOS. KARL, supra note 6, at 645. It is also to be remembered that Iranian
and Italian proposals in the negotiations leading to the Geneva Convention to discount
islands were heavily defeated in 1953.
280. AICONF.62/c.2/L 96 (proposed by nine states).
281. Id. at L.55 (Article 3.2).
282. Id. at L.62, Rev. 1.
VOL. 26:3
LIFTING THE VEILS OF EQUITY
a semi-enclosed sea. 28 3 This decisive and generalized defeat of all these
qualifications also established, beyond doubt, especially after the
demise of the natural prolongation concept, that islands as such
situated near another state are not themselves just special
circumstances sitting on such state's shelf.28 4 Rather, they have full
entitlements either on their own, or in conjunction with other territory
fronting on the delimitation area.
B. The Cases and the Commentators
Beside the texts of the Conventions, we find in the cases many
authoritative, unequivocal assertions that islands have the same rights
as any other territory.28 5 Indeed, we cannot find a single unambiguous
judicial statement qualifying or reducing the entitlements of islands as
such. This suggests that Article 121.2 of UNCLOS codifies customary
international law.
Why, then, in many cases and in a good number of state
settlements do we find in certain islands' situations diminished shelves
and zones below the equidistance reduction, drawn without much
explanation beyond the notion that 'I know equity when I see it?' Is
there some logic, some principle, or some practical wisdom underlying
this differentiation beside an a priori lesser entitlement of islands as
such? Is proportionality perhaps the explanation for these situations?
Many commentators did not seriously pursue that explanation. One
reason was that courts and states have been hesitant to give that much
explicit weight to proportionality. The other reason was that many
283. As had been proposed by Turkey (A/CONF.62/C.2/L.55) and this despite the fact
that UNCLOS recognizes the concept of an "enclosed or semi-enclosed" sea (Part IX, Arti-
cle 122-123) and provides for certain duties of cooperation and coordination of the littoral
states. Incidentally, the irrelevance of that concept in boundary formation is reflected in
Libya-Malta where the International Court of Justice referred to the entire Mediterra-
nean as being a "semi-enclosed sea" and still applied the same general criteria of delimi-
tation. Id. para. 47. This, of course, does not mean that, where proportionality adjust-
ments are being made in tight quarters, the radial projections of shorter coasts may be
where the cuts are to be made. Cf. Evans, supra note 199, at 686.
284. As explained by Judge Schwebel in his separate opinion in Jan Mayen:
The acceptance of islands as a special circumstance in the travaux
preparatoires (of the Geneva Convention) plainly refers to islands
whose situation or size or other characteristics may constitute a spe-
cial circumstance in a delimitation between two other coasts; an island
was not conceived to be of itself a special circumstance which affects
its own coastal projections. That concept is so bizarre that naturally it
finds no expression in the intentions of those who drafted the 1958
Convention.
Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, at 121-23. See also Karl, supra note 6, at 651
285. This position was recognized early in no lesser case than North Sea, 1969 I.C.J.
3, para. 57; see also JAYEWARDENE, supra note 6, at 344.
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commentators mentally focused on the model of two mainland states,
first dividing maritime spaces of less than 400 total miles between their
coasts, then adding islands on the map to see what effect they would
have on the delimitation. In that context, it is easy to understand why
the island distance criterion became relevant, and why it made sense to
classify the islands into three categories: islands close to their own
mainland, islands straddling the median line, and islands closer to the
other state's mainland. The rhetoric associated with this locational
approach proceeded to label islands as being on the wrong side of the
median line, or deflecting it excessively or distorting the geographical
situation. Once this characterization is accepted, it sounds sensible
that such islands should be pushed back to their proper place.
28 6
It seems to me that this approach not only reflects false
assumptions, but fails to guide us toward a method for the resulting
adjustments. The idea of islands being at the wrong place or on the
wrong side assumes that we have predetermined where the right side
lies. Perhaps the Creator, or nature, first generated the mainlands and
endowed them with their entitlements, and then mistakingly, or at
least inadvertently, cast the islands where they do not belong. With
equal plausibility we could argue the reverse, that after the sea came
the islands and the continents constitute misplaced latecomers. The
absurdity of this distinction is only further strengthened by the fact
that it does not take size into account, so that an island would come
second even where its coast is longer than that of the mainland. It is
apparent that this approach not only begs the question, but violates the
cardinal rule of delimitation, that geography should not be refashioned.
The second, fatal, flaw of this explanation is that it tells us nothing
about how much and where the island shares should be diminished. We
need a measuring rod to determine how much deflection of the normal
line is excessive or distortive, as well as a technique of correction. (How
much lesser effect (a half, a third?), and how (e.g. movement back?) and
when is partial or full enclaving justified instead, and of what size?)
Excessiveness or distortion presuppose that we know what is proper
and normal. As explained earlier, most of the typical characteristics of
a piece of territory, including an island, such as landmass, population,
economic need and political status have been eclipsed as relevant
factors. The distance-to-its-own-versus-to another-mainland idea which
underlies the wrong place argument not only lacks legal authentication
286. This approach was cultivated especially by Karl, supra note 6, at 651, 654-63 and
Pazarci, supra note 6, at 92, 246, 257, 327, 336. It has also been elaborated by
JAYEWARDENE, supra note 6, at 349-70. The latter author refined the classification, cre-
ating seven categories of islands: coastal, offshore, offlying, right-side, astride the median
line, wrong-side and detached. Id. at 366-70.
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but also it is difficult to manage. 28 7
It follows that where the 200-mile radius from a mainland, or for
that matter from another island with competing claims, extends to shelf
or to exclusive zone waters behind a distant island, all sides of such
island facing toward the same areas should count. There is no such
thing as a natural back side of a distant island. As the competing
mainland coast is counted first to share the in-between space with the
inner side of the island, and then again to share in full the outer space
with the external side of the island, all sides of the island constitute
relevant coasts. 28 8 The concerns expressed about islands projecting in
more directions than mainlands, especially straight ones, and thus a
mile of an island coast getting more mileage than a mainland mile,289
287. Karl's approach, including the basepoint dimension, is to recognize genuine shelf
rights only to islands lying close to their own mainland, to independent insular states and
to distant islands on the wrong side. Karl, supra note 6, at 654-61 and at 669, n. 108.
This bundling not only brings in the questionable factor of independence but leads to the
paradox that far off distant islands fare better than such islands within 400 miles of their
mainland! As for the remaining islands, Karl further subdivides them into 'substantial'
ones (more or less 25% of the territory of the state) and the rest, and short changes the
rest by providing for them only territorial waters, giving the benefit of the proportionality
factor only to substantial islands. Id. at 662-64. The Karl approach is not plausible ei-
ther in its classifications or in its outcomes. See also Jayewardene, supra note 6.
288. While the cases contain little explicit language on this issue, mostly because it
did not really matter in most contexts, there is nothing to suggest a different approach.
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, as well as in Gulf of Maine, the length of the coasts of
the islands was insignificant and the proportionality adjustment was very gross. It would
appear that the treatment of the coastal front of the islands in St. Pierre & Miquelon is
consistent with the position taken in the text. Indeed, the Court included in the propor-
tionality measurements all sides of the French islands except those that fronted on the
area charted by the 1972 territorial sea delimitation agreement between the two coun-
tries. By the same token, however, the Canadian coasts facing the same area were
equally excluded. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1145, paras. 30-33; cf. paras. 8-25
(Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion).
This issue has also escaped the attention of the publicists. Karl is not sufficiently explicit:
on the one hand, he agrees that the "measure of an island's size for the purpose of delimi-
tation is... the length of [its] coastline," and clarifies in his footnote that we count "the
amount of coastline that borders the area to be delimited," suggesting a total measure-
ment. Karl, supra note 6, at 663, n. 86. On the other hand, he adds that "the maximum
length of an island would be an appropriate measure of the length of the island's coast-
line," id., and it is not clear that he includes all sides facing the delimitation areas in his
mathematical calculations for the Aegean.
Of course, when the overlapping claims do not extend to the sea areas 'behind' an island
or group of islands, as happened, for example, in Jan Mayen, Libya-Malta, and
GuinealGuinea-Bissau, we count only the front side of the island, plus the lateral sides as
appropriate. While, for the Aegean, Karl apparently takes in only the northern coastline
of the Greek island of Crete, this is justifiable since the other side of Crete does not border
on the area under delimitation. Id. at 671-72, n.116
289. Pazarci has been arguing that it is inequitable for an island to project in four di-
rections when the mainland projects in fewer, maybe only one. Pazarci, supra note 6, at
289-90, 307-08.
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are taken care of by the proportionality adjustment, as will be explained
below.
In the opposite situation, where an island is situated along its own
mainland, foreclosing the latter's projection to the outer area, and
where the water space between them is less than the internal waters
plus the double breadth of the territorial sea, that is less than 24 miles
from the baselines, both inner coasts should not count for shelf and
exclusive zone purposes, and the external side of the island should
constitute the relevant maritime front.290 The same logic applies within
a group of islands, as was recognized in Guinea/Guinea-Bissau. In the
Bijagos Archipelago, the nearest island was two miles from its
mainland, the furthest island was 37 miles away, and no two islands
were further apart than five miles. Without the islands, the length of
the coasts would have been 128-154.291 Counting the perimeter of each
would have transformed the shorter coast into a much longer one. The
Tribunal took into account only the outer perimeter of the group.
292
This is sensible since the coast of a group of islands should not be
considered to be longer than if the water space between them was land.
An evaluation of the outcomes in the cases and of most settlements
shows that the island-distance criterion lacks explanatory power. The
adjudicated boundaries which appear to disfavor islands are reflective
of two quite unexceptional ideas: first, the natural diminution of the
shares of shorter shores under equidistance, 293 and second, the further
correction for gross disproportionality to total coastal fronts. This
produces moves of islands back, or downgrades in establishing base
points for the total shelf and zone, or half-enclaves or even total
enclaves in proper circumstances, for example, with small, minor
islands far off their main coast. All these particularizations, when
properly executed, are not inconsistent with the full rights of islands to
the maximum limit of 200 miles in all directions of all coastal fronts. A
more particularized analysis of the cases indeed supports the
proportionality-adjustment explanation.
In the Anglo-French Arbitration, where the whole thing started, the
ICJ accepted the position that islands have full continental shelf
rights.294 However, the presence of these islands, by virtue of their
particular geographical circumstances, led to modification of the strict
290. In Tunisia-Libya, there was no question that only the front of the Kerkennahs
counted and this is consistent with the position reflected in the text. Tunisia-Libya, 1982
I.C.J. 18. Cf. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 269-70, 335-36, paras. 31, 221.
291. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 95(b).
292. Id. para. 97.
293. See, e.g., Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. 38, , at 174-75 (Shahabuddeen, J., separate
opinion); Id. at para. 92 (Oda, J., separate opinion).
294. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, paras. 158, 190-94.
VOL. 26:3
1998 LIFTING THE VEILS OF EQUITY
equidistance line, which would have given most of the Channel shelf
and an inordinate portion of the near-Atlantic shelf to Great Britain.
The reasoning is rather clear: reduced effect to the islands was only the
result of an adjustment to correct disproportionality to coast lengths
equitably. 295 No other type of proportionality surfaced as potentially
relevant. 296 The references to the islands being detached from their
mainland and on the wrong side of the median line related to the
creation of a radical distortion of the boundary, not to their being
islands. 297 Indeed, the ICJ would have treated the Scilly Isles the same
way had they been a promontory. 298 The source of the distortion was the
perception that the shares of the shelf should not be manifestly
disproportionate to the length of the relevant coastlines, which were
comparable in this case. 299 Enclaving or half-effect for islands is just an
adjustment technique applicable to shorter coastlines. For the Channel
Islands, enclaving was just the practical solution. 30 0 If they had been
closer to Great Britain, or if they stretched out one after another long
distances from the mainland, another technique would have been to
divert the course of the mid-Channel median line toward France.
30 1
Alternatively, if there had been more space in the area, the islands
could have received the benefits of equidistance, compensating France
by shifting the line in the other regions in its favor under a total
adjustment approach. 302 In the Atlantic region, with more space to
295. Id. para. 202.
296. The Court suggested in dicta that proportionality is a more general concept, ex-
tending to other potentially relevant geographical features or configurations, but none
appeared on the scene in this case. Id. paras. 99- 100.
297. Id. para. 199.
298. Id. paras. 244, 250.
299. The Court referred to the 'equality of the two States in their geographical
relation to the continental shelf of the Channel' with coast lengths of about 300 miles
each, to the disturbance by the islands of the 'balance of the geographical circumstances'
and to the 'substantial diminution of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise
accrue to the French Republic,... prima facie a circumstance creative of inequity and
calling for e method of delimitation that in some measure redresses this inequity.' Id. at
paras. 181, 195, 183, 196. For the near-Atlantic region, the logic was the same. Id. paras.
243-244.
300. The Court was apparently also aided in its approach of enclaving the Channel
islands by the perception that Great Britain had agreed with the notion that there were
two separate delimitations, not one total. Consequently, it treated the island question in
a three-way manner as if Great Britain itself was claiming against the islands, in which
case the concept of enclaving would have been meaningless, but the shortness of the
shores of the islands would have counted heavily against them when measured against
the opposite French coast. Id. paras. 190, 201-02. France's proportionality argument also
envisaged the possibility of treating the islands in a similar 'micro-geographical' way on
the basis both of the actual lengths of the coasts and of the maritime facades. Id. para.
166.
301. Anglo-French Arbitration, 16 I.L.M. 54, para. 199; see also id. para. 177
302. The Court suggested that this approach was appropriate for situations such as
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spare, there was only a half-effect proportionality correction, 30 3 to offset
the fact that the Scilly Islands projected the English coast twice as far
into the ocean as the corresponding French island of Ushant.
30 4
Two islands played a role in Tunisia-Libya: the Kerkennahs and
Jerba. Their status as islands did not remove them from consideration
as claimants to the maritime areas. 30 5 The ICJ concluded, however,
that using a median line approach amounted to giving the islands too
much weight, as this approach straightened the coastline seaward fully
in front of the Kerkennahs, which were located close to their own state,
(thus adding a big chunk of ocean space to Tunisia's share, 30 6) and made
the waters behind them internal waters.307 While the ICJ did not
elaborate on what created this excessiveness, the context points to
proportionality. To correct it, the ICJ drew two coastal lines, one giving
these islands full effect, and another ignoring them. The ICJ then cut
the resulting area in half,30 8 thus notionally moving them half-way back
toward the coast. 30 9 With regards to the Tunisian island of Jerba, the
ICJ gave it full effect, as if it were a promontory, but concluded that the
other factors in the first sector overrode its projection, as they also did
certain other projections of the mainland.
310
Two minor questions relating to islands arose in Gulf of Maine. In
the segment where the proportionality adjustment was to be made, the
Chamber recognized that Seal Island, a small island near the Canadian
St. Pierre and Miquelon where the abundant oceanic spaces left room for compensatory
adjustment. Id. para. 200. It is an interesting question whether the actual St. Pierre &
Miquelon decision, rendered much later, can be explained in those terms
303. Id. para. 249.
304. Id. para. 251.
305. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, para. 79. See also R.D. Hodgson, The Tunisio-
Libyan Continental Shelf Case, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 16, 28-29 (1984).
306. Tunisia-Libya, 1982 I.C.J. 18, paras. 78, 122, 124.
307. Id. para. 128.
308. Id. paras. 128-129.
309. Even this limited reduction of the rights of the Kerkennahs was controversial.
Three judges disagreed, but a fourth judge would give them no effect at all. Judge Gros
disputed the presence of disproportionality and castigated the Court because "in sum, the
Tunisian coastline was effaced ... as if some geographical features did not exist .... This
is a perfect example of trying to unmake geography." Id. paras. 14-15. According to
Judge Evensen, giving half-effect to these islands, whose size approaches that of Malta
and which form an archipelago, without an explanation about 'excessiveness,' violates the
equitable principle of not refashioning nature. Id. paras. 17, 19. Judge Schwebel also
criticized the lack of explanation of the notion of 'excessive weight.' Id. at 99. On the
other hand, Judge Oda was wedded to the notion of straightening the coastlines before
applying equidistance moderated with proportionality, calculated in the general direction
of the coast. Id. paras.169-72, 179, 183-87.
310. Id. paras. 79, 131.
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coast, was entitled to full maritime rights but refused to locate
basepoints on it because "it would be excessive to treat the coastline of
Nova Scotia as transferred south-westwards [forward] by the whole of
the distance between [it] and that coast."311  The solution, quite
generous in result, was to give the island half-effect for a transverse
displacement of the median line. 312 The U.S. island of Nantucket fell
outside the delimitation area, as the ICJ did not use strict equidis-
tance, 313 but rather drew a median line following the general direction
of the Massachusetts coast parallel to Nova Scotia. However, since the
parties had already agreed that Nantucket was to be used as the
farthest U.S. point in drawing the closing line that separated the inner
and outer Gulf,314 its location shifted that line in the direction of
Canada. Thus, its indirect impact was significant.
The Tribunal in Guinea/Guinea-Bissau had to deal with three
categories of islands. First, it had to contend with the islands close to
the coast of Guinea-Bissau. Second, it had to deal with the Bijagos
Islands Archipelago of Guinea-Bissau, consisting of many islands
within two to 37 miles of the coast and five miles of each other. Within
this inner region, the ICJ treated all of the water as territorial. Both
sets of islands were treated as mainlands for purposes of determining
the crucial "coastal configuration and orientation, '" 31 5 and "the general
direction of the entire coastline of the country,"31 6 and therefore, the
coastal projection and the drawing of baselines. In addition, their
seaward projection (but not their entire perimeter, since they were
treated like promontories) was counted in determining the length of the
coastlines. This treatment of the Bijagos alone added 20% to the
Guinea-Bissau coast length, and brought it to the same level as that of
Guinea. 317 The third category consisted of a few islands scattered in
shallow waters closer to Guinea, the most important one being the
Guinean island of Alcatraz. 318 The Tribunal recognized their maritime
rights.319 Using equidistance and a southern limit line derived from a
treaty, the Tribunal considered Alcatraz, which was located only 2.25
miles on the right side of that line, as a factor of delimitation on its own,
311. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 222.
312. Id.
313. Counting it and Cape Cod under strict equidistance would have increased the
U.S. maritime zones by roughly eight times their land area in the outer region. See Jan
Schneider, The Gulf of Maine Case: The Nature of an Equitable Result, 79 AM. J. INT'L L.
539, 558 (1985). Canada had proposed that they be ignored under equidistance. Gulf of
Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 182.
314. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. 246, para. 33.
315. Guinea/Guinea-Bissau, 24 I.L.M. 267, para. 98.
316. Id. para. 97.
317. Id.
318. Id. para. 95.
319. Id.
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and gave it territorial waters of 12 miles extending above the line. As
this shifted the entire line for a considerable length, its effect on the
delimitation of the shelf and exclusive zone exceeded by far the 12-mile
limit.
In Libya-Malta, the parties had already agreed that "the
entitlement to continental shelf is the same for an island as for
mainland."320 This equality means that their coasts are subject to the
same adjustments for distortions, such as disproportionality of shares to
coastal lengths. 321 It was this factor, in the context of the proximity to
the northern littoral of the Mediterranean, that justified shifting the
median line northward.
If there ever was a case where a couple of small islands standing
very close to a massive mainland, and without any geographical support
from their own mainland, arrogantly claimed equal treatment, it was
St.Pierre & Miquelon! Yet, the ICJ rejected the idea that their share
was to be reduced because they were purportedly superimposed on the
Canadian continental shelf,322 or because they were not independent.
323
By the way, Newfoundland itself is as much of an island as St.Pierre
and Miquelon! 324 No, islands should not be enclaved within their
territorial sea; 325 and yes, they have the potential of generating full 200-
mile zones. 326 No, the location of potential hydrocarbon resources has
no bearing on this delimitation. 327  Judge Weil applauded this
treatment of islands which, in his view, abandons the impossible and
internally contradictory theory of special geographical circumstances
and constitutes, therefore, a milestone. 328 With this case, any doubts
about the equal treatment of islands have been laid to rest.
Finally, in Jan Mayen, Denmark had not even argued that Jan
Mayen, which is basically an uninhabited island resembling a rock, had
320. Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 52. The Court recognized, however, the possi-
bility that the coasts of an independent states, be it an island or other kind of territory,
may have a different relationship to the neighboring coasts than the same coasts if they
belonged to the same state.
321. Cf. Judge Oda's view that the effect of "narrow promontories of peninsulas or
even of islands" might be mitigated in "settling the basepoints on coastlines." Id. para.
68. See also id. para. 70.
322. "[S]ince it is all one shelf it cannot be considered as exclusively Canadian. Each
coastal segment has its share of the shelf." St. Pierre Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. 1149, para. 46.
323. St. Pierre & Miquelon, 31 I.L.M. at 1164-65, paras. 48-51.
324. Id. para. 52.
325. Id. para. 68. On the lack of precision of the term 'enclave' see also the point made
by Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion, that even if France had won on equidistance, the entire
French zone would have been 'enclaved', i.e. contained within an outer Canadian zone.
Id. para. 38 (Gotlieb, J., dissenting opinion).
326. Id. para. 74.
327. Id. paras. 89-91. Cf. Id. para. 34 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion).
328. Id. paras. 46-48 (Weil, J., dissenting opinion). See also Id. paras. 18-19.
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no entitlement to a continental shelf or fishery zone of its own, possibly
even within the exception of Article 121.3 of UNCLOS. Its position was
only that it can only be accorded partial effect. The rejection of this
contention by the ICJ deserves a full quote:
The coast of Jan Mayen, no less than that of eastern Greenland,
generates potential title to the maritime areas recognized by customary
law, i.e. in principle up to a limit of 200 miles from its baselines. To
attribute to Norway merely the residual area left after giving full effect
to the eastern coast of Greenland, would run wholly counter to the
rights of Jan Mayen and also to the demands of equity.
329
Jan Mayen rejected even the terminology of islands receiving
partial effect. It is quite remarkable that no judge in Jan Mayen took
the position that islands, as such, should be treated differently than
other kinds of territory. Judge Adjibola quoted Vattel to the effect that:
"A dwarf is no less of a man than a giant. A small Republic is no
less of a State than the most powerful Kingdom"... .Thus however
small the Island of Jan Mayen may be, this cannot affect its rights
under international law with respect to the issue of entitlement and the
non-encroachment principle .... since Jan Mayen is acknowledged to be
an island, it is entitled to the considerations that would normally be
attached to other land territory."
330
Judge Schwebel reminded us that an island in itself cannot be a
special circumstance with limited coastal projections: "That concept is
so bizarre that naturally it finds no expression in the intentions of those
who drafted the 1958 [Geneva] Convention. '" 3
31
While the negotiated settlements do not contain as many clues on
their reasoning and motivation, and sometimes are affected by political
considerations and bargaining with trade-offs and concessions, 332 they
329. Id. at para. 70. See also paras. 60, 80
330. Id. at 292, 300(Ajibola, J., separate opinion).
331. Id. at 123 (Schwebel, J., separate opinion).
332. Negotiated settlements as such, even when they fall into certain patterns, absent
an opinio juris sive necessitatis or at least opinio aequitatis, do not establish norms of in-
ternational law because they often reflect other considerations. According to the editor of
the massive study of more than 130 maritime boundary delimitation settlements spon-
sored by the American Society of International Law, the results of which are reported in
the IMB volumes:
To no one's surprise, few patters of state practice and opinio juris have
merged from these settlements. While the augmented access to this
information of foreign offices, courts and other tribunal may encourage
the development of new law, at present the international judgments
and awards have the leading oar in these murky waters.
Charney, Progress, supra note 6, at 228-29.
A striking example of the potential discrepancy between adjudication and negotiation is
provided by the Jan Mayen story itself. In the negotiated settlement between Jan Mayen
1998
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are, overall, consistent with this jurisprudence.
C. Conclusion
The message is clear: islands as such enjoy equal status with any
other land configurations. In every instance where an island was
somehow given lesser effect, or status below equidistance, a
proportionality adjustment was being made. In no case was an island
of comparable coastal dimensions with a mainland treated differently.
The share of every island, however, like that of any other coastal
territory, is affected by applicable considerations in the general
geographical context.
VI. CONCLUSION
The equitable storm unleashed by North Sea upon maritime
delimitations is proving to be more like a tempest in a teapot. At that
early juncture, with enormous ocean stakes up for grabs, and with
divergent state interests, the ICJ wanted to preserve some flexibility in
searching for principles, methods and factors other than equidistance,
leaving some space for a more complex notion of natural prolongation,
and giving some weight to the length of the coastal frontage. This
quasi-heretical stance needed some heavy-duty protective juridical
cover, and the respectable and suitably open-ended notion of equity lent
its wings.
But genuine equity had very little to do with the dilemmas that
were addressed in drawing the boundaries of the continental shelf and
of the exclusive economic zone. Despite their ritual invocation, no
recognizable equitable principles emerged in the delimitations.
Equitable maxims which inform, and sometimes override, the specific
rules of the law, such as the doctrines of clean hands, estoppel,
acquiescence, and unjust enrichment, or corrections for mistake, undue
influence and fraud, or notions that substance prevails over form and
that rights should be pursued diligently or at least should not be
(Norway) and Iceland, the latter received the entire 200-mile zone toward Jan Mayen. In
the Jan Mayen case, Denmark sought to invoke this precedent against Jan Mayen on the
theory that it constitutes relevant conduct of the parties on what is equitable. Norway
argued that the agreement represented a 'political concession'. Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J.
38, paras. 82-84. The Court rejected the Danish position, stating that, "in the context of
relations governed by treaties, it is always for the parties concerned to decide, by agree-
ment, in what conditions their mutual relations can best be balanced." Id. para. 86. In
the eventual decision under international law, Greenland, despite its size and coastline,
received substantially less than 200 miles. See also Judge Shahabuddeen's separate
opinion, id. paras. 18-20; Libya-Malta, 1985 I.C.J. 13, para. 44
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exercised in an abusive manner, which have made a dent in
international law, have no relevance to the delimitation issues. The
search for equitable results proved equally elusive. The typical
equitable flexible remedies such as personal injunctions (including
specific performance), or adequate financial compensation, are beside
the point. The courts displayed little imagination where the remedial
aspect of equity could have helped to produce viable zones rather than
geographical aberrations, such as the St.Pierre & Miquelon mushroom
pie. The general interpretative mandate that equal circumstances
should be treated equally, and that the relevant factors should receive
their proportionate weight, presupposes that the equality and relevance
of the circumstances and factors are supplied by some identifiable
source. The courts, however, made clear that this source could not be
abstract equity or distributive justice or refashioning of geography or
just shares. Furthermore, despite some language suggesting otherwise,
the courts did not espouse a theory equivalent to abstract justice, that is
ad hoc solutions to unique geographical situations, to be perceived
through some form of unmediated and intuitive meditation over
multiple considerations and incommensurable circumstances. Indeed,
there are few subjects in human knowledge where the variety of
circumstances is more easily catalogued, classified and organized than
geography, especially the types of coastlines and their seaward
extensions. In this field, principled and predictable guidelines are
feasible and desirable. In other words, equity of the type produced by
the Chancellor's foot or, more fittingly here, the mermaid's tail, was
least needed.
This brought the courts back in a circle to square one. The source
of the equity of delimitations were the regimes of the continental shelf
and exclusive zone themselves. Such regimes had to be explored and
defined directly and internally, and the equitable label was at best
superfluous and confusing. Only standard logical and teleological
interpretation, i.e. conforming the maritime boundaries to the rationale
of the law of continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, was needed.
Such rationale was clear enough: geographical extension of land
sovereignty over appertaining seabeds and water columns.
Methodologically, however, the escape to equity produced great
confusion. To suggest without more that equidistance, which is based
on the very notion of equality, produces distortions which lead to
inequitable solutions borders on the apocryphal; to say that it leads to
inequitable results because it does not take into account all relevant
circumstances calls for the ouija board! After a quarter century of
refinement through seven major cases, a large number of delimitation
agreements, a comprehensive new global treaty on the law of the sea,
and extensive commentaries by publicists, the regime of continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone boundaries has reached maturity and
no longer needs the equity blanket. Virtually all potentially relevant
1998
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factors and considerations have been tried out in variegated settings;
most were rejected. The darling on North Sea, natural prolongation,
did not float. Economic, social, political, demographic justice, and even
geology and geography other than the coastal front were ruled out.
This negative clearance did not touch equidistance, whose role
remained major, in fact, and whose practical and equitable virtues
became increasingly recognized. Only one significant competitor of
equidistance has emerged during this maturation period: the
reasonable proportionality of shares to the length of the relevant
coastlines. Equidistance already reflects proportionality both in that it
allocates shares proportionate to distances from the coast, and that
shorter coasts typically have lesser projections. However, some further
adjustments may become necessary. Furthermore, even under a fixed
geometrical method such as equidistance, the coastal front needs to be
identified and streamlined. Proportionality does not replace or compete
with equidistance on the same plane, but rather operates to moderate
its results if, and to the extent that, geometrical method produces a
gross disproportion between the share of continental shelf or exclusive
economic zone allotted and the length of the coastline on which the
claim is based. The mechanics of correcting disproportionality have not,
as yet, been worked out adequately. A very rough and oversimplified
quantification of the results suggests a formula between two-to-one and
three-to-one equidistance-proportionality.
It is also important to mention that the reasonable proportionality
factor opens up the field for some discretionary, non-symmetrical
readjustment of lines, which enables the courts to take care of two
nagging problems in this field. First, the treatment of islands:
proportionality makes it possible to look through the distinctions
between full, half or lesser effect or enclaving or semi-enclaving of
islands, which produce discrimination fundamentally inconsistent with
the equal rights of islands, and give all islands full effect but draw lines
closer to them in order to make the total shares correspond more to
total coast lengths. Second, such tangential factors as no-cut-off,
security and the location of resources: while equidistance normally
takes care of these ideas, some rare situations may arise needing
specialized attention. Furthermore, the non-symmetrical adjustments
of shares through proportionality may be made in a manner that
preserves their unity and corresponds to the applicable criteria of
sharing, either geographical or reflecting the need to avoid catastrophic
consequences. A method called equiratio may make the adjustments
more intelligible and intelligent.
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CIVIL AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS AS AN
ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM FOR
MASSIVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
VED P. NANDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil and political sanctions applied on an individual basis and with
due process for the defendant serve an important function as one of the
accountability mechanisms available to redress massive violations of
human rights. I start from the premise that, as a matter of policy,
there must be accountability and no political tradeoffs which result in
the sacrifice of justice at the altar of perceived but illusory peace, for the
dichotomy is false, as justice is a prerequisite for obtaining a peace that
is to endure.
The existing legal framework, notwithstanding several gaps and
weaknesses, suffices to reach the jus cogens violations-war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide and torture-and other egregious
and heinous human rights violations as well.2 However, both national
and international implementation and enforcement mechanisms are in-
adequate and ineffective, and several recommendations have been of-
fered to remedy the situation.
3
Any discussion on the goals of the sanctioning process has to ad-
dress the four pertinent perspectives-those of the victim, the defen-
*Vice Provost, Evans University Professor, and Director, International Legal Studies Pro-
gram, University of Denver. I wish to express my deep appreciation to Professor Cherif
Bassiouni and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences for
hosting the important conference on "Reining In Impunity for International Crimes and
Serious Violations of Fundamental Human Rights" in Siracusa in September 1997 and for
bringing together such an illustrious group of scholars and activists committed in the
cause of human rights.
2. The development of international human rights norms in the post-UN era, both
conventional norms and customary international law norms, is indeed impressive. The
major difficulty is with lack of effective implementation.
3. See generally IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 203-205 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (hereinafter IMPUNITY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS); Accountability for International Crimes, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4
(Autumn 1996) (a special symposium issue on the subject with several recommendations
from several authors to remedy the situation).
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dant, the society which has gone through the trauma in question, and
the world order. Based upon several perspectives, including those of
the New Haven School, 4 Professor Michael Reisman has recently syn-
thesized the "fundamental sanctioning goals for the protection, restora-
tion, and improvement of public order" into seven specific goal pro-
grams-i) prevention of public order violations, 2) suspension of the
occurring public order violations, 3) deterrence of potential public order
violations, 4) a restoration of public order, 5) correction of the behavior
that generates public order violations, 6) rehabilitation of victims and 7)
reconstruction to remove conditions likely to generate public order vio-
lations.
5
The criminal sanctioning process, both national and international,
the inquiry and truth commissions, and the mechanisms to provide
compensation and reparation to the victims advance these goals of pre-
vention, deterrence and restoration, among others, of public order.
These processes also provide redress to victims and contribute toward
their rehabilitation, healing and reconciliation, and the creation of a
climate and culture which actively discourage such violations in the fu-
ture.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
It is worth noting that the role of civil and political sanctions, that
is, non-criminal sanctions, is not a new one for addressing war crimes
and other egregious violations of human rights. After World War II,
several European countries extensively used civil and political sanc-
tions, in addition to criminal sanctions, against those who had collabo-
rated with the Nazis and the fascists. To illustrate, in France, more
than 11,000 alleged collaborators with the Vichy regime received some
form of sanction for their wartime activities and nearly 1,000 politi-
cians, 6,000 teachers and 500 diplomats were removed from office.
6
Judges in the occupied territories who had executed the Nazi plans en-
thusiastically were also purged from their positions both in the public
and private sectors. 7 All 569 members of the National Parliament who
4. I had the privilege to study and work with the founders of the New Haven School,
Professors McDougal and Lasswell, at Yale Law School.
5. W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations
of Human Rights, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., at 69, 69-70 (Autumn 1996).
6. See PETER NovICK, THE RESISTANCE VERSUS VICHY: THE PURGE OF
COLLABORATORS IN LIBERATED FRANCE 90 (1968); Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with
Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights,
59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 4, at 122, 134 (Autumn 1996). Kritz writes that separate
purge committees were established "for writers, composers, artists, the press and enter-
tainers, among others." Id. See also HERBERT R. LOTTMAN, THE PURGE (1986).
7. See NOVICK, supra note 5, at 87.
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had voted in favor of delegating constituent power to Marshal Petain on
July 10, 1940, were purged from serving in any political office.
8
Italian authorities similarly dismissed nearly 2,000 government
employees for their wartime activities. 9 However, these were tempo-
rary dismissals:
Judicial applications of the purge decrees and a final amnesty adopted
in February 1948 resulted in the fact that most of the 1,879 civil ser-
vants who had been dismissed.., and the 671 who had been compulso-
rily retired were reinstated. Similarly, the whole process of confiscat-
ing the illicit gains of fascist profiteers and of purging compromised
business leaders came close to naught. 10
In Holland, several Dutch who had joined German-sponsored mili-
tary and police organizations were deprived of their Dutch citizenship."
In Denmark several alleged collaborators lost political and civil rights
in a separate proceeding following criminal prosecution. 12 And in Bel-
gium, all those who, without being guilty, cannot be called innocent,
will, on a simple notification of the public prosecutor, lose their vote,
their right to engage in certain professions, and so on. Those who feel
they have been unjustly penalized can appeal to the tribunals unless
their cases have already been examined by the commissions. Those
who are thus penalized will be able to request their rehabilitation and
the recovery of their rights in ten years' time.13
In Germany, attempts at denazification were made under Allied
control by prosecution not only of leading war criminals but also of
those who had enthusiastically supported the Nazi ideology. But these
were only short-term purges and there was no long term ineligibility at-
tached, as it has been observed that "most of the collaborationist elite,
in administration, justice, education, the economy, remained in or reen-
tered positions held under the Nazi regime."'
14
In Japan, the Allies attempted to purge those who had been "active
exponents of militarism and militant nationalism." 15 However, soon af-
8. Id.
9. Kritz, supra note 6.
10. G. DiPalma, Italy: Is There a Legacy and Is It Fascist?, in FROM DICTATORSHIP
TO DEMOCRACY: COPING WITH THE LEGACIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM
122 (John Herz ed., 1982) (hereinafter LEGACIES OF AUTHORITARIANISM).
11. NOvICK, supra note 6, at 212.
12. See Mark Gibney, Decommunization: Human Rights Lessons From the Past and
Present, and Prospects for the Future, 23 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 87, 96 (1994).
13. Pierre Vermeylen, The Punishment of Collaborators, 247 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 73, 77 (Sept. 1946), cited in Gibney, supra note 11, at 97 n.44.
14. John Herz, De-Nazification and Related Policies, in LEGACIES OF
AUTHORITARIANISM, supra note 9, at 26, 30.
15. Arthur Tiedmann, Japan Sheds Dictatorship, in LEGACIES OF
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ter Japan regained its sovereignty, the Japanese government reversed
the process with pardons and by 1952 only 8,710 out of the 202,000
originally purged or provisionally purged were still under that sanc-
tion.
16
The final case briefly mentioned here is that of Greece after the
seven-year rule by the military junta from 1967 to 1974. The civilian
government under Constantin Karamanlis immediately dismissed all
general secretaries of the ministries and all prefects who held positions
of power under the junta.17 Further action was taken to dismiss those
who held power under the junta in all agencies, organizations, and cor-
porations operating under public law.18 Thus, in a few months 108,000
civil servants and other officials were dismissed, transferred, or disci-
plined. 19 Furthermore, Karamanlis' civilian government began selec-
tively retiring and transferring senior military officials who had been
part of the old regime.
20
III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Current developments discussed here include those in El Salvador
and those in the former Soviet bloc countries, and involve dismissals or
exclusions from elected or appointed office.
A. El Salvador
21
Under the peace accords two commissions were appointed, the
Truth Commission and the Ad Hoc Commission. The Truth Commis-
sion was designed to investigate serious allegations of serious acts of
violence and make any recommendations and take any measures neces-
sary to prevent their repetition, while the Ad Hoc Commission was
aimed at cleansing the military. The three members of the Truth
Commission, appointed by the U.N. Secretary General, were all non-
Salvadorans. In contrast, the three members of the Ad Hoc Commis-
sion, also appointed by the Secretary General, were all Salvadorans.
AUTHORITARIANISM, supra note 10, at 199.
16. Id. at 202.
17. Harry Psomiades, Greece: From the Colonels' Rule to Democracy, in LEGACIES OF




21. See generally IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2; AMERICAS WATCH, EL
SALVADOR: ACCOUNTABILITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, EL SALVADOR'S NEGOTIATED REVOLUTION: PROSPECTS FOR LEGAL
REFORM (1993).
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The Ad Hoc Commission was to hear the parties concerned and its
recommendations were confined to the transfer or discharge of military
officers. The Commission was able to "avail itself of information from
any source which it consider[ed] reliable. '22 It recommended the trans-
fer or discharge of 102 active-duty officers. After initial resistance by El
Salvador's President Alfredo Christiani to carrying out the Commis-
sion's recommendations, eventually the government implemented them,
including the removal of the defense minister, General Ren6 Emilio
Ponce. Thus, the Commission was able to cleanse the army, reaching
the highest level of command.
B. The Former Soviet Bloc Countries
In many countries under the former Soviet Bloc, lustration, 23 or
disqualification of those formerly in power, of the agents of the secret
police and their informers, and civil servants, has been the common
form of mechanism of accountability and acknowledgment, which may
include the loss of civil and political rights. Although, in general, this
form of sanctions may accompany a criminal conviction, in most East-
ern and Central European countries lustration is in lieu of criminal
prosecution.
1. Czechoslovakia (the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics)
24
Czechoslovakia adopted a stringent lustration code after the
Parliament appointed a Commission of 20 of its members to investigate
the November 17, 1989, incident in which many Czech students were
injured and beaten under the old regime. This was the incident, in fact,
that sparked Czechoslovakia's revolution. It was found, after the
Commission had been in existence for a few months, that half of its
members had previously collaborated with the Czech secret service.25
Under the Czech lustration law, former Communist officials and
collaborators with the secret police were banned from:
22. AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 21, at 8.
23. The word "lustration" is derived from the Latin lustrara, meaning "to put light
on" or illuminate. It also is said to be derived from lustrum, described as a purifying sac-
rifice carried on every five years in Imperial Rome, or the Latin lustratio, which means
purification by sacrifice or purging. See Accountability for State-Sponsored Human
Rights Abuses in Eastern Europe ad the Soviet Union, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 241, 244
n. 12 (1992) (remarks of Vojtech Cepl, Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Charles Univer-
sity, Prague).
24. See generally Mark Ellis, Purging the Past: The Current State of Lustration
Laws in the Former Communist Bloc, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 4, at 176 (Autumn
1996); Cepl, supra note 22, at 243-246.
25. See id. at 244.
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holding positions in the state administration at both the federal and
the republican levels; the Czechoslovak Army (the rank of colonel and
higher); the federal Security and Information Service; the federal in-
telligence agency; the federal Police; the Office of the President; the Of-
fice of the Federal Assembly; the Office of the Czech National Council;
the Office of the Slovak National Council; the offices of the federal,
Czech and Slovak governments; the offices of the federal and republi-
can Constitutional Courts; the offices of the federal republican Su-
preme Courts; and the Presidium of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sci-
ences;... top positions in Czechoslovak, Czech and Slovak radio and
television; ... the Czechoslovak Press Agency; ... top management po-
sitions in enterprises and banks owned by the state; . ., to top aca-
demic positions at colleges and universities;.., and to judges and
prosecutors.
26
Professor Cepl includes among the features of the lustration act
passed by the then Czech and Slovak National Assembly on October 4,
1991,27 that every citizen may apply to a special office for the results of
his/her lustration and receive a paper stating whether he or she was
registered as a collaborator. This paper is a requisite for applying for
employment in positions such as those listed above. Those who do not
agree with the results of their lustration can seek a court review of the
findings. Those who hold any position for which lustration is required
must provide a copy of the paper detailing the results of their lustration
or must otherwise relinquish their jobs. 28 The bar on holding a range of
positions remains in effect up to the year 2000.
In November 1992, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the law, although it struck down a "potential candidates for
collaboration" category contained in the law. 29 The law has been criti-
cized on the ground that:
[I]t is partially based on a presumption of guilt rather than of inno-
cence; that is, the burden is on people in certain government positions
to prove they did not work for the secret police or were not Communist
officials. Moreover, by barring entire categories of people, such as for-
mer Communist officials, from holding certain positions, the law es-
pouses the principle of collective guilt .... Finally, the law does not dis-
tinguish between various degrees of guilt. Former secret police officials
will be treated no more severely than people who were coerced into
26. Jiri Pehe, Parliament Passes Controversial Law on Vetting Officials, in 2
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES,
COUNTRY STUDIES 550-51 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995), cited in Mark Ellis, supra note 23, at 177
n.5.
27. Jiri Pehe, Parliament Passes Controversial Law on Vetting Officials, 2 REP. E.
EUR. (43), Oct. 25, 1991, at 4, cited in Gibney, supra note 11 at n.200.
28. Cepl, supra note 23, at 245.
29. See Gibney, supra note 12, at 124.
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collaborating with or informing for the secret police.30
In July 1993, the Czech Parliament passed the "Law on the Ille-
gitimacy of and Resistance to the Communist Regime." The law de-
clared the former Communist Party "illegitimate" and "criminal," and
abolished the statute of limitations for ideologically motivated crimes
committed between February 1948 and December 1989. In December
1993, the Czech Constitutional Court upheld the law.
31
2. Other Eastern and Central European Countries
Hungary adopted a lustration law in March 1994,32 under which
nearly 12,000 high-ranking officials, including members of Parliament,
ambassadors, army commanders, chiefs of police, managers of state-
owned banks, judges, and deans, were subject to a screening process.
The purpose was to determine whether they had collaborated with the
former Secret Police.
After the Constitutional Court struck down several provisions on
the ground that they were vague and arbitrary, Parliament enacted a
new law in July 1996, under which all persons born before February 14,
1972, must be screened before taking an oath before Parliament or the
President. The purpose is to determine whether the official worked for
the internal state security service. If so, the person will be asked to re-
sign within 30 days. In 1997, several deputies were investigated under
the law to determine whether they had collaborated with the former se-
cret police.
In Poland, amendments to the law on lustration entered into force
on August 3, 1997. 3 3 Under the law a Lustration Court was established
to examine those who collaborated with the secret police. The law pro-
vides for the screening and vetting of people who seek public office to
ensure that they had not collaborated with the former secret services.
Those affected include candidates for office and top officials.
The Lustration Court's task is to verify the high officials' declara-
tions regarding their collaboration or lack thereof with the former se-
cret police. Those screened have the right to counsel and to appeal the
Court's decision. A person giving false statements is to be banned from
public office for 10 years. 3
4
In Bulgaria, attempts to pass lustration laws began in 1992 and the
Constitutional Court upheld the Law on the Temporary Introduction of
30. Pehe, supra note 27, at 8, cited in Gibney, supra note 11, at 124 n. 204.
31. See Ellis, supra note 24, at 178.
32. See generally id., at 178-79.
33. See id. at 186-87.
34. Constitution Watch, 6 E. EURO. CONST. REV. 22 (1997), cited in id. at 187.
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Additional Requirements for Members of the Executive Bodies of the
Scientific Organizations and the Higher Certifying Commission, under
which screening of all persons seeking positions in the executive bodies
of scientific organizations is required. The burden of proof is on the
candidate to show that s/he was not ranking members of the Commu-
nist Party.
35
Similarly, in Albania the lustration law, the Law on the Verifica-
tion of the Moral Character of Officials and Other Persons Connected
with the Defense of the Democratic State, 36 was adopted by Parliament
in 1995. Under the law, the government is authorized to examine for-
mer secret police files, and a candidate cannot run for office without
clearance of the newly created Special Verification Commission. The
administrative procedure for clearance is seen as long and cumber-
some,37 and lacking in adequate due process for prospective candi-
dates. 3
8
The Baltics, 39 Romania, 40 Russia, 41 Ukraine, 42 Belarus, 43 and Cen-
tral Asian Republics 44 have also attempted to address the excesses of
the Communist era by legislative measures, including attempts at civil
and political sanctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The role of civil and political sanctions is to ensure accountability
and to exclude from public office and positions of influence those who
are found to have committed egregious violations and abuses and also
to prevent them from holding positions of influence even in the private
sector, such as banking executives and school teachers. Democratic so-
cieties must have a right and the means to rid from positions of respon-
sibility, power or influence those who have committed abuses and seri-
ous violations, as high military officials and law enforcement officers.
This is a sound accountability mechanism, for it sends a salutary
signal to victims in particular and society in general that those respon-
sible for excesses, egregious violations and abuses will not stay in office.
It helps the healing process. If a prosecutor, for example, who abused
35. See generally id. at 182-83.
36. No. 8043, Nov. 30, 1995, cited in id. at 180, n.26. See generally id. at 180-82.
37. Constitution Watch, 5 E. EURO. CONST. REV. 2,3 (Winter 1996), cited in id. at
181 n.33.
38. See id. at 181, n.36.
39. See generally id. at 184-86.
40. See generally id. at 187-88.
41. See generally id. at 188-89.
42. See generally id. at 188-89.
43. See generally id. at 189-90.
44. See generally id. at 190.
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the process, is not allowed to stay in office, this lends credibility to the
new government's voice.
This process, however, has to be undertaken on an individual basis.
A blanket exclusion of all who belonged to a party or of those whose
names are found on some files seen by those now in power smacks of
imposing collective guilt. If this results in administrative purges the
executive in power could be simply indulging in a new abuse and an ef-
fort by those in power to consolidate it. Due process protections must
be ensured. There must be a right to appeal, and there must be trans-
parency. The process must be formal and proceedings open.
A critical appraisal of the Lustration Law of Czechoslovakia, the
first such experiment in recent years, aptly illustrates the flaws:
Despite the initial high hopes, Lustration does not seem to have ful-
filled all of its stated aims. On the one hand, it has prevented some
former communist officials and State collaborators from acquiring posi-
tions of current political and economic influence. On the other hand, it
has also fostered an atmosphere of political instability in which scan-
dals often took precedence over more important legislation. Nor, it
seems, has lustration necessarily allayed the public's suspicions that
former communist officials and State collaborators continue to exert
political and economic influence and to reap the same benefits as were
afforded the communist regime.
45
The role of the International Criminal Court, once it is established,
pertaining to civil and political sanctions by member states presents a
difficult issue. Is there room, for example, for the ICC to prosecute
those cases where there are also administrative civil sanctions, for
these do not amount to impunity?
We must ensure that administrative vetting, civil and political
sanctions are not arbitrary, nor politically motivated, but are applied
fairly and serve the public order goals that I discussed at the outset.
International lawyers have not paid adequate attention to the sub-
ject of civil and political sanctions, unlike that of criminal sanctions, to
address massive human rights abuses. Thus, the forthcoming initiative
of the U.S. Institute of Peace to conduct in-depth research in this area is
most welcome.
45. Paulina Bren, Lustration in the Czech and Slovak Republics, RFEJRI/RES.REP.




ACCOUNTABILITY: CASE OF PCB




At the conclusion of World War II, the newly formed United Na-
tions sought to aid in the autonomous development of the newly liber-
ated peoples in Africa and Micronesia. This entailed the establishment
of a system of trusteeship states to be administered by members of the
United Nations until the beneficiaries of these trusts were ready to take
the reins of governance into their own hands. Along with the develop-
ment of autonomous systems of government, the trustees also sought to
aid in the trust territories' economic development. In doing so, the trus-
tees were basically given free reign in administering the trust territo-
ries.
Tragically, this lack of accountability for their actions in the trust
territories led to a number of haphazard environmental practices
among the trustees. Subsequently, the former trust territories were left
with a number of ecological disasters to deal with. Economically unable
to deal with these issues by themselves, the governments of the former
trust territories requested that those who created these situations be
accountable. However, they were often faced with a great deal of resis-
tance by the former trustees.
A number of these ecological issues were raised by the former trus-
tee states with the trustees. None of these suits have actually been re-
* Washington College of Law, American University 1997, JD; University of Washington
School of Law, LLM. I would like to thank my family for their support since the begin-
ning. I want to extend my profound thanks to: Professor Daniel Bodansky and Greg
Hicks of the University of Washington School of Law for mentoring me through the LLM
that resulted in this paper; to Bob Thiel and Andrea Mathis for peer reviewing my paper;
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I would have been utterly confused on the facts of what occurred; Sally Dalzell for giving
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solved through an adjudication which would have established some sort
of legal precedent on the matter. Rather, the parties have all negoti-
ated settlements wherein the former trust territories contract away
rights to further claims against the trustees. In light of the non-
resolution of some of these issues, the question still exists as to whether
a fiduciary relationship exists between the trustees and the former
trust territories such that they are liable for ecological harm.
In 1986, the United States terminated its trustee relationship with
its former trust territories by entering into the Compact of Free Asso-
ciation. Presently, the former portion Trust Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands consisting of the Marshall Islands are an independent country,
the Republic of the Marshall Islands. While it still retains close ties
with the United States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands is an
autonomous state. However, the environmental consequences of the
trusteeship era still linger. The United States has agreed to compen-
sate the RMI for the harm caused to the various atolls by atomic testing
during the Cold War. Another ecological threat still remains, the more
subtle threat of PCB contamination. PCB's represent a more subtle,
but also harmful threat, to the people of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands. It is uncertain whether the RMI can afford to pay for this
clean up on their own. To its credit, the United States has cleaned up
one of these PCB sites, it has not accepted legal accountability. Thus,
the issue still remains whether former trustees owe a duty to their for-
mer trusts to clean up for past contamination.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Republic of the Marshall Islands is located in the South Pacific
Ocean in the region known as Micronesia. The Marshall Islands consist
of approximately "thirty-four coral islands and atolls with a total land
area of approximately 180 square kilometers and a population of about
43,000."1 It has been speculated that the Micronesian region of the Pa-
cific Ocean was settled by human inhabitants some time between 3,000
and 5,000 B.C.2 Spain claimed Micronesia in 1565.3 This year marked
a pivotal point in Micronesia history. The Europeans who first colo-
nized Micronesia entered the venture with the mentality that they were
civilizing ignorant savages. 4 This mind-set prevailed in Spanish coloni-
1. Jean Zorn, The Republic of the Marshall Islands, in SOUTH PACIFIC ISLANDS
LEGAL SYSTEMS 102 (Michael A. Ntunmy ed.,1992).
2. Id. at 100.
3. Id.
4. The sixteenth century theologian and jurist Francisco de Vitoria stated that:
[a]lthough the aborigines in question are ... not wholly unintelligent, yet
they are little short of that condition, and so are unfit to found or administer
a lawful State up to the standard required by human and civil claims .... It
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alism until the end of the Spanish Empire. It can be argued to have
survived even through the days of the League of Nation Mandate Sys-
tem and the United Nations Trusteeship System. From the date that
Europeans arrived there, the Micronesian islands and its peoples would
be traded back and forth from one empire to another.
By the nineteenth century, Micronesia would be visited by mari-
time traders from around the world.5 It was during the era of steam
ship travel that Micronesia really became the focus of imperialist atten-
tion. This was the era where Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories of mari-
time empires based on re-fueling stations spread throughout the world
came to life. Micronesia represented a crucial link between Europe, the
Americas and Asia. This was also the time when the German Empire
and the British Empire began to dispute Spain's claims to Micronesia.
6
The lands and peoples of Micronesia were never perceived by Europe-
might, therefore, be maintained that in their own interests the sovereigns of
Spain might undertake the administration of their country, providing them
with prefects and governors for their towns and might even give them new
lords so long as this was clearly for their benefit. I say there would be some
force in this contention; for if they were all wanting in intelligence, there is
no doubt that this would not only be a permissible, but also a highly proper,
course to take; nay our sovereigns would be bound to take it, just as if the
natives were infants.
Antony Anghie, The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445, 491-92 (1993) (quoting FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, DE
INDIS ET DE IVRE BELLI REFLCETIONES 161 [On the Indians Lately Discovered] (Ernest
Nys ed. & J.P. Bate trans., The Carnegie Inst. of Washington 1917) (1696). See also
TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA: THE QUESTION OF THE OTHER (Richard
Howard trans., 1984).
5. Zorn, supra note 1, at 100.
6.
Britain was not overly anxious to acquire new colonies but could not at the
same time permit the unopposed expansion of German influence in what was
now perceived to be a vital area of the globe. A compromise had to be
reached and at a Conference in Berlin in 1886 the two empires drew an arbi-
trary line dividing the Pacific into two great spheres of influence-the British
and the German. The map drawer, who may have never seen [the region he
was demarcating], ran his pen through the little stretch of 250 kilometers of
water which separated Nauru from its nearest neighbor .... There was
nothing unusual in such map drawing activities. The great powers had
grown accustomed to the idea that the rest of the world was there to be di-
vided up for their own benefit. Portions of the world had been carved up be-
fore and this was the era when the great partition of Africa took place at the
Congress of Berlin in 1885 and that continent was cut into portions shared
out among the colonial powers. The welfare of the people populating the ar-
eas through which the fine pen of the cartographer ran was certainly not the
most important consideration in the exercise.
CHRISTOPHER WEERAMANTRY, NAURU, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE UNDER INTERNATIONAL
TRUSTEESHIP 6 (1992).
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ans thought of as independent nations with living and breathing human
inhabitants with unique cultural assets worth preserving, but merely as
strategic assets on a global chess board. Even in the nineteenth cen-
tury, there was still the Eurocentric racist notion that had engrained
itself into international law that only "only European states were fully
sovereign[; and] Non European states [ ] existed outside the realm of
the law and thus could not legally oppose the sovereign will of the
European states. '7 Given this mind set, it is not surprising the attitude
of the European conquerors who conquered Micronesia, and then traded
the land and the people as though they were chattel.
After Spain lost the "Spanish American War" to the United States,
it sold its possessions in Micronesia to the German Empire for $4.5 mil-
lion in 1886.8 German occupation of Micronesian Islands only lasted
until World War 1.9 Once World War I began, Japan declared war on
Germany and annexed German possessions in Micronesia, including the
Marshall Islands. 10 At the end of World War I, the League of Nations
created a system of mandates out of the former territories of the Ger-
man and Ottoman Empires.
The League of Nations established a number of basic principles to
guide its members in the administration of the Mandate Territories.
One of the most fundamental of the guiding principles of the League of
Nations was that the administrators of a Mandate were in the position
of maintaining a trust. In Article XXII of the Covenant of the League of
Nations it proclaimed,
[t]o those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late
war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which for-
merly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern
world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and de-
velopment of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that
securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this
Covenant.11
Thus those members of the League of Nations that accepted a
Mandate made a covenant with each other and the inhabitants of the
Mandate that the interests of the inhabitants of the Mandate were to be
considered a sacred trust. The League of Nations Mandate System,
where states entrusted with a Mandatory were to act on behalf of the
7. Anghie, supra note 4, at 493-94 (citing THOMAs LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1895)).
8. CARL HEINE, MICRONESIA AT THE CROSS ROADS 13 (1974).
9. RON CROCOMBE, ET AL., POLITICS IN MICRONESIA 84 (1983).
10. HEINE, supra note 8, at 14.
11. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 1.
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League of Nations, was the first time that international accountability
was implemented.
12
The League of Nations divided the former German and Ottoman
territories into three classes of Mandates: Class A Mandates,' 3 Class B
Mandates' 4 and Class C Mandates. 15 In 1920, Japan was granted the
Class C Mandate of the "former German Pacific Islands," including the
Marshall Islands.16 Under the Japanese mandate, the Marshall Islands
were subjected to intense economic development as a result of large-
scale Japanese immigration. 17 By 1935, Japan had begun constructing
military bases on its Class C Mandates.' 8 Subsequently, by the begin-
ning of World War II when Japan left the League of Nations, the ma-
jority of the population in the Marshall Islands Class C Mandate was
Japanese.' 9
Believing the December 7, 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
had been launched from the Marshall Islands, the United States en-
tered World War II "determined that Micronesia would never again
pose a security threat to the United States."20 After a long and bloody
engagement in the Pacific, the United States ended World War II with
the detonation two nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At
the end of the hostilities, the United States replaced the Japanese Em-
pire's military presence in Micronesia as the regional power. On a
global scale, the United States had a tremendous amount of influence in
shaping the post war global reality. Subsequently, the United States
made it a priority to neutralize Micronesia as a strategic threat to the
United States.
At the end of World War II, the United Nations replaced the
League of Nations. It replaced the League of Nations Mandate System
12. CHARMIAN TOUSSAINT, THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM OF THE UNITED NATIONS 11-12
(1956).
13. Class A Mandates consisted of former Turkish territories (Lebanon, Transjordan,
Syria, Iraq and Palestine) which were autonomous but subject to assistance by a manda-
tory power "until such time as they are able to stand alone." Francis B. Sayre, Legal Prob-
lems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System, 42 AM. J. INT'L. L. 263, 264
(1948) (citing LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 4).
14. Class B Mandates were former German territories in Central Africa "not yet
ready for self government." Id. at 264.
15. Class C Mandates included South West African as well as all of the German Pa-
cific colonies: those territories which the Allies doubted would ever be able to stand alone.
Id. (citing LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para 6).
16. See Larry Wentworth, The International Status and Personality of Micronesian
Political Entities, 16 ILSA J. INT'L. L. 1, 3 ( 1993).
17. Id. at 4.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing JOHN McNEIL, THE STRATEGIc TRUST TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 25 (1976)).
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with the International Trusteeship System. As in the League of Na-
tions Covenant, the nation states that accepted a UN Trusteeship ac-
cepted a sacred trust to promote the well being of the inhabitants of the
Trust. It recognized the need to respect the cultures of the peoples of
the Trusts. The U.N. Charter recognizes that the interests of the in-
habitants of the newly created Trust territories are "paramount." It
also requires the members of the United Nations who accept the Trus-
teeship responsibility to acknowledge the acceptance of a "sacred trust
obligation" whose beneficiaries are the Trust Territory's inhabitants.
This system should have been the means to achieve the noble aspiration
of self determination originally articulated in the League of Nations.
The United Nations Trusteeship System should have served to give life
to the noble spirit of the United Nations Charter and to create an ave-
nue to achieve those noble aspirations articulated decades before in the
League of Nations.
In light of the newly emerging Cold War and the heavy price paid
in World War II, national security and strategic interests prevailed in-
stead. Within the United Nations Charter, there was a provision that
permitted the creation of "Strategic Trusts."21  "The administering
authority of a strategic trust was able to exercise more control over the
territory than a non-strategic trust. The Trusteeship Agreement that
the United States negotiated with the United Nations Security Council
allowed the United States to deploy its military forces in Micronesia,
establish military bases, and to close off areas for security purposes."22
This device granted the Trustee a great deal of latitude in the admini-
stration of the Trust Territory.
23
The terms of the Trusteeship and the Strategic Trust would be gov-
erned by the individual Trusteeship Agreement. In its relationship
with the Marshall Islands, the United States had extensive powers in
administering the Trusts.24 Article 3 of the Trusteeship Agreement
21. "There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas
which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, with-
out prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43." U.N.
CHARTER art. 82.
22. Wentworth, supra note 16, at 7.
23. As the U. N. CHARTER states:
It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust
territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer
forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the
obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the
administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of
law and order within the trust territory.
U.N. CHARTER art. 84.
24.
In discharging its obligations under Article 76(a) and Article 84 of the Char-
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stated that,
[t]he administering authority shall have full powers of administration,
legislation and jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions
of this agreement, and may apply to the trust territory, subject to any
modification which the administering authority may consider desir-
able, such of the laws of the United States as it may deem appropriate
to local conditions and requirements.
25
The United States had ultimate authority over the terms of the
agreement in that it had to approve any modifications to the Trustee-
ship agreement.261n the end, the United States had near complete do-
minion over how it would administer the Trust territories placed in its
care. The United States had the entire area comprising the Marshall
Islands, the Carolina islands and the Marianas, composing an area of
846 square miles designated a "Strategic Trust."27 The United States
used several atolls in the Marshall Islands as "Ground Zero" for ther-
monuclear detonation experimentation. The very first of these hydro-
gen bomb experiments took place on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Is-
lands in 1946.28 The experiments that took place in 1946 were referred
to as "Operation Crossroads." 29  The following year on December 2,
ter, the Administering Authority shall ensure that the Trust Territory shall
play its part, in accordance with the Charter of United Nations, in the main-
tenance of international peace and security. To this end, the administrating
power shall be entitled: 1) To establish naval, military and air bases and to
erect fortifications in the Trust territory; 2) To station and employ armed
forces in the Territory; and 3) To make use of volunteer forces, facilities and
assistance from the Trust territory in carrying out the obligation towards the
Security Council undertaken in this regard by the Administrating Authority
as well as for the local defense and maintenance of law and order within the
Trust Territory.
Trusteeship Agreement For the Former Japanease Mandated Islands, 1947, 8 U.N.T.S.
189, 192.
25. Id. at art. III.
26. "The terms of the present Agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated
without the consent of the Administrating Authority." Id. art. XV.
27. Emanuel Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64
YALE L.J. 629, 630 (1955).
28. Id.
29.
The first test, code named Able, took place on July 1, 1946. The Army Air
Force dropped the atomic bomb from a B-29 Superfortress at an altitude of
30,000 feet. The bomb was detonated 519 feet above the Bikini Lagoon's sur-
face, which contained the Navy's target fleet of ninety-five ships. The explo-
sion was enormous and created the now familiar mushroom cloud, which
climbed to 20,000 feet. The bomb released explosive energy equivalent to
23,000 tons of TNT. As a result of the Able bomb, five target ships sank.
The second test, code named Baker, took place on July 25, 1946, about three
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1947, the Atomic Energy Commission announced that Enewetak Atoll
would be the "proving ground" for future atomic weapons tests. 30 The
Atomic Energy Commission justified its choice of Enewetak Atoll and
the resettlement of its inhabitants, on the basis that it had the fewest
inhabitants and "it [was] isolated and there [were]hundreds of miles of
open seas in the direction in which winds might carry radioactive parti-
cles. 13 1 Operation Crossroads forced the evacuation of the Bikinians
from their ancestral homes to Kili Island.
32
In 1954, the Marshallese people made an urgent plea to the United
Nations to stop the next round of hydrogen bomb experiments. In their
petition, the Marshallese people described the subject of their petition
as a "Complaint regarding the explosion of lethal weapons within our
home islands."33 In this petition, the Marshallese emphatically stated
that:
[W]e, the Marshallese people feel that we must follow the dictates of
our consciences to bring forth this urgent plea to the United Nations,
which has pledged itself to safeguard the life, liberty and the general
weeks after the Able test. The bomb was suspended at a depth of 90 feet be-
low the Bikini lagoon surface. Once detonated, the explosion created an
enormous dome of water that rose nearly a mile into the sky. The explosion
also created an underwater shockwave and gigantic waves that caused se-
vere damage to many target ships and the islands .... Despite warnings, the
Baker test went ahead as scheduled. As [predicted, [sic] all target ship, as
well as the Bikini lagoon, were heavily contaminated by radioactive materi-
als.
Major Timothy J. Saviano, Book Review, Operation Crossroads the Atomic Tests at Bikini
Atoll, 145 MIL. L. REV. 193, 194 (1994).
30. Margolis, supra note 27, at 631.
31. Id. (quoting The Atomic Energy Commission Press Release No. 70, Dec. 1, 1947).
32.
mo stage the testing of atomic bombs at Bikini, the United States had to up-
root 167 islanders from their homeland. In return, they were promised that
the United States would care for them during the testing and then return to
Bikini Atoll. Unfortunately as [Jonathan M. Weisgall] noted [in his book
Operation Crossroads-the Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll] the islanders be-
came 'nuclear nomads' as the United states moved them several times.
Although the Bikinians were fisherman, they were eventually resettled on
Kili, a small island that had neither a lagoon nor sheltered fishing ground.
In 1952, conditions became so bad on Kili that the United States had to air-
drop emergency rations on the islands. Because of the radiation levels at Bi-
kini, the islanders were not allowed to return home until 1969. On their re-
turn they were shocked to see how mush the Atoll had been destroyed or
damaged by the bombs.
Saviano, supra note 29, at 195.
33. Petition from the Marshalese People concerning the Pacific Islands, U.N. Doc. No.
T/Pet. 10/28 (1954)[hereinafter Petition].
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well being of the people of the Trust Territory, of which the Marshal-
lese people are a part.
The Marshallese people are not only fearful of the danger to their per-
sons from these deadly weapons in case of another miscalculation, but
they are also very concerned for the increasing number of people who
are being removed from their land.
Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. It means more than just
a place where you can plant your food crops and build your houses; or a
place where you can bury your dead. . .It is the very life of the people.
Take away their land and their spirits go also.
The Marshall Islands are all low coral atolls with land area where food
plants can be cultivated quite limited, even for today's population of
about eleven- thousand people. But the population is growing rapidly;
the time when this number will be doubled is not far off.
The Japanese had taken away the best portions of the following atolls;
Jaluit, Kwajalein, Enewetak, Mills, Malcelap and Wetje to be fortified
as part of their preparation for the last war, World War II. So far, only
Imedj Island on Jaluit Atoll has been returned to its former owners.
For security reasons, Kawajalein Island is being kept for the military
use. Bikini and Enewetak were taken away for atomic bomb tests and
their inhabitants were moved to Kili Island and Ujelang Atoll respec-
tively. Because Rongelab and Uterik are now radio-active, their in-
habitants are being kept on Kwajalein for an indeterminate length of
time. 'Where next?' is the big question which looms large in all of our
minds.
34
Tragically, the hydrogen bomb experiments continued. Subse-
quently, the Marshallese islands of Rongelap and Utrik were irradiated
and its people were deprived of their ancestral homes. Beginning in the
late 50's, the Micronesians began to exercise some influence on the ad-
ministration of the Trust Territories. The Congress of the Marshall Is-
lands created in 1949, was reorganized into a new unicameral legisla-
ture in 1958, giving special seats to the traditional chiefs known as Iroij
laplap. 35 In 1965, the Congress of Micronesia was established as a ter-
ritory wide bicameral legislative body.36 In 1967, it established the Po-
litical Status Commission to negotiate with the United States about
34. Id.
35. Zorn, supra note 1, at 100.
36. Id.
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administration of the Trust Territory. 37 This resulted in the establish-
ment by the Nijitela (the Marshallese Legislature) of their own separate
Political Status Commission to negotiate with the United States about
the administration of the Marshall Islands. 38
The first substantive steps towards Marshallese independence be-
gan in 1977 with the convening of the Marshall Islands Constitutional
Convention.39 This led to the Hilo Principles in 1978, establishing free
association as the basis for future relations with the United States.40
The Marshallese eventually adopted their own Constitution in 1979.41
The principles of free association established in 1978 led to fruition in
1982 with the signing of the Compact of Free Association, ending the
Trust territory relationship between the United States and Micronesia.
Presently, the days of the Trusteeship System are over. The Mar-
shallese have a nation of their own, the Republic of the Marshall Is-
lands. Their relationship with the United States is one of "free associa-
tion," governed by the Compact of Free Association. 42  With the
ratification of this document, almost forty years of U.S. administration
of the Marshall Islands as a Trust Territory ended.43 Although the offi-
cial Trust relationship between the United States and the Marshallese
is over, the legacy of the past still lingers today. To its credit, the
United States has accepted financial accountability for some of its ac-
tions in the past.
III. THE PROBLEM OF PCB CONTAMINATION
A. The Leaking Transformers






42. Cf. Territories and Insular Possessions, 48 USC 1681 (1998), et seq.
43.
The Compact of Free Association set forth in title II of this joint resolution
between the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands of
the Palau is hereby approved, and Congress hereby consents to the subsidi-
ary agreements as set forth .... Don April 9, 1986, as they relate to such
Government. Subject to the provisions of this joint resolution, the resident is
authorized to agree, in accordance with section 411 of the Compact, to an ef-
fective date for and thereafter to implement such Compact, having taken
into account any procedures with respect for termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement.
Id. at Title I, § 101.
VOL. 26:3
1998 POST TRUSTEESHIP ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Defense and the Department of Interior, the two agencies mandated by
the United States government with the administration of the Marshall
Islands, brought electrical transformers to the Marshall Islands to de-
velop a power system.44 Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) were used in
transformers as insulation because of their longevity, their durability,
non flammable nature and stability.45 Under United States law, as of
1977 PCB's were no longer permitted to be imported or manufactured in
the United States.46 When these, PCB carrying, transformers were
brought to the Marshall Islands is unclear. However, the threat they
represented to the Marshallese people was.
Some of these hazardous transformers were buried and abandoned
on atolls in the Marshall Islands.47 A number of the sites where used
transformers had been abandoned were discovered to be leaking PCBs
into the soil and water.48 It is unclear how many of these PCB sites ex-
ist undiscovered. A number of transformer sites were found on Jauit,
Ebi, Enewetak and Bikini Atoll, with the largest being on Majuro.
49
The E.P.A. tested the soil these transformer sites for P.C.B. contamina-
tion. The results varied from no PCB contamination of the soil to some
PCB contamination of the soil.5o The sizes of the PCB carrying trans-
formers varied from smaller 30 to 50 gallon containers to larger 1,000
gallon containers.51 Consequently, the magnitude of contamination or
potential for contamination varied from site to site. At one site in Jaluit,
the E.P.A. dealt with the problem of PCB contamination using a method
of treatment known as cement fixation, where cement was poured into
the soil to immobilize future PCB seepage movement. 52 At a site in
Majuro, the PCB concentration was not terribly high but action was
still required. Thus, E.P.A. capped the contaminated site with a 40 by
44. Marshall Islands Seek Superfund Money to Clean Up PCBs Left by US Govern-
ment, BNA INT'L ENVTL. DAILY, Sept. 8, 1993. [hereinafter Marshall Islands].
45. THEO COLBURN ET AL., OUR STOLEN FUTURE 89 (1996).
46.
(2)(A)... no person may manufacture, process, or distribute in commerce or
use any polychlorinated biphenyl in any manner other than in a totally en-
closed manner... (C) For the purposes of this paragraph, the term 'totally
enclosed manner' means any manner which will ensure that any exposure of
human beings or the environment to a polychlorinated biphenyl will be in-
significant as determined by the Administrator by rule.
15 U.S.C. § 2605 2(A) & (C) (1998).
47. Marshall Islands Seek Superfund money to Clean UP PCbs Left by U.S. Govern-
ment, BNA INT'L. ENVIRONMENTAL DAILY (Sept. 8, 1993).
48. Telephone Interview with Holly Barker, Spokeswoman, Embassy of the Republic
of the Marshall Islands [hereinafter Barker].
49. Telephone Interview with Norm Lovelace, Director, Pacific Insular Area Pro-
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60 foot concrete slab. 53 Generally, any transformer at a PCB site that
had a concentration of higher than 500 parts per million of PCB in it
was treated and shipped off island to the United States for disposal at a
licensed disposal facility.5 4 Throughout the clean up process of the
known transformer sites, the E.P.A. encountered administrative diffi-
culties in that a number of the problematic transformers had been from
one site to another. Subsequently, the E.P.A. had to re-identify and re-
assess the site before beginning the removal process.
55
Unlike the long and complex process involved in a standard Super-
fund clean up,56 the E.P.A. was able to move relatively quickly by des-
ignating the clean up as an emergency removal.57 Throughout the clean
up process, the E.P.A. consulted with the government of the RMI in a
cooperative agreement. The first major transformer sites were cleaned
up by the United States Environmental Protection Agency.58 According
to Norm Lovelace of E.P.A. Region IX, this was done as a good faith
measure, not as a legal obligation.59 One of the reasons for the rela-
tively quick and efficient clean up of these PCB contaminated sites was
the informal, but personal, relationships between the various actors
from the Marshallese government and the United States. By avoiding
the various formalities in official proceedings, the people involved were
able to devote important time and resources to cleaning up the PCB
contamination. 60 The United States E.P.A. has also taken measures to
instruct local authorities on how to deal with future clean ups. 61 How-
ever, the issue of liability in the context of future disposal of newly dis-
covered PCB contamination is still unresolved. 62 Holly Barker, a
spokesperson from the Republic of the Marshall Islands Embassy in
Washington, D.C., stated that new leaking transformers are uncovered
after every major storm blows through the islands. 63 Another batch of
transformers was discovered recently on Kawajalein Atoll.64 Thus, the
problem of PCB contamination still exists as a very real threat to the




56. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1998), et seq.
57. Lovelace, supra note 49.
58. Telephone Interview with Jorelik Tibon, Republic of the Marshall Islands Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency.
59. Lovelace, supra note 49.
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B. The Harm Caused by PCBs
The true potential for harm the presence of these abandoned trans-
formers represent to the Marshallese people cannot be understood
without some understanding of the nature of PCB's. PCB's, while
harmful in nature, do not kill instantaneously like cyanide. Rather,
their effects are felt in a more subtle and less easily detectable manner.
Dioxins, such as PCB's:
[A]ffect the thyroid system in diverse, complex, and as yet incompletely
understood ways. Some analyses indicate they may mimic or block
normal hormone action perhaps by binding to the thyroid receptor.
Other data suggest they may even increase the number of receptors
present to receive the hormone signals. They also seem to act particu-
larly on T4, the form of thyroid hormone that is critical to prenatal
brain development.
65
As a hormone mimic or block, PCB's will disrupt biological devel-
opment at a cellular level. Normally:
[h]ormones and their receptors fit together with a "lock and key"
mechanism. Under normal conditions, a natural hormone binds to its
receptor and activates genes in [a cell's] nucleus to produce the appro-
priate biological response. Hormone mimics can also bind to the recep-
tor and induce a response, but prevent natural hormones from attach-
ing to the receptor. Certain synthetic chemicals released into the
environment can behave like hormone mimics and hormone blockers,
contributing to disruption of cellular activity. The compound that out-
numbers or completely out competes for receptor sites determine the
response by the cell. 66
Thus a hormone mimicker or blocker will manifest itself in the form
of damaged reproductive systems, altered nervous system and brains,
and impaired immune systems.
67
The threat of PCB's is not isolated to the disruption of cellular de-
velopment. Rather, as one of the most persistent of dioxins, it has a
tendency to effect an entire eco system. PCBs move up through the food
chain, beginning in soil that is absorbed by plants then consumed by a
herbivore that is then eaten by an organism higher on the food chain
and eventually working its way to human consumption. By the time it
is consumed by a human being, the concentration level of PCB in the fat
cells will have increased dramatically.
65. Colborn, supra note 45, at 187.
66. Id. at 72.
67. See id. at 172.
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C. PCB Contamination on the Marshall Islands
During its trip up the food chain, each organism acquired through
consumption all the PCBs stored in the fat cells of its meal. 68 Subse-
quently, PCBs will manifest themselves in the soil, the ground water,
the surface waters, the vegetation, the animal life and human life
wherever it is present. In a small eco system such as the atolls of the
Marshall Islands, where there is little escape for this persistent sub-
stance, the level of exposure concentration in the environment will be
higher. Thus, the Marshallese will be subject to more exposure path-
ways through which PCBs can enter their bodies. Therefore, a more
thorough remediation will have to be effected in contaminated areas.
Until a remediation takes place those lands that have absorbed the
leaking transformer PCBs will be potentially harmful to human health.
Thus, the Marshallese will be deprived of the use of land that is par-
ticularly valuable given the small amount of land that comprises their
nation. The Marshallese recognize that their population is growing and
that this will be problematic in light of the geographic reality that the
Republic of the Marshall Islands is made up of a number of small atolls.
As articulated in their 1954 petition to the U.N.,
[]and means a great deal to the Marshallese. It means more than just
a place where you can plant your food crops and build your houses; or a
place where you can bury your dead... It is the very life of the people.
Take away their land and their spirits go also.
6 9
The PCB contamination of their lands will not only physically im-
pair the ability to efficiently utilize their lands, depriving them of valu-
able land that could be used for farming or housing, but it may also
strike at the heart of their culture. To people who have lived on small
delicate atolls dating back thousands of years, the deprivation of the
use of certain lands may have significantly detrimental cultural effects.
The potential for harm from these PCB leaking transformers is
clear. The source of this pollution is also clear. These transformers
were brought to the Marshall Islands by the United States to develop a
power system on the islands. There was no malevolent intent on the
part of the United States in this action. In all likelihood, the United
States was acting quite benevolently in aiding in the development of an
energy infra structure on the Marshall Islands. However, the fact of
the matter is that in the process of developing this energy infra struc-
ture, the United States government left behind a number of transform-
ers that have leaked their hazardous contents. While the United States
68. See id. at 87-109.
69. Petition, supra note 33.
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Government has taken measures to clean up the first PCB site, it has
acknowledged no liability. It has also been speculated that there are
other sites in the Marshall Islands with aging transformers that may
begin or have already started to leak their hazardous contents into the
soil or waters of the Marshall Islands. The question that remains to be
resolved is whether there is a future duty on the part of the United
States government that brought these transformers to the Marshall Is-
lands, or by any of the other Trustees who polluted the Trust they were
administrating, to rehabilitate their former Trust. Answering this
question will entail an examination of the provisions of the UN Charter
establishing the Trusteeship System, the terms of the Trusteeship
Agreement between the United States and the UN Security Council,
other international agreements such as the Stockholm Declaration and
the UNCED Declarations, International Custom and actions that may
be the basis for establishing a new custom of international affairs.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. International Environmental Law
The general body of International environmental law is unclear on
whether liability attaches to a state that causes injury to another state
through past actions that are not violations of international law nor in-
ternational custom. Generally, most international environmental
agreements are prospective in nature. They seek to prevent present
and future environmental harm. All discussions of international envi-
ronmental harm and liability begin with the Trail Smelter case between
the United States and Canada. 70 The Trail Smelter Arbitration in-
volved claims brought by the United States against Canada for damage
to U.S. residents' property by sulfur dioxide emissions from a Canadian
smelting operation in British Columbia. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
tribunal ruled that:
[u]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its ter-
ritory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the terri-
tory of another State or the properties or persons therein, when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
71
This ruling became, what is known today, as the "Polluter Pays"
70. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada), 3 U.N. REP. INT'L ARBITRATION
AWARDS 1911 (1941).
71. Id. at 1965.
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principle in international environmental law. Some international legal
scholars have suggested that the Trail Smelter Arbitration ruling
stands for the proposition that liability should not be based on fault, but
something closer to strict liability.
7 2
B. Strict Liability Based Regime
International agreements have established the imposition of abso-
lute liability for harm resulting from certain activities such as space ac-
tivities. 73  The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects provides that "[a] launching State shall be ab-
solutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space ob-
ject on the surface of the earth o to aircraft in flight."74 This imposition
of absolute liability is rooted in the traditional notion that parties en-
gaging in potentially ultra hazardous activities should be absolutely li-
able for any harm. It stands as recognition that with the great ad-
vances in technology within the last fifty years, human beings have
begun to engage in activities that entail the use of materials that are
more potentially harmful and volatile.7 5 Applied to the facts of the PCB
contamination on the Marshall Islands, the importation of transformers
for the purpose of developing a power system for the Marshallese can-
not reasonably be considered an ultra hazardous activity that would
carry strict liability consequences with it.
C. Wrongfulness Based Liability Regime
The World Commission on Environment and Development has ad-
vocated a liability scheme based on wrongfulness rather than one
based on strict liability.7 6 In Article 21 of the Brundtland Report, it
states that "[a] state is responsible under international law for a breach
of an international obligation relating to the use of a natural resources
or the prevention or abatement of an environmental interference.
'" 77
Under this wrongfulness based approach, the responsible state would
72. Constance O'Keefe, Transboundary Pollution and the Strict Liability Issue: The
Work of the International Law Commission on the Topic of International Liability for Con-
sequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 145, 175-76 (1990) (quoting Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive De-
velopment of International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1189, 1227 (1965)).
73. Convention on International Liability for the Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter Convention].
74. Id. art II.
75. O'Keefe, supra note 72, at 187-89.
76. Id. at 192.
77. Id. at 191 (quoting WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw REPORT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 32 (1986)).
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be required to, "a. cease the internationally wrongful act; b. as far as
possible re-establish the situation which would have existed if the in-
ternationally wrongful act had not taken place; c. provide compensation
for the harm which results from the internationally wrongful act; d.
where appropriate, give satisfaction for the internationally wrongful
act."
78
Applied to the facts surrounding the PCB contamination of the
Marshall Islands, it is uncertain whether, at the time of their importa-
tion, the United States was even aware of the potential harm that PCBs
could cause. Nor is it clear whether anyone knew at the time of the im-
portation of the transformers that PCBs were a toxic substance. It is
entirely possible that the transformers were perceived as being benefi-
cial goods that were being imported for the benefit of the Marshallese.
Therefore, it is uncertain, based on the scientific knowledge at the time,
whether the United States could be found to have been negligent in im-
porting the PCB carrying substances into the Marshall Islands. Thus, a
reasonable argument could be formulated that the United States did
not act negligently in importing PCB laden transformers to the Trust
Territories and cannot be found liable under a wrongfulness based li-
ability scheme.
Therefore, it is unlikely that the United States could be held liable
for the clean up of the PCB contamination of the Marshall Islands
based on a strictly state to state analysis of transboundary environ-
mental harm.
In the case of the Marshall Islands and the other former Trust Ter-
ritories of the Pacific Islands, there was not a state to state relationship
between them and the United States. Rather, it was a special one in
which the United States, due to its position as a pre-eminent world
power, enjoyed special privileges in its administration of the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands. In this relationship, the inhabitants of the
Trust Territory were dependent on the United States as the adminis-
trator of the trust to act in good faith. The United Nations Charter
which created the International Trusteeship System and granted the
United States the administration of the former Japanese Mandated Is-
lands, also imposed a fiduciary duty upon the United States to admin-
ister the trust for the ultimate benefit of these inhabitants. In adminis-
trating the trust territory, the United States had full powers of
administration, legislation and jurisdiction.7 9 As a result of the unequal
nature of this relationship, it can be argued that the fiduciary obliga-
tion imposed a higher standard and longer enduring duty of care upon
the United States in its administration of its Trust Territories.
78. Id.
79. Convention, supra note 24, art. III.
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V. THE UN CHARTER & THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
A. The International Trusteeship System
The United Nations International Trusteeship System was created
to replace the former League of Nations Mandate System. The Interna-
tional Trusteeship System was one in which member states of the
United Nations were entrusted with the administration of territories
inhabited by people who had not achieved self governance.8 0 In Article
73 of the United Nations Charter, "the member states who assumed the
responsibility of administering a trust acknowledged was a sacred trust
the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of interna-
tional peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-
being of the inhabitants of th[e] territories ... ," 81 The roots of this
principle of the sacred trust can be traced to the writings of Edmund
Burke 1783 where he stated that the trusteeship principle in colonial-
ism was one in which there must be a degree of accountability by the
trustees for their actions.8 2 This regulatory element of colonialism was
also embedded in the League of Nations Mandate System where it
stated that "there should be applied the principle that the well-being
being and development of peoples [colonies and territories of the de-
feated nations from World War I not yet able to govern themselves] for
a sacred trust of civilization. '8 3 The notion of this sacred trust was one
of the corner stones of the International Trusteeship System.
The International Trusteeship System was established by the
United Nations to administer and supervise those territories placed un-
der the system by individual agreement.8 4 The "basic objectives" of the
International Trusteeship System echoed those Purposes of the United
Nations stated in Article 1.85 The "basic objectives" of the International
Trusteeship System were:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance-
ment of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peo-
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
82. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 6 (citing HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY vol.
123 (1783)).
83. Id. at 10 (1956) (quoting LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 2).
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 75.
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
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ples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to
encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the
world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial mat-
ters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals, and
also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice,
without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and
subject to the provisions [in the trusteeship agreements] .86
In looking at the express language of Article 76, it appears that the
objectives of the International trusteeship System was to primarily
benefit the international community rather than the Trust territories'
inhabitants.8 7 However, when looked at from the broader perspective of
Chapter XI and Chapter XII, including the article 73 provisions on "Non
Self Governing territories," it becomes apparent that the well being of
the inhabitants of the trust territories is indeed a priority.
88
B. Comparison to League of Nations Mandate System
Unlike the League of Nations Mandate System, the Trusteeship
System was not limited by geography nor to defeated parties of the
most recent war.8 9 The International Trusteeship System had a broader
scope of parties that could be placed underneath its supervision than its
predecessor, the League of Nations Mandate system. Whereas the
League of Nations Mandate System applied to former territories of de-
feated states from World War I and those peoples not able to govern
themselves,90 the International Trusteeship System had a much
broader scope. Under the International Trusteeship System, trust ter-
ritories could be territories held under a mandate, territories formerly
belonging to defeated states of World War II and states voluntarily
placed under the trusteeship by the administering state.91 The Interna-
tional Trusteeship could not accept as a trust territory a nation already
a member of the United Nations.92 The terms under which the territory
86. Id.
87. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 55.
88. Id. at 53.
89. Id. at 3.
90. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
91. U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 1.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 78.
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would be placed under the International Trusteeship System and how it
would be administered were to be specified in the individual Trustee-
ship Agreements.
93
C. The Trusteeship Agreements
The Trusteeship Agreements were to specify "the terms under
which the trust territory will be administered and designate the
authority which will exercise the administration of the trust terri-
tory. '94 The terms of the Trusteeship Agreement were to be agreed
upon "by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power
in the case of territories held under Mandate," and approved by the
United Nations Security Council and General Assembly.95 In essence,
the Trusteeship Agreement was to be the legal foundation for the ad-
ministering authority's administration of the trust territory. 96 However,
should a conflict arise between the individual trusteeship agreement
and the United Nations Charter, the terms of the Charter will prevail.
97
Within each trusteeship agreement, the administering authority
may designate a strategic area(s) that could include "part or all of the
trust territory."9 8 The terms of the trusteeship agreement leading to
the designation of the strategic trust were to be approved by the United
Nations Security Council. 99 The basic objectives of article 76 of the
United Nations Charter referring to the International Trusteeship Sys-
tem were applicable to strategic trusts as well.10 0 Under article 84 of
the United Nations Charter, the administering authority had the duty
to ensure that the trust territory was to contribute to the maintenance
of international peace and security. 10 1 This entailed the authorization
of the administering authority to "make use of volunteer forces, facili-
ties, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obliga-
tions towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the
administering authority."'102 The designation of a strategic area permit-
ted the administering authority broader discretion in the administra-
tion of the trust territory.
93. U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 2.
94. U.N. CHARTER art. 81.
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 79.
96. TOUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 95.
97. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 82.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 83.
100. Id.
101. U.N. CHARTER art. 84.
102. Id.
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D. The Role of the Trusteeship Council
The United Nations Trusteeship Council was the primary mecha-
nism to assist the United Nations General Assembly in the supervision
of the administering of the trust territories.10 3 The Trusteeship Council
was to consist of member states administering trusts, the fifteen per-
manent members of the Security Council and members of the United
Nations elected to the councill o' 4 The elected members of the Trustee-
ship Council were to act as a balancing factor to ensure an equal num-
ber of UN member states that were administering trusts and not ad-
ministering trusts were represented on the Trusteeship Council.
0 5
One of the major functions of the Trusteeship Council was to "for-
mulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educa-
tional advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory."'0 6 In
carrying out this function to evaluate the administering authority's ad-
ministration of the trust territory, the Trusteeship Council was to
consider reports submitted by the administering authority; accept peti-
tions and examine them in consultation with the administering
authority; provide for periodic to the respective trust territories at
times agreed upon with the administering authority; and take these
and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship
agreements.
0 7
In that respect, the UN Trusteeship Council can be contrasted with
the League of Nations Mandate System which did not avail itself of in-
spections of mandates because it would offend the sovereignty of the
administering authority.1l 8 Thus the UN Trusteeship Council served as
an information intermediary between interested parties and the U.N.
General Assembly. Based on the information collected and submitted
under Article 87, the Trusteeship Council was to submit recommenda-
tions to the U.N. General Assembly. 10 9 In this role, the Trusteeship
Council limited to making non binding recommendations to members. 110
Subsequently, the effectiveness of the UN Trusteeship Council was reli-
ant upon the good faith practices of the administering authorities."'
103. U.N. CHARTER art. 85.
104. U.N. CHARTER art. 86.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 87.
108. ToUSSAINT, supra note 12, at 180.
109. Id. at 152.
110. Id. at 174.
111. Id.
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VI. STATE OF LAW DURING THE TRUSTEESHIP
Pursuant to Article Three of the "Trusteeship Agreement for the
Former Japanese Mandated Islands," "[t]he Administering authority
shall have full powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction
over the Territory. 112 Although officially sovereignty lay elsewhere,
this Trusteeship Agreement had the practical effect of granting the
United States sovereign authority over the trust territory. 113 By desig-
nating the Trust Territory a Strategic Trust, the United States was re-
sponsible to the Security Council, where the United States had veto
power, for its administration of the Trust Territory.
114
The United States agency mandated with administering the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands was the United States Department of In-
terior.1 15 The executive authority in the Trust Territory was vested in
the High Commissioner who was appointed by the President with ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.11 6 Legislative authority was vested in
the Congress of Micronesia who were elected by the citizens of the Trust
territory. 17 However the Congress of Micronesia was curtailed in its
legislative authority in that it could not enact legislation that was "in-
consistent with the laws of the United States applicable to the trust
Territory, treaties or international agreements of the United states, Ex-
ecutive Orders of the President or orders of the Secretary of Interior. 118
Furthermore, any legislation enacted by the Congress of Micronesia
could be vetoed by the High Commissioner. However this veto could be
overridden by two thirds of the majority of both houses of the Congress
of Micronesia (Senate and House of Representatives), subject to the ul-
timate veto of the United States Secretary of Interior. I" 9 Although the
United States exercised direct control of areas of regulation such as
foreign affairs, "the daily administration of the islands has largely
shifted into the hands of the local government. The Territory operates
under its own comprehensive legal code. Inhabitants of the islands are
citizens of the Territory, not of the United States.12O However, other
Courts have found that as a result of its veto authority, "the United
States exercises a maximum degree of control which is inconsistent
112. Convention, supra note 24, art. III.
113. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 653 (D. Haw. 1973).
114. Id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 27).
115. Id. (construing Exec. Order No. 11021, 27 Fed. Reg. 4409 (1962)).
116. Id. at 655 (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (Supp. 1973)).
117. Id. (citing Department of Interior Order No. 2918, pt. III §§ 1,2,5,7 and 8 (Dec. 27,
1968)).
118. Id. (citing Department of Interior Order No. 2918, pt. III §§ 2 (Dec. 27, 1968)).
119. Id. (citing Department of Interior Order No. 2918, pt. III § 13 (Dec. 27, 1968)).
120. Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 588 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
1004 (1975).
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with the assertion that the Trust territory is a foreign country... there
does not appear to be have been any significant delegation of authority
to the citizens of the Trust Territory.
121
While the Trust Territory did have its own legislature that enacted
its own legislation. This was subject to U.S. approval. Although the
United States exercised full powers of administration, legislation and
jurisdiction over the Trust Territory, 122 federal legislation did not auto-
matically apply there.1 23 Congress was required to "manifest an inten-
tion to include the Trust Territory within the coverage of a given stat-
ute before the courts will apply its provisions to claims arising there."
124
A number of U.S. laws have been ruled to have applicability in the
Trust Territories through the definition of the term "State"125 and
"United States"' 26 to include the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
In these statutes, the act specifically includes the Trust territory of the
Pacific Islands as being within the scope of the legislation. Thus, cer-
tain U.S. laws do have extraterritorial application in regulating U.S. ac-
tivities abroad. However, it is unclear whether U.S. environmental
regulatory standards applied to the disposal of the PCB leaking trans-
formers in the Marshall islands. While the Solid Waste Disposal Act
does not include the former Trust territories within its definition
"states,"'127 the Toxic Substances Control Act does include "any other
territory or possession of the United States"'128 within its definition of
"State." The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation
and Liability Act also includes "any other territory or possession over
which the United states has jurisdiction" within its scope.' 29 Thus it
can be argued that the former trust territories fall within the scope of
the statute through its use of the "any other territory" language.
The RMI has argued that section 105 (h) of the Energy Policy Act of
1992 mandates the United States use money from the Superfund to
clean up the PCB contamination there. Section 105 (h) of the Energy
Policy Act states that "the programs and services of the Environmental
protection Agency regarding PCBS shall, to the extent applicable, as
121. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 655 (D. Haw. 1973).
122. Convention, supra note 24, art. III.
123. See People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 814 (D. Haw. 1973).
124. Id.
125. See id. (citing inter alia 42 U.S.C. § 4571; 41 U.S.C. § 48(b); 42 U.S.C. § 247(b); 47
U.S.C. § 397; 42 U.S.C. § 4402(3); 42 U.S.C. § 2949; 20 U.S.C. § 1401; 42 USC 300(a); 7
U.S.C. § 135 et seq.; 33 U.S.C. § 1362; 42 USC § 229(b); 42 U.S.C. § 3890; 20 U.S.C. § 403;
42 U.S.C. 298(b); 20 U.S.C. § 807; 20 U.S.C. § 807; 33 U.S.C. § 1169; 42 U.S.C. § 4601).
126. See id. (citing inter alia 33 U.S.C. § 1163; 42 U.S.C. § 2949; 22 U.S.C. § 2127; 33
U.S.C. § 1161; 15 U.S.C. § 633; 16 U.S.C. § 633; 16 U.S.C. § 951).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(31) (1988).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 2602(13) (1988).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(27) (1988).
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appropriate, and in accordance with applicable laws be construed to be
made available to such islands. 130 Since the enactment of this provi-
sion, the United States Environmental Protection Agency has cleaned
up a number of the PCB sites using Superfund money. The United
States has stated that the remediation of the PCB sites was not an ac-
ceptance of liability, but merely acts of good neighborliness.
VII. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP'S
Article 75 of the United Nations Charter established the Interna-
tional Trusteeship System mandated with the development of the trust
territories.1 31 The major objectives of the International Trusteeship
System were "to promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their pro-
gressive development towards self government or independence.
'"1 32
The U.N. Charter required the members that accepted the administra-
tion of a trust to recognize that "the interests of the inhabitants of these
territories are paramount 133 and to accept that responsibility as "a sa-
cred trust the obligation [of which] to promote to the utmost.. .the well-
being of the inhabitants of these territories."'1 34 Thus the United States
as the administrator of the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
of which the Republic of the Marshall Islands was formerly a member,
accepted the obligation to promote the interests of the Marshallese.
This principle was never in dispute.
Unlike the Former League of Nations Mandates which were to be
administered as integral portions of the controlling state, implying a
lesser duty to the Mandate's inhabitants,1 35 article 73 of the UN Char-
ter obligates the Trustee to make the interests of the inhabitants of the
Trust Territory paramount. 136 This obligation is clearly indicative of
the existence of a fiduciary duty of loyalty between the administering
trustee to the inhabitants of the trust territory.137
The existence of a fiduciary duty commands the trustee to "act for
the benefit of the other while subordinating one's personal interest."'
138
130. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2781.
131. U.N. CHARTER art. 75.
132. U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
134. Id.
135. Ramon E. Reyes, Nauru v. Australia: The International Fiduciary Duty and the
Settlement of Nauru's Claims for Rehabilitation of its Phosphate Lands, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 40 (1996) (citing Ellen M. Fitzgerald, Note: Nauru v. Australia: A Sa-
cred Trust Betrayed?, 6 CONN J. INT'L L. 209, 215 (1990)).
136. Reyes, supra note 135, at 37(citing U.N. CHARTER art. 73).
137. Id. at 39.
138. Id. at 35 (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990)).
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This duty commands the trustee "not [to] exert or pressure on the bene-
ficiary, [not] deal with the subject matter of the trust as to benefit him-
self or prejudice the beneficiary, or take advantage of the relation-
ship."1 39 Thus, the United States was bound by this fiduciary duty in
its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Despite
the permissibility provided for in the UN Charter articles establishing
Strategic Trusts1 40 , the United States was clearly acting outside the
scope of its duty by detonating hydrogen bombs on the trust itself, irra-
diating it and making it unusable for some time. However, it is unclear
whether the fiduciary duty extends so far as to require the trustee to
rehabilitate lands contaminated during the trust administration after
the trust has been terminated.
In resolving this issue, it will be useful to look at how other legal
systems view a trust in establishing the parameters of a trustee's du-
ties. Legal cultures such as "the civil law, the Judaeo-Christian tradi-
tion, Islamic law, socialist law, African customary law and the non the-
istic traditions of Asia and South Asia,"141 "have recognized that each
generation is a trustee or steward of the natural environment for the
benefit of generations yet unborn."142 Under United States law, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the inhabitants of a trust can sue to enforce
their treaty rights. 143 During the trusteeship period, the Trusteeship





Under U.S. commonlaw principles, a fiduciary relationship is one in
which a party entrusted with property is legally bound to maintain
property for the benefit of another. 145 In a trusteeship there is the set-
tlor who intentionally created trust, the trustee is the maintainer of the
139. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990)).
140. U.N. CHARTER arts. 83-84.
141. WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 338 (citing E.B. WEISS, IN FAIRNESS To FUTURE
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY 18-19 (1989)).
142. Id.
143. People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 96 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
144. Michael W. Leslie, International Fiduciary Duty: Australia's Trusteeship Over
Nauru, 8 B.U. INT'L L. J. 397, 408 (1990).
145. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS §1.1 (6th ed. 1987).
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trust, the trust property itself and the beneficiary for whose benefit the
trust property is held by the trustee. 146 The beneficiary is required to
place a great deal of trust in the trustee because the trustee has greater
control over the trust than the beneficiary. 147 Consequently, the trustee
owes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiary wherein he must act with strict
honesty 148 and must act solely in the interests of the beneficiary when
maintaining the trust. 
149
2. U.S. Trust Relationship with Native American Peoples
Historically, the United States has exercised a trusteeship relation-
ship with the Native American peoples of North America. This rela-
tionship has been characterized as one in which a "domestic dependent
nations" exists within the boundaries of a sovereign state.150 All native
peoples in the United States, including those in Hawaii and Alaska suf-
fered a "common loss of land and resources to an immigrant majority
population with colonialist impulses.'' In the relationship between
the United States and the Cherokee Nation, the Cherokee were placed
under the protection of the United States which also had the exclusive
right to regulate trade with them and "manag[ed] all their affairs as [it]
thought proper."' 52 It is a relationship in which the Cherokee are "so
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States,
that any attempt to acquire their lands [by foreign nations], or to form a
political connection with them, would be considered by all as an inva-
sion of [United States ] territory."'153 It has been characterized by Chief
Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1831 as one that "re-
sembles that of ward to his guardian."'
15 4
The trust relationship between the Native American peoples and
the United States is one in which the United States provides has a fi-
duciary duty to "protect the tribes' property, treaty rights and way of
life." 15 5 This trust relationship is one of the fundamental principles un-
derlying the relations between the United States and the Native Ameri-
can peoples. 5 6 It represents an enforceable legal acknowledgment by
146. Id. at §1.1.
147. Id. at §1.2.
148. Id. at §1.2.
149. Id. at § 95, at 340.
150. Cherokee Nation v. U.S., 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
151. Mary Christina Woods, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward the
Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administra-
tion's Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 742 (1995).
152. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Woods, supra note 151, at 735.
156. See id. at 743.
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the United states that it has taken what once belonged to the Native
American peoples and now agrees to protect what they still retain.
157 It
stands as a judicially created doctrine and "stands independent of trea-
ties and inures to the benefit of all tribes, treaty and non treaty
alike."' 58 It binds federal agencies to deal with the tribes in "the most
exacting fiduciary standards" when carrying out their various statutory
mandates. 159 Federal agencies are bound not to, "abrogate or extin-
guish the trust relationship, or violate the treaty rights, though courts
still allow Congress such plenary power. Absent a direct conflict be-
tween an applicable statutory provision and the trust responsibility, a
federal agency must implement its program in a manner that protects
tribal lands and resources."'
160
Within the United States, the trusteeship relationship between the
United States and the Native American peoples is an enforceable one
with substantive obligations. Tragically, the United States government
has been unable to significantly deter the ecological degradation that
has severely damaged tribal lands and resources to such a degree that
it is uncertain whether these cultures will ever be able to recover from
this harm. 161 Looking at the Northwestern United States as an exam-
ple, mismanagement of the Columbia River by the state and federal
government have led to the devastation of the salmon population and
the subsequent desolation of the fisheries for which the local Native
American peoples were dependent on for their economic and cultural
survival. In that respect, the United States can be said to have failed in
its trusteeship obligations to "protect tribal lands, resources and native
way of life from the intrusions of the majority society."'162 Applied to the
principles of commonlaw trusts, the United States can reasonably be
argued to have been negligent in its management of the body of the
trust.
B. The Civil Law System
Under the Civil Law System, which has its roots in Ancient Roman
157. See Woods, supra note 151, at 742 (citing Seminole Nation v. United States, 316
U.S. 286, 296 (1942)); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 244-248 (1983); Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256-257 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem),
modified on other grounds, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd in part on other grounds,
499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert denied. 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Northern Cheyenne Tribe
v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 3065, 3070-3071 (D.
Mont.) (May 28, 1985).
158. Id. at 742.
159. Id. at 743 (quoting Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 297; Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
of Indians, 354 F. Supp at 256).
160. Id. at 744.
161. Id. at 745.
162. Id. at 742.
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Law, there exists the mandatum. 163 In a mandatum, there is a manda-
tory, who like a trustee, "is entrusted with the goods of a principal and
is under a legal duty to account faithfully and honestly in regard to his
custody of those goods."164 Another similarity to the modern trust is
that "the mandatory.. .may not benefit from the mandate except to the
extent that [the terms of the mandate]specifically entitles him to such
advantage." 165 Within the French legal system, where there is no dis-
tinction legal and equitable estates, the closest legal device to the com-
monlaw trust is the tutelle. 166 A tutelle is a legal institution used to
provide an unemancipated child who has lost both parents with a
tuteur (guardian or tutor).167 The tutelle who is entrusted with custody
of the unemancipated child "is responsible for the child's maintenance,
education, estate and all 'acts of law." '168 Unlike a commonlaw trust,
the tutelle has a built in oversight component referred to as a conseil de
famille (family council).
169
C. Non European Legal Systems
Besides the European legal societies, other legal cultures have also
embraced devices similar to the commonlaw trust. In each of these
trust like devices there is a recognition that individual actions do not
take place in a complete vacuum and thus consideration must be given
to one's actions on the greater whole.
In Islamic law, there is a trust like device known as the wakf. The
historical roots of the wakf are said to date back to Mohammad when he
mandated his followers to "[i]mmobilize [their property] in such a way
that it cannot be sold or made the subject of gift or inheritance, and dis-
tribute the revenues among the poor."' 70 Subsequently, wakfs are used
to maintain public charities or "side step the strict scheme of succession
prescribed by the Shari'a that often left a testator unable to make the
adequate provisions for his surviving family."171 In a wakf, the "muta-
walli" acts in a similar fashion to the commonlaw trustee "to take
charge of the property, maintain it, pay taxes and collect rent, but he
cannot alienate the land."172 Hindu law also places a high value on the
163. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 151.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Leslie, supra note 144, at 11.
167. Id. at 411 (citing MAURICE SHELDON AMOS, AMOS AND WALTON'S INTRODUCTION
TO FRENCH LAW 82 (1963)).
168. Id. at 411 (citing AMOS, supra note 167, at 84).
169. Id. (citing AMOS, supra note 167).
170. Id. at 413 (citing 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 109 (R.
David et al eds., 1972)).
171. Leslie, supra note 144, at 413.
172. Id.
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maintenance of trusts. Violations of trusts in Hindu legal culture called
for the severest of sanctions and punishments.' 73 In African customary
law, the chief acted as trustee over the land that his people dwelled
on.' 74 Moreover, the chief "could not alienate any part of the tribal ter-
ritory without the consent or [sic] the people nor could he even make
grants or perpetual loans without the approval of the public assem-
bly."1
75
Thus, there is evidence that the enforceability of a trust, or legal
devices that are akin to commonlaw trusts, is something that has been
accepted and implemented in several legal cultures. There is a definite
recognition that a party entrusted with a trust has a strong and sub-
stantive duty to the beneficiaries of that trust. Moreover, violations of
the duty to that trust are severely punished in some legal cultures. It is
apparent that the fiduciary relationship exists between the current
trustee and the beneficiary. However, it is unclear whether a fiduciary
relationship exists between the trustee of a trust and the descendants of
the beneficiaries of the trust. In the case of the PCB contamination in
the Marshall Islands, it can be argued that the abandonment of the
transformers was, not a violation of the fiduciary duty in a self dealing
sense, but an example of mismanagement of the trust. Thus, it can be
argued that equity demands that the obligations of the trustee cannot
terminate until the body of the trust is rehabilitated to a condition be-
fore the contamination that resulted from the trustee's administration.
IX. INTERNATIONAL EQUITY ARGUMENTS
It can be argued that as a matter of intergenerational equity, the
United States's duties should be extended to entail the clean up of the
PCB contamination. Intergenerational equity is a principle developed
by Edith Weiss Brown in "the Conservation of Equality Principle." It
states that:
[e]ach generation should maintain the quality of the planet so that it is
passed on in no worse condition than the generation received it, and
each generation is entitled to an environmental quality comparable to
that enjoyed by previous generations. 176
In the case of the Marshall Islands, the United States should have
173. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 152.
174. Id. at 151.
175. Id.
176. Lawrence E. Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy, Negotiating More Effective
Global Agreements, 54 (1994) (citing EDITH WEISS BROWN, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL
EQUITY (1989)).
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maintained the quality of the trust so that when it was returned to the
Marshallese, they would be able to enjoy a comparable degree of envi-
ronmental quality to that of their ancestors. In this case, they could
not. First, the United States had irradiated a number of the Marshal-
lese atolls during the hydrogen bomb experiments in the 50's and sec-
ond, because of the abandonment of PCB leaking transformers on the
atolls. In the latter case, the United States should be required to take
action, pursuant to its acceptance of the sacred trust, to remediate the
PCB contaminated lands.
The harm done to the Marshall Islands by the PCB leaking trans-
formers of such a nature that it is uncertain whether the Marshallese
will ever be able to use those lands as they once had. Moreover, it is
uncertain whether those Marshallese who have absorbed PCBs into
their bodies will ever be the same. The greater tragedy is that the bio-
logical impacts of the PCBs will not be felt by the generation that first
absorbed into their bodies, but the following generation. Thus, it is to
them, this faceless next generation, that the United States owes a duty
to rehabilitate the ancestral lands of the Marshallese people.
The existence of this duty to the following generations of the bene-
ficiaries of the trust has been stated and echoed implicitly in several in-
ternational agreements. In 1972 the United Nations declared in Prin-
ciple One of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
that, "[m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and ade-
quate conditions of life, an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to pro-
tect and improve the environment for present and future genera-
tions."1
7 7
The United States is bound by the Stockholm Declaration's lan-
guage requiring parties "to protect and improve the environment for
present and future generations."' 178 By denying its responsibility to re-
habilitate the PCB contaminated lands, the United States will have
failed in its duty as a steward to the next generation of Marshallese.
X. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
More recently, similar sentiments were expressed at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development ("UNCED") in
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992. More specifically, one of the key provi-
sions of UNCED was expressed in Principle 2 where states agreed to
ensure that "activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
177. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment from the U.N. Confer-
ence in Stockholm, Sweden U.N. Doc. AICONF,48114, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
178. Id.
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damage to the environment of other States."' 79 In this case, the United
States government brought the transformers to the Trust Territory
with the intention of developing an energy infra structure there. It is
unclear whether they were brought to the Trust Territory at a time
when people were aware of the harm that PCBs caused. It is apparent
that the transformers were brought to the Trust territory for the benefit
of the local population. The area of contention can properly be focused
on the disposal of the transformers after their use. Apparently, a num-
ber of these were simply abandoned and have been discovered only
within the last decade. It is the Trust Territory government's disposal
practices with these transformers that have led to the potential prob-
lems the Marshallese and other former Trust Territory nations may
face. The decision to bring the transformers to the Marshall Islands was
clearly within the jurisdiction of the United States government. Fur-
thermore, the United States was the generator and the arranger for the
delivery of these problematic substances to the Marshall Islands. Were
these activities to have taken place in the United States with the same
resulting harm, the United States government, or the agency in charge
of these activities, would have been liable for the costs of clean up under
section 120 on Federal facilities liability of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response Compensation and Liability Act. 8 0 At the time
some of these problematic transformers were brought to the Marshall
Islands, no official action by the Trust Territory government could have
occurred without some degree of approval from the United States De-
partment of Interior. Therefore, the United States can be argued to be
legally obligated to rehabilitate those PCB contaminated lands. As a
matter of equity, the United States, as the former steward of those is-
lands, can be said to have a continuing duty to return those islands to
its people in the state they were in before the trusteeship began. Thus,
the fiduciary obligations of the trusteeship should endure until those
contaminated lands are rehabilitated.
The International Court of Justice has acknowledged the existence
of equity as a legal concept and that it "is a direct emanation of the
idea of justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer jus-
tice is bound to apply it."181 Therefore, future generations may be able
"to point a finger at the period of administration under the partner gov-
ernments as a period when the rights of generations of [Marshallese]
were jeopardised [sic] for the sake of the immediate advantage of the
trustees."'18 2 Thus, it can be argued that the United States should be
179. United Nations Conference on Environment & Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874
(1992).
180. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 9620.
181. See WEERAMANTRY, supra note 6, at 338.
182. Id.
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It remains to be seen whether there is a basis in customary law to
obligate the United States to rehabilitate these lands. The first steps in
the establishment of international legal precedent where former Trus-
tees accept accountability for ecological harm done to the Trust Terri-
tory during the Trusteeship period may have been established in the
1986 Compact of Free Associations Provisions on the hydrogen bomb
experiments of the 50's and in the recent Australia -Nauru Settlement.
In determining whether these acts do indeed establish international le-
gal precedent, requires an examination of whether there is
a point of legislative or expository behavior [that] crystallize[s] into a
customary rule which states feel bound to follow themselves s and
which they wish to see applied to other states. This involves the recog-
nition that a state is acquiescing in the practice (state practice) and
has accepted the particular practice on the basis of a legal obligation
(opinio juris) and not merely of comity or goodwill to other states.
18 3
Furthermore, there is a requirement of repetition of act for there to
be a basis for the establishment of custom.18 4 However this notion has
begun to change and the emphasis on repetition has shifted to "the
number of states taking part in a practice."18 5 Thus acknowledging
that:
[t]he number of state taking part in a practice is much more important
than the number of separate acts of which the practice is composed, or
the time over which it is spread; a single act involving fifty States pro-
vides stronger proof that a custom is accepted by the international
community than ten separate acts involving ten separate pairs of
States.
8 6
183. James Cameron, The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law,
in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 262 (Tim O'Riordan & James Cameron
eds., 1994).
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B. The Beginning of Custom with the Nuclear Settlement
The very first steps in the establishment of a body of international
customary law that requires trustees to be accountable for ecological
harm during their stewardship may have been taken with the Compact
of Free Association between the United States and the inhabitants of
the former trust territories. While the Marshallese may never be put
back in the situation had the United States never detonated hydrogen
bombs on their lands, the United States has made an attempt to finan-
cially compensate them for past harm. In Section 177 of the Compact of
Free Association, it states that:
[T]he Government of the United States accepts the responsibility for
compensation owing to citizens of the Marshall Islands, or the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia (or Palau) for loss or damage to property and
person of the citizens of the Marshall Islands, or the Federated States
of Micronesia, resulting from the nuclear testing program which the
Government of the United States conducted in the Northern Marshall
Islands between June 30, 1946 and August 18, 1958.187
In doing so, the United States agreed to establish a multi million
dollar fund to pay financial compensation to those parties who claimed
injury as a result of the nuclear testing program.188 Furthermore, the
United States agreed, at the request of the Government of the Marshall
Islands, "to provide special medical care and logistical support thereto
for the remaining 174 members of the population of Rongelap and Utrik
who were exposed to radiation resulting from "Bravo" test."1 8 9 In the
specific case of Rongelap, the United States has agreed to, "take such
steps (if any) as may be necessary to overcome the effects of such fallout
[from a 1954 thermonuclear test] on the habitability of Rongelap Island,
and to restore Rongelap Island, if necessary, so that it can be safely be
inhabited."'90 However, section 177(i)(1) does begin with the phrase "be-
cause the Rongelap people remain unconvinced that it is safe to con-
tinue to live on Rongelap Island,"' 91 and every required action is a
187. Id. at § 177.
188.
In approving the Compact, the Congress understands and intends that the
peoples of Bikini, Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik, who were affected by the
United States nuclear weapons testing program in the Marshall Islands, will
receive the amounts of $75,000,000 (Bikini); $48,750,000 (Enewetak),
$37,500,000 (Rongelap) and $22,500,000 (Utrik), respectively, which
amounts shall be paid out of proceeds from the funds established [under
other articles of the Compact of Free association].
Id. at § 177(a).
189. Id. at § 177(h)(1)
190. Id. at § 177 (i)(1).
191. Id.
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qualified one (contingent on a review of findings of habitability), there
appears to be a patronizing air to the language of this specific provision
to the Marshallese living on Rongelap. Ultimately, the United States
has accepted some measure of accountability for the harm done and has
taken steps to begin to remediate the situation.
C. Nauru v. Australia Settlement
Recently, the Island nation of the Republic of Nauru brought a law-
suit against Australia claiming that "it suffered damage as a result of
Australia's violation of its rights under both the relevant United Na-
tions Trusteeship provisions and several general principles of interna-
tional law including self-determination, permanent sovereignty over
natural resources, and abuse of rights."192 One of Nauru's greatest
natural resources was an abundant supply of rich phosphate depos-
its.193 Due to its value as a fertilizer, Australia mined out approxi-
mately one third of the island during its administration of Nauru as a
U.N. Trusteeship.
194
The primary focus of the Republic of Nauru's suit against Australia
was that it "had suffered loss first as a result of the failure of the part-
ner governments [Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia] to reha-
bilitate the lands mined prior to [the date when Nauru gained control
over the phosphate mining industry], and second because of the manner
in which the phosphates had been exploited."'195 More specifically, the
Republic of Nauru asserted that Australia first, "abused its authority
over the territory and people of Nauru;"'196 second, "Australia violated
the solemn duties of a predecessor state that is entrusted with the task
of administering or preparing a territory whose title is to be trans-
ferred;"'9 7 and "[flinally, . . Australia violated customary international
law principles prohibiting unjust enrichment."' 198 In its claim for relief,
the Republic of Nauru "requests that the ICJ ajudge and declare that
Australia has incurred an international legal responsibility and is
bound to make restitution or other appropriate reparation to Nauru for
the damage and prejudice suffered." '199
Australia responded to the Republic of Nauru's claims with a num-
192. Anghie, supra note 4, at 445-446.
193. Id. at 446.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 453 (citing Memorial of Nauru (Nauru v. AustI.), 1990 I.C.J. 89, 309 (Apr.
1990)).
196. Id. at 462.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 463.
199. Id. (quoting Memorial of Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1989 I.C.J. 32 (May 19) (Appli-
cation Instituting Processdings)).
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ber of assertions. As a matter of jurisdiction Australia asserted that
only the UN general assembly and Trusteeship council were competent
to rule on the case and the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the mat-
ter.200As to the merits of the case, Australia's official responses to the
Republic of Nauru's claims on the matter could not be disclosed to the
public until the case had reached that phase of the adjudication. 20 1
However, based on public statements made by Australia on the matter
of rehabilitation, it can be discerned that their official position was
"that the phosphate agreement Nauruans the economic benefit of the
phosphate industry, that the partner governments gave up their mining
concession without compensation, and that as a result, Nauruans had a
means to provide for rehabilitation. " 20 2
In 1993 Australia and the Republic of Nauru settled their claims
before the International Court of Justice could rule on the matter. It is
of significant interest to note that the International Court of Justice
ruled that it did have jurisdiction to hear the case.20 3 Subsequently, it
can then be argued that the International Court of justice may also
have jurisdiction to hear a similar case in the context of toxic contami-
nation brought by former Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands against
the United States. While Nauru v. Australia was a case involving self
dealing on the part of the administering authority and thus distin-
guishable from the case of the PCB contamination of the Marshall Is-
lands, both suits sought ecological rehabilitation of lands harmed dur-
ing the trusteeship period. Had the Nauru v. Australia case been
actually litigated, historic legal precedent may have been established on
the subject of post trusteeship environmental liability.
In the settlement agreement between Australia and Nauru over
Australia's phosphate mining,204 Australia, "agreed to pay Nauru $107
million (Australian) 'in an effort to assist the Republic of Nauru in its
preparations for post phosphate future.' However the Settlement
Agreement explicitly states that the settlement payments are 'made
without prejudice to Australia's long-standing position that bears no re-
200. Id. at 464.
201. Id.
202. Id. (citing Australian Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Nauru: International
Court of Justice Action Against Australia Backgrounder, 13 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 409, 410
(1992)).
203. Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), 1992
I.C.J. 240 (June 26).
204.
A brief look at the island [of Nauru] shows that pre-independence mining left
much of the island covered with former strip-mining sites. Because of the
nature of phosphate mining, these sites are not simply open pits, but rather
fields of rock pinnacles standing several meters high, making the mined por-
tions of the island unusuable for virtually anything.
Leslie, supra note 144, at 415.
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sponsibility for the rehabilitation of the phosphate lands."' 20 5
Despite the presence of this "no responsibility" provision, the
agreement can be viewed "as a tacit acknowledgment of some responsi-
bility by Australia for the massive environmental and economic damage
perpetrated on the island of Nauru."20 6 This settlement alone may not
signal the emergence of a new trend in international customary law,
but in the context of other agreements it may. In light of the U.S. Com-
pact of Free Association in regards to nuclear rehabilitation of hydrogen
bomb experiment lands there does appear to be a growing, albeit a re-
luctant, trend for former Trustees to take responsibility for their ac-
tions.
XII. CONCLUSION
Typically, the former Trustees have negotiated settlements with
the inhabitants of the former trusts. It can be reasonably argued that
this is done out of fear that if the merits of the case were litigated, the
case might result in official international legal precedent that officially
obligates Trustees to take responsibility for their past acts. Presently,
the former Trustees are attempting to pre-empt this type of precedent
by negotiating settlements with waivers of liability provisions in them.
However, the truth of the matter is quite apparent. The former Trus-
tees are remediating the ecological harm done under their administra-
torship out of a sense of apprehension of litigation and the potential es-
tablishment of legal precedent. Thus, this is a trend in and of itself. It
is a new trend where the negotiation of settlements entailing voluntary
remediation is indeed the beginning of a custom of former trustees ac-
cepting some accountability for ecological harm. This may be the basis
for an argument requiring the United States to rehabilitate newly dis-
covered PCB contaminated lands.
Further strengthening this argument, the express text of the U.N.
Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations
clearly state the existence of a trust relationship. The trusts were cre-
ated to help the inhabitants of the former Mandate territories, not as a
justification to exploit them. History has shown that a number of the
trustees exploited their trusts for their own economic or strategic bene-
fit. In this case, the transformers were brought to the Marshall Islands
to help the development of the Marshallese. However, the unintended
residue of energy development has been toxic PCB contamination of the
soil and waters, thus making some of the lands unusable. Until the
PCB contaminated lands are rehabilitated, the Marshallese will be de-
prived of lands that were of reasonable use before the trusteeship be-
205. Reyes, supra note 135, at 32.
206. Id.
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gan. Thus the clear language of the UN Charter, the Trusteeship
Agreements are proof of the existence of a fiduciary relationship and
equity demands that this relationship cannot end until the harm
caused during the trust is repaired.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISRAELI AND
ARAB WATER LAW TRADITIONS AND INSIGHTS FOR
MODERN WATER SHARING AGREEMENTS
MtLANNE ANDROMECCA CMC*
INTRODUCTION
Rules of water use among early Jewish tribes date back as far as
3000 B.C.E. when Semetic groups settled at Ur in Mesopotamia.' Wa-
ter,2 a natural resource critical to all life and to human, social, eco-
nomic, and industrial development, is scarce in the arid Middle East.
The main sources of freshwater in this region include the Jordan and
Yarmouk Rivers, and a number of underground aquifers, all of which
have had to be shared by various communities with different religious,
cultural and, in modern times, national identities. Yet, as stated by
scholar Leif Ohlsson, "A river does not know any boundaries,' 3 and a
river or other water source that flows through public or private property
or crosses Israeli, Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese or Egyptian borders
must somehow be shared by all users.
Modern water law in Israel, 4 specifically, and in the Middle East,
generally, addresses competing interest among users and usage, and
more recently, among nations. It is the result of centuries of local cus-
toms and multiple political, religious and historical influences, includ-
* LL.M., International and Comparative Law, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D.
Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati College of Law; B.A.
Vassar College. The author teaches international law at the American University School
of International Service and was an Independent Consultant to the U.N. Commission on
Sustainable Development and an Associate U.S. Delegate to the U.N. World Conference
on Human Rights. The views represented in this article are solely those of the author.
1. See Dr. M. Virshubski, Israel (Israel), UNITED NATIONS FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION, SURVEY OF WATER LAW IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES at 87, U.N.
Doc. /_/ (1974) [hereinafter Virshubski, Israel, Israel].
2. The term "water" will refer to freshwater, not sea water, including water from
naturally occurring sources such as lakes, rivers and streams, as well as man-made con-
duits, including wells and reservoirs.
3. Leif Ohlsson, Water-An Elusive and Ultimate Constraint for Development, re-
printed in REGIONAL CASE STUDIES OF WATER CONFLICTS 1, 5 (Leif Olson ed., 1992).
4. Modern Israel or the State of Israel will refer to all land over which the govern-
ment of the State of Israel exerts political control, including, at the present time, the Go-
lan Heights, West Bank and Gaza Strip. "Israel" refers generally to the geographic area
first settled during the Jewish Royal Period, 1020-586 B.C.E.
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ing the ancient Jewish and Islamic religious and social laws, the laws of
the Greco-Roman Empires, the Ottoman Empire and colonial Manda-
tory rule, and most recently, international principles of apportionment.
Even where the Roman, and later the British empires ruled over the re-
gion, water law remained closer to the traditional Jewish and Islamic
doctrines-most notably honoring a communal approach to water use,
and close community or state control over water resources-than to the
laws of the conquerors. 5
This article examines the evolution of water law in Israel, and
compares it to the development of Arab water law. First, it presents a
discussion on water law of the ancient religious systems: Jewish law of
the Talmud,6 and Islamic law of the Holy Koran.7 Next, it reviews wa-
ter regulation under Ottoman rule when the Mejelle Code, a unified le-
gal system, was enforced over the entire Middle East region. The arti-
cle proceeds with a discussion of the impact on Israeli and Arab water
law under British Mandatory rule. Finally, it examines the develop-
5. See generally DANTE A. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES OF WATER LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION (1992) [hereinafter CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES]; Dante A. CAPONERA, Water
Laws in Moslem Countries, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization Develop-
ment Paper No. 43, March 1954 [hereinafter Moslem Water Laws]; A.M. Hirsch, Water
Legislation in the Middle East, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 168 (1959) [hereinafter Hirsch, Water
Legislation].
Three major water rights systems may be identified throughout history: the riparian
rights doctrine, prior appropriation, and a shared community or administrative control
approach. See L. TECLAFF, WATER LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (1985) [hereinafter
TECLAFF, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE].
Israel water law has never recognized riparian rights doctrine, characteristic of the Ro-
man and then the British systems, as well as followed in a modified form in the eastern
states of the United States, which provides that water rights stem from land ownership or
occupation. The owner or occupier of land has the right to use water flowing on or abut-
ting his land without need for licensing or other form of consent from the community or
other authority. The allowable use extends to all domestic purposes without regard to the
effect on other riparians. Beyond this, use for irrigation or industrial purposes is limited
so far as it must not impair the quantity of water flow (the water level), or the quality of
the water (including pollution, siltration and salinization), to the other riparians. See
CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra, at 82. Israel water law also has never recognized prior
approapriation water rights principles, which observe a first in time theory of property
rights. According to prior appropriation doctrine, one who arrives first, and makes bene-
ficial use of a water source, acquires a superior right to use against all subsequent potien-
tial uses. See TECLAFF, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra at 22. The right is retained so
long as the original use, or uses, continue. Id. Prior appropriation is prevalent in the
western United States of America. In 1872, California codified the procedure by which
water could be appropriated. Id. at 20.
6. The Talmud was written and compiled during the 61h through 3d centuries B.C.E.
in Palestine and Babylonia. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 170. The
Talmud generally refers to the body of oral Jewish Law including commentaries and
scholarly discussions. E.N. DORFF, JEWISH LAW AND MODERN IDEOLOGY 149 (1970).
7. The Koran is believed by the Moslem people to be the embodiment of divine law.
N. Ellison, A Symposium on Muslim Law, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1, 1 (1953).
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ment of national water systems in the modern State of Israel and, as a
means of comparison with a modern Moslem nation, the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.
8
As an initial note, the historical legal systems9 discussed in this ar-
ticle exert no legal authority either in the modern State of Israel or the
modern Kingdom of Jordan. As part of the historical tradition of these
nations, they remain relevant to law and custom at the local level, as
well as to the legal and cultural perspective of the modern inhabitants.
Finally, this author argues that water law development in Israel, and in
the Arab countries bordering Israel, share a common historical theme.
The legal and cultural perspectives of water ownership, use and regula-
tion common to Israel and its neighbors, and distinctive to this region,
may and should contribute in a positive and productive way to discus-
sions on the present conflicts concerning the equitable division and
sharing of water among the Middle East nations.
THE ANCIENT WATER LAW REGIMES
Certain fundamental similarities exist between the water rights
and duties described in the religious law of both Judaism and Islam.
Principally, both communities conceive of water as a gift of God's crea-
tion, belonging to all members of the community. 10 Access to water, at
least for the purpose of human sustenance, is considered to be a right of
all persons, within and without the community, and whether on private
or publicly held property."
Jewish Water Law
12
Jewish religious and civil law is documented and commented upon
in the Talmud, including rules on water rights and priorities 13 of usage.
Jewish water law flourished from approximately 930 B.C.E. through
332 B.C.E, the beginning of the Greco-Roman Empires. 14 During this
period,' 5 the first centralized municipal water supply management sys-
8. Jordan borders Israel along Israel's eastern border.
9. These include the laws of the Talmud, the Koran, the Mejelle Code of the Otto-
man Empire, and Mandatory Rule. See discussion infra Parts I and II.
10. See generally CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5; Hirsch, Water Legislation,
supra note 5; and Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5.
11. See generally CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5; Hirsch, Water Legislation,
supra note 5; and Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5.
12. Jewish water law here refers to the laws set out principally in the Talmud, as dis-
tinct from water law in the modern state of Israel.
13. The relative rights of a non-community member to water to sustain himself. See
Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 186.
14. See Virshubski, supra note 1, at 87.
15. Around 930 B.C.E., the Nation of Israel split into the Kingdom of Israel in the
1998
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tem was instituted. 16 Jewish law and legal principles, to the extent that
they did not conflict with the laws of their conquerors, continued to be
followed' 7 during the Greco-Roman, 8 and successive conquests, until
the institution of the Mejelle Code under the Ottoman Empire. 19
The fundamental Talmudic water law established that water was
the common right of all people: "Rivers and Streams forming springs,
these belong to every man. '20 Thus, all naturally occurring bodies of
water, whether located on or adjoining private property, or whether
flowing from one village to another, were the right of all-not just of the
private property owner or of the community members. This scheme
permitted no legal interest to exclude another from water use, although
it recognized a system of priorities of use.
2'
Jewish law established a descending order of priority for certain
types of water usage, and for villagers versus non-community members,
or outsiders. At the top of the hierarchy was the "Right of Thirst"2 2 - no
person could be denied the right to quench his thirst, regardless of
whether he was a member of the community or whether the water was
on public or private land.23 Use by outsiders could be restricted, how-
ever, until the needs critical to the life of community members were
satisfied. 24 Thus, villagers' drinking use attained priority over outsid-
ers' satisfying their thirst, and then villagers' irrigation and livestock
needs came before community outsiders' watering their animals: "A
spring owned by the people of the city: their lives and the lives of others
- their lives take precedence over those of others; their beasts and the
beasts of others - their beasts take precedence over the beasts of oth-
ers. ... "25
Lower on the water use hierarchy, the community's non-life sus-
taining, casual water use had priority over outsiders' casual use, but
north, and Juda in the South. The first destruction of the Temple of Solomon occurred in
586 B.C.E. and the Persian conquest in 538 B.C.E, followed by the Edict of Cyrus, the re-
turn of the Jewish people to Jerusalem, and the rebuilding of the Temple. See id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Greek conquest occurred around 332 B.C.E. and the Roman conquest in 63
B.C.E. Id.
19. Jerusalem was conquered in 638 C.E. Id.
20. CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 22; see also Hirsch, Water Legislation,
supra note 5, at 173.
21. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 172-186.
22. Id. at 186.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 172 (quoting Talmud Bavli,
Nedarim, 80b).
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was subjugated to outsiders' life-sustaining needs. Thus, the commu-
nity's laundering needs would be satisfied before those of outsiders, but
an outsider could drink or water his animals before the community
could use water for laundering: "[T]heir laundering and the laundering
of others - their laundering takes precedence over the laundering of
others; the lives of others and their laundering - the lives of others
takes precedence over their laundering."
26
Similarly, riparian landowners retained no right to exclude others
from the reasonable use of the water of rivers and streams flowing
through their property or wells located on their property,27 although,
the owner of the land did maintain a right of compensation for access
across his land, and for use of the water: "And the children of Israel said
unto Him, 'We will go by the highway and if I and my cattle drink of thy
water, then I will pay for it only, without doing anything else, go
through on my feet."
'28
Among several landowners upon whose property a natural source of
water flowed, priority of right to use the water varied according to lo-
cality.29 Thus, in Palestine, the upper riparian landowner had priority
over lower riparians, 30 and the landowner whose land was located near-
est to a well had prior rights to the other riparians. 31 In Babylon, pri-
ority was determined principally on the basis of who could most easily
make use of the water source.
32
The owner of private property likewise had a legal property interest
in any man-made water conduits or holding devices. The landowner
had a right to restrict, but not to exclude, the use of wells, springs, or
underground water sources. The owner of the land which was located
closest to an underground source feeding a well had priority of use over
all others. 33 He also had the responsibility for maintaining the well,
but all riparian landowners using the well had a duty to assist him.
34
Thus, under Talmudic law, water use could be regulated by the
community, or the private landowner, upon whose property water
flowed or springs formed. A system of priorities was established, but in
26. Id. See also CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 25.
27. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 22.
28. Numbers 20:19 cited in CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 22.
29. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 22; see also Hirsch, Water Legisla-
tion, supra note 5.
30. See TECLAFF, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 5, at 56; see also E. KALLY,
WATER AND PEACE 23 (1993).
31. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 171.
32. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 22; see also A. HIRSCH,
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 153 (1957) [hereinafter HIRSCH,
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS].
33. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 171.
34. See HIRSCH, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, supra note 32 (citing Talmud Balvi).
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no case did the property interest give the community or the landowner
a complete right to exclude. Water use for human sustenance was
available to all people from all sources. This perspective of water as a
communal resource is mirrored in Islamic religious law35 and later, in
modified form, in Arab and Ottoman civil law.
Traditional Islamic Water Law
The Koran conceived of water as a gift from God,36 and commen-
taries to the Koran, similar to Jewish Talmudic law, established a right
of all men to use water, including a right to drink, to water one's ani-
mals, and a right to irrigate one's land, within a system establishing
certain priorities of usage and user.
37
Sharing water was considered a holy duty. Like Talmudic law,
both Sunni and Shi'ite38 law recognize a Right of Thirst, and denying
water was considered to be an offense against God: "Anyone who gives
water to a living creature will be rewarded.... To the man who refuses
his surplus water, Allah will say: 'Today I refuse thee my favo[]r, just as
thou refused the surplus of something that thou hadst not made thy-
self."'39 Like Jewish law, Islam law held that all natural sources of wa-
ter, including lakes and streams, belonged to all people. 40 Top priority
was given to water for drinking purposes, then for domestic purposes,
including watering one's animals, and then for other uses. Upper ri-
parians and upstream users had priority over lower riparians and
downstream users.
41
While Jewish law allowed compensation for use of water located on
private property, Islamic law prohibited any transaction that resembled
the selling or buying of water.42 This prohibition apparently applied
only to natural water sources. Ownership rights to artificial ground
water sources were granted under Islamic law. Sunni doctrine allowed
for one who dug a well or constructed a conduit through which water
could flow, whether on his own property or on unoccupied land, to have
an ownership interest in the water, an exclusive right for irrigation
35. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 70.
36. See the Holy Koran 21:30, cited in CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 70.
37. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 70.
38. Sunnis follow an orthodox interpretation of Islam while Shi'ites are sectarian.
See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 173.
39. See Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5, at 15-16.
40. See id. at 70.
41. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 174.
42. "It would seem that the Prophet Mohammed declared that water.., should be
the common entitlement of all Moslems and to prevent any attempt to appropriate water
he prohibited the selling of it." Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 173 (citing
Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5, at 17).
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purposes. 43
Still, surplus water was to be made available to the community for
public use. Shi'ite doctrine awarded an exclusive irrigation right to the
landowner with no public right to surplus.44 In no case however, under
Sunni or Shi'ite law, did an owner of an artificial water source have the
right to deny a living being water to quench his thirst.
WATER LAW UNDER OTTOMAN RULE AND THE MEJELLE CODE
Ottoman Rule, 1300 C.E. - 1922, imposed a highly centralized and
powerful political system on a formerly decentralized and localized re-
gion. Jewish communities, as non-Muslim minorities within the Otto-
man Empire, maintained a certain degree of autonomy as regards re-
ligious law and internal affairs, but were not permitted to hold any
public office, 45 including the position of water officer. 46 The early code
of the Ottoman Empire integrated Moslem religious law with decrees
and ordinances issued by the Turkish Sultans. 47 A first series of legal
reforms took place in 1839.48 The second period of reform resulted in
the Mejelle Code, drafted between 1870 and 1876.
49
The Mejelle Code, while it adapted and secularized the law in three
significant ways, retained earlier principles of traditional Islamic water
law.50 First, the communal right of all persons to water, fundamental to
the ancient legal systems, was codified, albeit in modified form: "Water,
grass and fire are free to be used by all. In these three things mankind
are partners. ' 51 The strong and centralized leadership of the Ottoman
empire defined the sovereign as the living embodiment of the commu-
nity; therefore, community ownership was one and the same as owner-
ship by the sovereign. The sovereign retained all rights to all water
sources, and private rights were acquired only by grant from the gov-
ernment. All water resources, even water on private property and from
man-made wells, was subject to government regulation and control.
The Mejelle Code, like the Talmudic and Koranic laws, maintained
43. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 74.
44. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 174.
45. See ARYEH SHMUELEVITZ, THE JEWS OF THE OTrOMAN EMPIRE IN THE FIFTEENTH
AND THE SIXTEENTH CENTURIES 16 (1984).
46. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 173.
47. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 36.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. "The Mejelle was not intended to supersede the early authorities." Jassonides v.
Kyprioti, 7 CYPRUS L. REV. 83, quoted in Herbert J. Liebesny, Impact of Western Law in
the Countries of the Near East, 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 127, 131 (1953).
51. THE MEJELLE ch. IV, § 1, art. 1234, at 202 (C.R. Tyser et al. trans., Law Pub-
lishing Co. 1967).
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that all members of the community had the right of access, in instances
of private necessity, to use water on private property for personal and
domestic use.5 2 During times of public necessity, all sources of water,
including privately-owned water sources, were taken for public use.
53
Like ancient Islamic law, the Mejelle Code prohibited the sale of water
by private individuals. 54 Water rights were awarded by the state by a
Water Commission and registered in a Land Registry.
55
Second, a concept of reasonable use emerged. While all members of
the community had equal right to use the water of rivers and lakes, an
individual user was not permitted to impair the rights of others to use
the water, or to affect the quantity or quality of the water.5 6 The Water
Commission had the authority to determine reasonable use among
competing claims.
57
Third, although with some modifications, the hierarchy of priority
fundamentally remained much the same as under the ancient systems.
Water for drinking and for watering one's animals had first priority.
58
Article 1268, however, permitted a private landowner to exclude per-
sons from obtaining drinking water from a natural stream or well lo-
cated on private property, except if no other public water sources were
available.5 9 Like Talmudic law, the person entering private property
was responsible for any damage caused to the property, or to the well or
water conduit.
60
Irrigation was an important part of the Ottoman Empire develop-
ment, expansion and wealth, and the Mejelle Code treated irrigation
rights and priorities of use comprehensively. Priority was determined
generally on the basis of one's physical proximity to the water source.
Whomever was located nearest to the water source had the right to take
first.61 As between two persons in equally close proximity to a water
source, the first to arrive had priority. 62 Finally, landowners on higher
ground had priority over users on lower ground, with no reasonable use
restriction protecting the downstream landowners. 63
The Mejelle Code had a lasting influence on water law in Israel and
52. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 72.
53. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 175.
54. Article 1234 of the Mejelle Code, cited in Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5, at 37.
55. Id.
56. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 72.
57. Id.
58. See Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5, at 38.
59. MEJELLE CODE art. 1268, cited in Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5, at 38.
60. Id.
61. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 73.
62. Id. Thus, an element common to the later prior appropriation doctrine existed,
but only as a qualification of the physical proximity principle.
63. See CAPONERA, PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, at 73.
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throughout the Middle East region long after the fall of the Ottoman
Empire. Under the British Mandate, the Mejelle Code, in part, re-
mained on the books. The Code continued to influence local concepts of
water rights and duties throughout the Mandate and into the modern
era. 64 Most significantly, a theory of state ownership of water resources
emerged which was to continue through the Mandatory period and be-
come a legal cornerstone of the water code of the independent State of
Israel.
BRITISH MANDATE WATER LAW IN ISRAEL
Under British Mandate, 65 a hodge-podge of rules consisting of sec-
tions of the Mejelle code and local customary law, took the place of a co-
herent national water law system.66 Consequently, little distinguishes
the period of British Mandate rule as far as water regulation or water
development policy is concerned.
It was not until 1940, in response to the marked increase in Jewish
settlement in Israel, 67 that the British Mandatory government made its
first declaration of water policy and asserted the Crown's dominion over
all sources of water within Israel, including water on, under, or abut-
ting public or private lands.68 Article 16E of the amended Palestine Or-
der in Council provided that: "[T]he waters of all rivers, streams and
springs and of all lakes and other natural collections of still water in
Palestine shall be vested in the High Commissioner.
'" 69
The High Commissioner was endowed with the power to pass laws
"for the control ... [and] beneficial and economic use of water .... [and]
supervision over.., control... [and] exploitation of, the underground
sources of water supply in Palestine."70 Despite the dominion asserted
over the area's water resources, no legislation was passed under Article
16E to give effect 7' to the Order in Council; water regulation and devel-
64. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 179.
65. British Mandate was established in 1922 by Resolution of the League of Nations
and lasted until Israeli independence on May 15, 1948. The British also exerted Manda-
tory Rule over Trans-Jordan until the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
in 1949. See DANTE A. CAPONERA, WATER LAWS IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 88
(1975) [hereinafter EUROPEAN WATER LAWS].
66. "The law governing the use of water ... is not only inadequate but also very con-
fused." DOREEN WARRINER, LAND AND POVERTY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 73 (1948).
67. See KALLY, supra note 30, at 5.
68. Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 178 n.48 (citing Great Britain, Gov-
ernment of Palestine, December 4, 1940, in A Survey of Palestine in Report of the Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry I, 391, 1946).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The Article was never "gazetted." See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at
179 (citing HAIM HALPERIN, WATER LAW IN ISRAEL 13 (1956)).
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opment was left largely to the local law and customary principles.7 2
The policy statement of Article 16E, however, was utilized by the suc-
cessor government of the independent State of Israel.
WATER LEGISLATION IN THE MODERN PERIOD
The modern era of water law began after World War II with the es-
tablishment of the independent State of Israel in 1948 and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949. The newly independent coun-
tries of the Middle East then enacted national water codes and created
national water regulatory bodies.
Water Law in the Modern State of Israel
Even prior to Israel's independence, May 15, 1948, regional water
development plans were underway by Jewish settlers.7 3 Upon estab-
lishment of the State of Israel, in 1948, the new government invoked
the earlier King's Order in Council of 194074 to assert state ownership
over all water resources and establish a national water distribution and
development policy. 75 Like the water law of ancient times, which con-
ceived of water as belonging to the entire community, modern law de-
clares water to be a right of all people of Israel, and states that water
resources belong to all members of the community at large.76 In 1959,
Israel's legislative body, the Knesset, enacted a nation-wide water
management code and created a national water authority. 77 All water
resources 78 are subject to the control of the state and to judicial supervi-
sion,79 and the complex water management system determines distribu-
tion, planning and development at the national, regional, and local lev-
els. This article reviews water management at the national level only.
At the national level, the Minister of Agriculture is in charge of wa-
ter-related legislation, as well as the execution of water laws.8 0 The
Water Board is an advisory body to the Minister of Agriculture, and it is
through the Board that the public participates in national water policy.
72. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 171.
73. Virshubski, supra note 1, at 88.
74. Id.
75. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 178.
76. THE WATER LAws OF ISRAEL Stat. 288, § 4, at 1 (S. Aloni ed., 1970).
77. 1959 Water Law (No. 5719), 1959 reprinted in The Water Laws of Israel, supra
note 76, at 1-60.
78. These include all above ground and underground currents or accumulations of
water, and all natural and man-made accumulations, including even drainage and sewage
water. ISRAEL STATUTE no. 288 cited in TECLAFF, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 5,
at 56-57.
79. See TECLAFF, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 5, at 56.
80. See Virshubski, supra note 1, at 103.
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The Board consists of thirty-nine members, of which two-thirds are rep-
resentatives of the public, and one-third are government representa-
tives, including one representative of the Jewish Agency.81 The Plan-
ning Commission, a body appointed by the Minister of Agriculture,
designs large-scale water supply systems.
8 2
The Water Commission is a subdivision of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and executes the day-to-day decisions of water management. The
Commission issues water use licenses, keeps records of water rights,
oversees and enforces compliance with licensing terms, and collects
data on water use and planning needs.
All private use of water, including use by a landowner of water lo-
cated on his private property, requires approval by the state by means
of a system of permits and licenses issued by the Water Commis-
sioner.83 Private ownership of water, whether naturally existing or
man-made, is not recognized under Israeli law, and thus riparian land-
owners possess no rights superior to the general public to use or restrict
access to water on, or touching, their land.84 The right of an individual
licensee to water use, duly recognized by the state, is a legally protected
property interest which is enforceable against third parties.
8 5
The Water Commissioner has the discretion to cancel or modify li-
censes for reasons of public need, and to declare a rationing area.8 6 The
creation of a rationing area automatically reconverts all licensed use to
state ownership, and subjects water use strict distribution rules. Deci-
sions of the Water Commissioner on licensing, water use, distribution,
and rationing are enforced by means of judiciary review and through
the Tribunal for Water Affairs, established as the body of final appeal.
8 7
All decisions are documented in a public water register.88
The Water Law of 1959 establishes a hierarchy of priorities of types
of use. Like Talmudic law, at the top of the hierarchy is domestic use,
principally, water for drinking purposes.8 9 This is followed by agricul-
tural use, and then industrial and other uses. 90 The Water Commis-
sioner, in exercising his discretionary authority to issue water use li-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 104.




87. ISRAEL WATER LAW, §§ 141-47, cited in TECLAFF, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 5, at 59.
88. Id. at § 148.
89. Domestic uses also include any ordinary uses within one's home, e.g., laundering.
See TECLAFF, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note, at 57.
90. 1959 Water Law, sec. 24, cited in THE WATER LAWS OF ISRAEL, supra note 76; see
also Virshubski, Israel, supra note 1, at 91.
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censes, is required to consider the following criteria: existing licensed
water rights, the abundance or scarcity of water in the region, the most
beneficial use possible, and other needs of the particular locality that
may be affected. 91
Thus, the modern State of Israel maintains complete control over
its water resources, and decides and enforces priorities of use over all
water sources and supplies by means of a system of permits and regula-
tions. State ownership is perceived as representative of the communal
right to water, a legacy of the traditional Talmud and Ottoman influ-
ences.
Water Law in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Jordan followed the traditional law of the Koran until the 19th cen-
tury when it was supplanted by the Mejelle Code. From 1922 through
1949, the British exerted Mandatory Rule over the area. During the
past forty-eight years, a national civil code has replaced the Mejelle
Code, and has integrated some of the principles of traditional and Ot-
toman Empire Moslem law.
All water resources in the modern Kingdom of Jordan are under
state regulation by the Natural Resources Authority. 92 The Natural
Resources Authority is a non-representative governmental body whose
president is the nation's Prime Minister, and whose Board of Directors
consists of the heads of relevant Ministries including, among others,
Agriculture, Interior and National Economy.93 It is a planning, legisla-
tive, executive, administrative, and judicial body. The Natural Re-
sources Authority issues, enforces, and reviews permits for water use.
Consistent with ancient Moslem law, naturally occurring bodies of
water, including lakes, rivers and streams, are considered to belong to
the community, 94 as does water to which no private right has been
claimed and registered. Reservoirs and other man-made bodies of wa-
ter, unless located on private property, are also considered community
property. 95
A private landowner acquires ownership rights to water on his land
as part of his land ownership, as long as the water has been registered
along with registration of the land.96 This property interest in the wa-
91. See Virshubski, supra note 1, at 110.
92. Law No. 12, 1968, of the Natural Resources Authority, art. 16, cited in G. Masina,
Jordan, in Moslem Water Laws, supra note 5, at 99.
93. See Masina, supra note 94, at 109.
94. Law No. 40, 1952, on Settlement of Land and Water Rights, cited in Masina, su-
pra note 94.
95. Id.
96. Law No. 12, 1968, of the Natural Resources Authority, art. 59, cited in Masina,
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ter is directly linked to the property interest in the land and it cannot
be severed or transferred separately from the land.
97
Permits, issued by the Natural Resources Authority, are required
for all uses other than personal 98 and ordinary irrigation 99 use. No pre-
established priority of water use exists. The Natural Resources
Authority will consider the circumstances of the area and the competing
beneficial uses, with a tendency to favor traditional priorities of use, in-
cluding personal and agricultural, followed by industrial and other
uses.100
Thus, water regulation in Jordan is centralized, strictly regulated,
and most closely resembles the law under Ottoman Empire rule. The
sovereign controls all water resources on behalf of the community, and
water on public lands is considered to belong to the community. Dis-
tinct from the traditional law of the Koran and the law of the Mejelle
Code, however, a private ownership right to naturally occurring water
resources, not only to artificial ground water sources, is recognized as
linked to, albeit still distinct from, private land ownership.
CONCLUSION
As seen from the above discussion, the ancient laws of the Talmud
and the Koran, the laws of Ottoman and Mandatory Rule, and even the
modern water regimes, contain certain fundamental similarities as re-
gards water regulation, priorities of use and sharing. Certainly, the
geographic and hydraulic conditions of the region, the exigency of water
scarcity, and the existence of different religious and ethnic groups living
side by side, necessitated an approach to water regulation that was not
consistent with the laws that emerged from European conditions. Addi-
tionally, early water development in the Middles East was principally a
local process, 10 1 and therefore, more directly influenced by the custom-
ary or traditional principles of the local cultures, than by the central-
ized government control of the Greco-Roman, Ottoman or British peri-
ods. Thus, certain fundamental principles of water use and
development remained constant from ancient to modern times and
supra note 94.
97. Law No. 40, 1952, on Settlement of Land and Water Rights, art. 8.5, cited in Ma-
sina, supra note 94.
98. This includes drinking, domestic, and household needs, not exceeding an official
limit.
99. This constitutes use within the established limits of an Irrigation Area. See Ma-
sina, supra note 94, at 102.
100. Id. at 103-04.
101. See Hirsch, Water Legislation, supra note 5, at 169.
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among ancient Jewish and Moslem traditions.
The Distinctive principles of water regulation that have flowed, so
to speak, from one legal system to the next in this region include, most
significantly, the concept of a community right to water - that water is
a thing which is shared and not owned - a gift from God to all people.
This principle is prevalent, as we have seen, in both the Jewish and
Moslem ancient law systems. This community right to water was
translated into state ownership of water resources from the time of the
Ottoman Empire and continues to this day in the modern State of Is-
rael. State control over water may have marked a formidable change in
the ancient principle of community water rights, except that state own-
ership, as established, is the embodiment of the original communal
right.102 Thus, the traditional view of water as a communal resource
not only prevails, but establishes a fundamental common link between
the modern Israeli and the modern Arab nations' views of water rights
and water ownership.
In light of this fundamental, historical and enduring link between
the Israeli and Arab views of water use and sharing, an argument can
be made that transboundary water sharing negotiation between Israel
and its Arab neighbors should also follow this communal approach on
an expansively regional level.
Israel and Jordan have already made significant steps in the bilat-
eral recognition of a shared responsibility, if not a shared right, to wa-
ter and their natural resources. The 1994 Treaty of Peace, 103 signed by
Israel and Jordan, directly addresses the allocation of transboundary
water resources.10 4 Article Six agrees to an equitable apportionment
scheme as detailed in Annex II of the Treaty. 10 5 Annex II outlines the
allocation of waters of the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers, as well as water
from other sources. Annex II also establishes a Joint Water Commit-
tee10 6 as an implementing body of the program of action described in the
102. See THE MEJELLE ch. IV, § 1, art. 1234, supra note 51. British Mandatory Rule
maintained this principle of water law and the modern State of Israel institutionalized
this principle.
103. Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan, Oct. 26, 1994, Isr.-Jordan, 34 I.L.M. 743 (1995) [hereinafter Israel-Jordan Peace
Treaty].
104. See id. at Annex II, art. VI.
105. Jordan concedes that Israel may pump an additional 20 MCM from the Yarmouk
River during the winter period in return for Israel conceding to transfer 20 MCM to Jor-
dan from the Jordan River during the summer period. See id. at Annex II, art. I, paras.
1b, 2a. Additionally, both countries agree to work together to find alternative water
sources of drinking water for Jordan. See id. at Annex II, art. I, para. 3.
106. See id. at Annex II, art. VII, para. 1. The Committee is to be comprised of three
members from each country, see id., and cooperation is to be advanced by means of dis-
tinct sub-committees representing northern versus southern regions within each country.
See id. at Annex II, art. VII, para. 3. The Committee's purpose is to oversee water allocation, see id. at
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Annex. The parties agree to transfer information, to conduct joint re-
search and development, 07 and to act together in alleviating water
shortages, developing existing and new water resources,10 8 and in pre-
venting the contamination of shared water resources. 10 9
Additionally, the 1995 Agreement on Cooperation in Environ-
mental Protection and Nature Conservation Between Israel and Jor-
dan 1 0 recognizes and addresses environmental concerns common to the
two nations. Article I articulates the spirit of cooperation upon which
the agreement is based:
The parties shall cooperate in the fields of environmental protection
and conservation of natural resources on the basis of equality, repri-
procity and mutual benefit.... They shall take the necessary measures,
both jointly and individually, to protect the environment, and prevent
environmental risks... in particular those that may affect or cause
damage to ... natural resources ... in the region."'
Article Five outlines various programs of cooperation including the
exchange of information, 112 the sharing of scientific and scholarly
data, 113 and the promotion of joint scientific, technical research, and
joint development projects." 4 Notably, Article Ten provides for the es-
tablishment of a Joint Committee on Environmental Protection and
Natural Resources Conservation to meet bimonthly, alternatively in Is-
rael and Jordan.115 The Joint Committee will propose new projects, as
well as monitor existing projects and the performance of both parties
under this agreement.
116
These agreements authorize a mutually agreeable allocation of wa-
ter, and joint protection of natural resources, including water. They
mark very significant, and highly visible, steps forward for two nations
that have been in a longstanding state of military aggression over terri-
Annex 1I, art. VII, para 1, storage, see id. at Annex II, art. II, water quality protection, see id at Annex
II, art. I1, as well as information transfers and data sharing. See id at Annex I1, art. VI, para. I.
107. See id. art. VI, para. 4d.
108. See id. art. VI, para. 4a.
109. See id. art. VI, para. 4b.
110. Agreement on Cooperation in Environmental Protection and Nature Conservation Between
Israel and Jordan, Sept. 7, 1995, Isr.-Jordan, (unpublished) [hereinafter Environmental
Agreement].
111. Id. art. I, paras. 1, 2.
112. See id. art. V, para. 3.
113. See id. art. V, paras. 2, 3.
114. See id. art. V, para. 4.
115. See id. art. X.
116. Id.
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tory and control of transboundary water sources. 117 Another step for-
ward along this positive course could be to view transboundary water
sharing in a new light, and yet from a perspective as ancient as Juda-
ism and Islam, and as historically well-established, drawing upon their
common heritage of a communal view of water rights and water use.
This perspective would open water sharing schemes to the regional
rather than predominantly national level. As it has been stated, "[t]he
only natural unit for river management is... the river basin in its en-
tirety."11s Recognizing and utilizing this common historical heritage
could contribute to advancing not only water apportionment negotia-
tion, but also to creating a genuine and lasting peace in the Middle
East. 119
117. In 1964, for example, Syria and Jordan began the construction of a dam to divert
the flow of the Yarmouk, Baniyas and Jordan Rivers. See Stephan McCaffrey, Water,
Politics and International Law, in WATER IN CRISIS: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S FRESH
WATER RESOURCES 25 (Peter H. Gleick, ed. 1993). The dam would have prevented Israel
from carrying out its national water distribution plan. See MASAHIRO MURAKAMI,
MANAGING WATER FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 296 (1995). Israel bombed and de-
stroyed the dam before construction was complete, and in 1967 occupied the Golan
Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. See id. at 297. Through this occupation,
Israel increased control from a mere 10 km tract of land along the Yarmouk to half the
length of the river. See id.
118. Ohlsson, supra note 3, at 5.
119. See id. at 1; see generally Adam M. Garfinkle, War, Water and Negotiation in the
Middle East: The Case of the Palestine-Syrian Border, 1916-23 (1994); see generally Kally,
supra note 30; see generally M. Murakami, Managing Water for Peace in the Middle East
(1995); see generally Joyce R. Starr & Daniel C. Stoll, The Politics of Scarcity: Water in
the Middle East (1987); see generally War and Peace in the Middle East: Proceedings on
the First Israeli-Palestinian International Academic Conference on Water (J. Isaac and H.
Shuval, eds., 1994); see generally Joyce R. Starr & Daniel C. Stoll, Water Wars, 82 Foreign
Poly. 17 (1991).
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"And Daddy won't you take me back to Muhlenburg County
Down by the Green River where Paradise lay?
Well I'm sorry my son, but you're too late in asking
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Mr. Peabody's coal train' has hauled it away.
"Then the coal company came with the World's largest shovel
and they tortured the timber and stripped all the land.
Well, they dug for their coal till the land was forsaken,
Then they wrote it all down as the progress of man."
-"Paradise" by John Prine © 1971.
PART I. BOISE CASCADE IN PERSPECTIVE.
Introduction.
Power 2 is something we all understand and respect, but none more
than timber barons and loggers. Whether dealing with chain saws or
skidders, lobbyists or legislatures, loggers, timber barons, and lumber
companies know, appreciate, and wield power. Power influences the
timber industry just as it does labor relations, politics and many other
areas of human affairs. But the concept of brute strength and raw
1. Although this paper deals with Transnational Corporations in the context of
global capitalism, the treatment of ethnic minorities inside the U.S.A. is not unlike the
treatment of developing nations in what-used-to-be called the Third World. For instance,
the Peabody Coal Company's treatment of the Navajo and Hopi nations in getting the
rights to mine the coal deposits beneath the surface of Black Mesa, a great tableland of
3300 square miles spanning the reservations' boundary, has been documented several
places. F. WATERS, MOUNTAIN DIALOGUES 125-31 (1981). Under a 35 year lease, the "Ho-
pis would eventually receive an estimated $14.5 million, the Navajos $58.5 million, while
the Peabody Coal Company profits would amount to about $750 million." Id. at 125-26.
To illustrate, the lease of the Hopi land to the Peabody Coal Company "was granted by
the Department of the Interior without Congressional or public hearings. Neither the
traditionalist leaders, nor the Hopi people, were generally informed of the terms of the
contract..." Id. at 125. That Black Mesa was considered sacred by both tribes made no
difference to the the Department of the Interior, then headed by Stewart Udall, a Mor-
mon; or to John S. Boyton, a Salt Lake City lawyer and Mormon, who had been appointed
by the B.I.A. to represent the Hopis; or to the head of the B.I.A.- controlled Hopi Tribal
Council, Abbott Sekaquaptewa, another staunch Mormon. id. at 128. In a 1977 report,
the Indian Law Resource Center in Washington, D.C., alleged that Mr. Boyton, the B.I.A.
-approved legal counsel for the Hopi Tribal Counsel, was on the Peabody Coal Company
payroll during the time it was strip-mining the Black Mesa, a gross conflict of interest.
See id. at 131.
2. The term "power" (as a noun) has fourteen different definitions in a recent
abridged dictionary. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1058 (1994). Synonyms listed
for power include dominion, authority, command, and control. Id. In law, the term
"power" seems to be even more prominent; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1169-71 (6th ed.
1990) devoted 3 entire columns to definitions for the word. Id.
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power is central to the work and myths 3 of loggers in ways unlike most
other occupations with the possible exceptions of mining, fire fighting,
and police work; areas also associated with maleness and male domi-
nance and, of course, violence.
4
In 1991, we wrote "a better model is needed to describe ethical be-
havior, particularly when applied to the use of power to resolve conflict
in cross-cultural situations .... ',5 Professor Werhane has articulated a
six-question protocol for analyzing the social responsibility of a set of
activities on the part of multinational corporations. 6 One of the fears
repeatedly voiced about transnational corporations ("TNCs") 7 is that
3. For our purposes, myth can be defined as " an intricate set of interlocking stories,
rituals, rites, and customs that inform and give the pivotal sense of meaning and direction
to a person, family, community or culture. C. KEEN & A. VALLEY Fox, YOUR MYTHIC
JOURNEY xi (1989). In Western logging companies such as Boise Cascade, two sets of
powerful myths converge: the Tales of Paul Bunyan and his Blue Ox Babe and the myths
of the American West. Paul Bunyan, as everyone knows, was superhuman in size and
strength and often solved his problems with the application of greater size and strength -
although ingenuity also helped occasionally. Tales of Paul Bunyan were promoted com-
mercially by lumber companies in the early years of the American Century. See ID
Statesmen (Feb. 19, 1998) at 3D. Six historically Western values that emphasize
power/violence are: "the doctrine of no duty to retreat; the imperative of personal self-
redress; the homestead ethic; the ethic of individual enterprise; the Code of the West; and
the ideology of vigilantism." MILNER ET AL., THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WEST 393 (1994). The Code of the West involves "honesty, courage, sensitive pride, stoic
indifference to pain, and, above all, a violent vengefulness against insult." Id. at 395. See
also A. C. Williams, Influences of the Myths of the American West on Business Culture in
the United States: An Interdisciplinary Exploration (1997) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Boise State University) (on file with authors and Boise State University library).
4. See Walter Wink, The Myth of Redemptive Violence, in ENGAGING THE POWERS
(1992), reprinted in READINGS IN BUSINESS ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 41-45
(William Wines & Steven C. Anderson, eds., 1994). For a discussion of how myths instill
values in human beings, see William A. Wines, An Ethics Perspective on Economic Myths,
Theories and Ideologies (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors) (presented
to the Annual Meeting of the Pacific Northwest Academy of Legal Studies, Hotel Georgia,
Vancouver, B.C., Canada on April 19, 1996). By analogy, the authors are suggesting that
archetypical myths that are shared by entire industries inevitably become part of the cor-
porate cultures of companies in those industries and help form a national identity by con-
tributing to the nation's set of stories. See also BARBARA EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES:
ORGANS AND HISTORY OF THE PASSIONS OF WAR 216-24 (1997) (detailing American patri-
otism as a self-perpetuating form of war worship); DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (1995); BARBARA G.
WALTER, THE CRONE: WOMEN OF AGE, WISDOM AND POWER (1985) (detailing violence
against women in chapter six).
5. William A. Wines & Kevin E. Learned, Managing the External Environment:
Boise Cascade and a Modern Tale of Two Cities, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BUSINESS
AND POLITICS 204 (Karen Paul, ed., 1991) [hereinafter Wines & Learned].
6. Patricia H. Werhane, The Moral Responsibility of Multinational Corporations to
be Socially Responsible, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BUSINESS ETHICS 531, 535 (Joseph
H. Desjardins & John J. McCall, eds., 3d ed. 1996).
7. In this article, we prefer to use the term "transnational corporation" rather than
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they may prove to be above the law.8 This article will look at that con-
cern as well as attempt to apply the Werhane protocol to Boise Cascade
Corporation's ("BCC") actions over time and in different locales. We
will attempt to determine whether a practice and a pattern emerged in
BCC dealings with labor, in the environment, and with communities in
which it operates. We will also address power inequities in labor rela-
tions where some observers have suggested that the power equation is
central. 9
Supposedly fifteen transnational corporations are engaged in log-
ging in Mexico. 10 Our selection of BCC as the subject of our inquiry
does not imply nor is it meant to suggest that BCC is somehow better or
worse in its foreign operations than any of its competitors. In fact, this
piece is premised upon the assumption that in many, many respects
BCC is representative of transnational corporations that are engaged in
extractive industries around the world. A spokesman for BCC says it
most simply: "Alls [sic] we do is go in and take out the logs."" Some-
how, we do not find it that simple. In some ways, injecting millions of
dollars into a dirt-poor, 12 corrupt, 13 and violence-saturated State14 in
the older term "multi-national corporation" for several reasons. First, it is more accurate
because the TNCs have risen above the reach of nation-states as the following materials
will argue; and second, it is the mania of global capitalism's outdistancing all social insti-
tutions, law and customs that is at the heart of our concerns.
8. See, e.g., William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Magic Logic of Global
Capitalism 11-16 (1997); David C. Korten, When Corporations Rule the World: An Inter-
view with David Korten, MULTNAT'L MONITOR, Jan. 1, 1996. In one passage, Korten de-
clares: "Corporations have emerged as the dominant governance institutions on the
planet, with the largest among them reaching onto virtually every country in the world
and exceeding most governments in size and power. Increasingly, it is the corporate inter-
est more than the human interest that defines the policy agenda of states and interna-
tional bodies, although this reality and its implications have gone largely unnoticed and
unaddressed." Id. at 54 (1995); see also, e.g., George Soros, The Capitalist Threat,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 45.
9. See Zimarowski, A Primer on Power Balancing Under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 47, 52 (1989). See also infra note 22 and accompany-
ing text in which one observer (Woodhouse) pointed to BCC's resolution of labor conflicts
by brute application of economic and political power seemingly indifferent to the human
suffering inflicted upon workers or their communities.
10. See John Ross, Treasure of the Costa Grande, SIERRA July-Aug. 1996, at 22
[hereinafter Ross, Treasure].
11. Telephone interview by Brian Bell, Boise State University student researcher,
with Doug Bartels, BCC Spokesman (Feb. 18, 1997).
12. The average wage in Guerrero places many of its people below the federally man-
dated daily minimum wage. The rate is different for different parts of Mexico; in 1991,
the commission set the minimum for most of Guererro at 9.92 new pesos per day. Yet
24.8% of the population earned less; and 15.7% reported no income at all. The new peso
was worth less than 13 cents U.S. at the official exchange rate on February 20, 1997;
thus, outside Acapulco, the minimum daily wage was $1.28 U.S. In Acapulco, the official
daily wage was set at approximately $2.92. G. Tooman, A Comparison of the Logging In-
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Mexico and then disclaiming all responsibility for the destruction and
deaths that follow seems insensitive, irresponsible and morally indefen-
sible.
1 5
dustry in Idaho, British Columbia and Guererro, Mexico: The Effects of Government Pol-
icy on the Industry 18 (Apr. 15, 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
Life in the eijdos (the rural sectors) is especially primitive. Charles Krause, a Public
Broadcasting System correspondent stationed in Mexico, describes the situation in these
words: "Just 50 miles from the beaches and sophistication of Acapulco, dirt roads lead to
villages like Paso Real, which might as well be in another world or on another planet. No
telephones here, no doctors, no hospital, no discos or tourists ... nor even running water.
Paso Real is the other Mexico foreigners rarely see: rural Mexico, where subsistence
farming, drug trafficking, corruption, and political violence mix in what is often an explo-
sive combination." Id. at 20.
13. "The Mexican government deserves some of the blame for creating an atmosphere
where it is easier to operate businesses illegally than it is to obey the myriad laws with
which a legal business must comply. In an effort to control the economy, the government
now controls nearly every aspect of business ..... The 1995 edition of the Catalago Gen-
eral de Obligaciones Empresariales (General Catalog of Business Obligations) lists over
800 laws with which businesses must comply. Sadly, the ruling party, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party, actually makes more money from bribes than it would from the legal
purchase of permits and payment of fees. (citations omitted]" G.Tooman, supra note 12,
at 23.
14. Guererro is one of thirty-two states that comprise the united Mexican States. An
austerity plan and pledges of U.S. support saved Mexico's currency from collapse in early
1995; but in August 1996, the Popular Revolutionary Army guerrillas launched coordi-
nated attacks on government positions. See, e.g., WORLD ALMANAC 799 (1996). In the
realm of violence, BCC 's American employees were " not allowed off the sidewalk" for fear
of kidnapping, a major industry in Guererro. There have been over 100 kidnappings in
Guererro in the past three years. A. Waters, A Study of the Timber Industry in British
Columbia, Idaho, and Guererro (Apr. 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors)
at 17. The annual per capita income in Mexico is about $4,000, roughly 15% of that of
Americans. On January 9, 1996, an FCO Travel Advisory warned travelers/tourists
against traveling after dark, venturing off roads or frequenting isolated beaches "par-
ticularly in the states of Michoacan, Guererro, Oaxaca, Chiapas and Campeche" because
of the risk of violence. A free-lance journalist interviewing a returning millwright for
BCC asked about the threat of violence and was told: "We never traveled outside the hotel
without armed guards." In March, authorities seized heroin paste with a U.S. street
value exceeding $4.1 million about 15 km from a Guererro logging site. LA JOURNADO,
March 30, 1997. In June, the same newspaper headlined "In the mountains of Guererro,
the threat of violence and armed narcotic traffickers is constant." LA JOURNADO, June 10,
1997. A recent traveler to Guererro reports that buses are robbed daily and that death
squads have been active in the State. Claudio Beagarie, free-lance journalist, in Boise,
Idaho (Sept. 3, 1997). On New Year's Day, 1997, a death squad of eight men with AK-47's
and painted faces executed four men: two teachers in one village and two campesinos later
in another village. On January 11, eight members of one family were killed from ambush
by heavily armed men. All of the killings were in the State of Guererro. REPORTE (USA
Independent Hispanic Weekly, No. 551) at 25.
15. Interview by William A. Wines with John Ross in Boise, Idaho (June 6, 1996).
Ross declared that "ex-Governor Figueroa was expected to have a hard hand, especially
since his predecessor was assassinated in office." Id. Further, Ross shared his opinion
that "to deal with Figueroa in millions of dollars is to intervene in Mexican politics." Id.
1998
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A Chronology.
What do Council, Idaho, International Falls, Minnesota, and Pa-
panoa, State of Guerrero, Mexico have in common? They have all expe-
rienced the arrogance and greed of BCC. In the Falls Council, unions
were destroyed along with some temporary housing; an established mill
was closed; and in Guerrero, the introduction of huge sums of money for
timber further aggravated a destabilized countryside in which seven-
teen unarmed environmental protesters were shot dead in June 1995
and dozens of others have since disappeared, been executed or mur-
dered. 16 BCC meanwhile enjoyed near record profits in 199517. Al-
though profits set record highs, employment in the timber industry in
Idaho peaked in 1979 and has declined ever since, according to Idaho
Department of Employment figures. The impact of increased mechani-
zation coupled with mill closures has been devastating on the small mill
towns. 18
16. According to Ross, by June 1996, ten more people had been murdered in Guerrero
since the June 28, 1995 massacre at Aguas Blancas. Also, the number of people who have
simply "disappeared" in the State of Guerrero is estimated at over 1,000. One former
Army General admitted that over 400 people were disappeared between 1972 and 1979
when ex-Governor Figueroa's father was Governor. Interview by William A. Wines with
John Ross in Boise, Idaho (June 6, 1996).
17. Boise Cascade reported net profits in calendar year 1995 of $5.39 per share or
$351.8 million. BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (1995).
18. See A. Waters, supra note 14, at 7, wherein the author states: "Council is not the
first Boise Cascade sawmill to be dismantled and reassembled elsewhere. In the late
1970's, Boise Cascade bought the sawmill at Cambridge, Idaho and sold it to a company in
the Philippines. As for closure of sawmills, Council was the latest. Other closures were
McCall in 1978, Barber in 1980 and Emmett in 1982. Horseshoe Bend and Cascade are
the only sawmills left in Idaho. They are not expected to remain open much longer." On
October 23, 1995, only 10 days after announcing record profits for the third quarter of
$118.5 million, Boise Cascade laid off 253 people at the Horseshoe Bend, Emmett, and
Cascade mills. Id. at 9. A spokesman for BCC said the layoffs would last until lumber
prices improved and that further mill closures would depend on "how Congress treats the
timber industry in its next round of environmental legislation." Julie Bailey, Boise Cas-
cade Open Sawmill in Mexico, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 25, 1995, at llA, available in 1995
WL 1260165. According to an analyst with the Pacific Crest Securities in Portland, Ore-
gon, the timber industry is moving towards greater consolidation, "as logging is spread
over larger landscapes to reduce damage to fish and wildlife." Timber Industry Future
will be Rooted in Bigger Companies with More Capital, OREGONIAN, Dec. 18, 1994, at 10B.
Small mill operators can't compete with larger firms because they are unable to modern-
ize and compete with timber industry giants. Since old-growth trees have been over-
logged in the Pacific and Interior West, and since access to the remaining large trees is
limited because they largely exist in roadless ares, the big companies have been forced to
re-tool their operations to handle the smaller logs. The smaller companies, without the
readily available investment capital, have not been in a position to modernize, and have
thus been left with fewer cutting opportunities, being unequiped to handle the small logs.
University of Wisconsin sociologist Bill Freudenburg, concluded that "Loss of timber jobs
in the Pacific Northwest stems from overcutting rather than from measures to protect old-
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In an attempt to avoid any public accounting, BCC has attempted
to demonize the environmental movement, a journalist who explored
the Mexican operation, and the Sierra Club. Remember Commodore
Vanderbilt? "What do I care about the law? Haint I got the power?"19
Welcome to the Robber Barons, Part II, with a polished veneer of civili-
zation courtesy of a staff of public relations types and highly paid corpo-
rate lawyers. Enter the so-called "Spin Doctors;" otherwise, nothing
much has changed in the sequel.
Why is BCC doing business in Mexico and preparing to do even
more business in places like Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand and the for-
mer U.S.S.R.? The answer to that question varies with whom you ask.
For the record, BCC says it is not after cheap labor but that timber
supplies in the U.S. are inadequate for its needs. It blames environ-
mentalists and restrictions on timber sales from federal lands and pos-
tures as a local Idaho business interested in the "Idaho way of life."20 A
large neon sign at the Boise Airport declares "Welcome to Our Home"
from Boise Cascade Corporation: mildly humorous for a Delaware Cor-
poration that has gone transnational.2 1 Besides on the theme of jobs or
growth timber and the northern spotted owl, according to newly presented research."
Overcutting costs more timber jobs than owl, study says, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 16, 1997,
at 15A.
19. Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barrons 15 (1934).
20. Dr. Thomas Power, the chair of the Economic Department at the Univeristy of
Montana, studied the effects of wildlands preservation, showing that the emerging econ-
omy in the Northern Rockies is leaving the extractive industries in the dust. Jobs created
from tourism, recreation, services (including health, legal and other professions), and in-
formation have largely replaced the extractive industries. He found that within a seven
week period the number of jobs created in this growing sector of the economy more than
makes up for the loss of timber jobs. TOM POWER, ALLIANCE FOR THE ROCKIES, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: THE TIMBER EMPLOYMENT IMPACT OF THE NORTHERN ROCKIES ECOSYSTEM
PROTECTION ACT IN IDAHO, MONTANTA, OREGON, WASHINGTON, AND WYOMING, SPECIAL
REPORT No. 3 (1992). A report, with Dr. Power as its main author and co-signed by 33
other economists, titled 'Economic Well-Being and Environmental Protection in the Pa-
cific Northwest" stated that "[a]llowing more environmental degradation in hopes of
turning the economic clock to a previous era is more likely to threaten the region's future
than improve it." Report Links Economy with Strong Environment, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Jan. 4, 1997, at 1A. According to a study conducted for the Eastside Columbian Ecosys-
tem Management Project, "Small timber dependent communties in the Columbian River
Basin are generally adapting to changes in more constructive ways than towns based on
farming and ranching, a University of Idaho study showed." Timber Tenacity: Study Re-
veals Small Logging Towns Adopting to Change, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Jan. 2, 1995
at 5A.
21. At the 1997 annual meeting of Boise Cascade shareholders, a motion to move the
place of incorporation from Delaware back to Idaho was opposed by management and
soundly defeated. Boise Cascade Annual Meeting Showcases Management Power, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 19, 1997. The forerunner of BCC was the Boise Payette Lumber Com-
pany, incorporated on December 24, 1913 under the laws of the State of Idaho with an
authorized capital of $7 million. On April 23, 1931, the Boise Payette Lumber Company
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environment, Idahoans have elected some of the most extreme anti-
environmentalists in Congress: people such as Helen Chenoweth,
22
Mike Crapo,23 Larry Craig, 24 and Dirk Kempthorne25 who surf the crest
of Delaware was incorporated in Delaware and took over all assets and liabilities of the
Idaho corporation. See BOISE PAYETTE LUMBER COMPANY., REPORT TO STOCKHOLDERS
(1947). Frederich E. Weyerhauser was Treasurer of the Original Board of Directors,
elected on March 9, 1914. Id. Boise Cascade Corporation was formed in 1957 by the
merger of the Boise Payette Lumber Company and the Cascade Lumber Company. See A.
Waters, supra note 14, at 3.
22. A Sierra Club designation, awarded to Congresswoman Chenoweth. SIERRA,
May-June 1996, at 28. "Chenoweth plays to the paranoia of the far-rightists by fanning
their delusions about mysterious black helicopters supposedly used by federal Fish and
Wildlife agents to enforce environmental laws in Idaho. The congressman also fears that
environmental regulations are ushering in the one-world government long feared by the
Birchers. Her evidence: the United Nations' designation of Yellowstone National Park as
a world heritage site." Id. Congresswoman Chenoweth has recently proposed cutting
down trees as a way of dealing with the so-called "greenhouse effect." This is but one ex-
ample of her concern for the environment. Fredreka Schouten, Chenoweth Backs Plan to
Cut Trees to Clear Air: Idea Offered as Way to Prevent Global Warming, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Oct. 23, 1997, at 1A. During her first run for the House of Representatives
in 1994, Congresswoman Chenoweth questioned whether salmon could be endangered
because she could "still find salmon in cans on the shelves at Albertson's [grocery stores.]"
Her recent fundraising letter declared that America's elite colleges (Wellesley, Brown,
Yale, etc.) have taught young women that "marriage is slavery, faith in God a male-
crafted prison, and abortion is a declaration of independence." Fredreka Schouten, The
Helen Chenoweth Factor, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 8, 1997, at 10A. A faxed biographical
sketch from the Congresswoman's office lists among her accomplishments her "pivotal
role in advancing legislation which establishes the concept of local management of re-
sources, in saving the Purchaser Road Credits program from assault by Eastern legisla-
tors..., and in defending the concept of State sovereignty over its waters." See infra note
207 in which Boise Cascade's "take" from the Purchaser Road Credits program made it
the second largest corporate welfare recipient in the program.
23. Representative Crapo is, perhaps, the least openly hostile to the environmental
cause of the four Idaho representatives to Congress. That, considering his colleagues, is
not high praise. A biographical sketch provided by the Congressman's office indicates
that Crapo is in his third term as U.S. Representative from Idaho's second district after
spending eight years in the Idaho State Senate. Crapo currently serves as co-chairman of
the Congressional Beef Caucus, and is founding member of the Congressional Water Cau-
cus. In the 103rd Congress, he served as the co-chairman of the Republican Task Force on
Private Property Rights. Congressman Crapo graduated from Harvard's Law School in
1977 with honors, a distinction that makes him probably the most literate and the best
educated of Idaho's contingent.
24. Larry Craig is the champion of so-called "salvage logging" in the Senate. He hails
from a small cattle ranch in western Idaho and is opposed to any fee increases or limita-
tions of the "rights" of cattlemen to graze cattle on public lands. Senator Craig proposed S.
391, a bill to establish a permanent timber salvage policy that would replace the 1995
salvage rider when it expired in 1996. S. 391, 104th Cong. (1995). The bill was defeated
in part by opposition from Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society. The Washington Post
called the timber salvage rider "arguably the worst piece of public lands legislation ever."
Jessica Mathews, Two Tasks for Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 1996, at A15. Under it,
4.6 billion board feet of lumber were cut in 18 months. ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES,
A REPORT ON THE TIMBER SALVAGE RIDER OF THE 104TH CONGRESS cited in NETWORKER
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of timber, cattle and mining PAC campaign money.
On June 6, 1996, John Ross, poet, journalist, and prize-winning
author, came to Boise, Idaho to present his findings in a talk entitled
"Boise Cascade Corporation, Political Turmoil & Logging in Mexico's Si-
erra Madre." In a response that was unseemly as well as uncalled for,
BCC's CEO George Harrad 26 pulled out his big stick and attempted to
Spring 1997, at 5. A biographical sketch provided by the Senator's office indicates that
"As a westerner and a former rancher, he plays a leading role in the formation of natural
resource and energy policies, and has gained a national reputation as a stalwart against
environmental extremism."
25. Senator Kempthorne was once student body president at the University of Idaho
in Moscow [as was Senator Craig] and later mayor of the City of Boise. His administra-
tion as mayor flashed a large green light for unlimited development that has contributed
to present infra-structure problems. Kempthorne's chief work in the Senate was an at-
tempt to water-down the Endangered Species Act to pay reparations to landowners whose
property rights were injured by protected species. Boise Cascade Corporation has been a
large financial backer of Kempthorne throughout his public career. Officially reported
contributions of the timber industry to the Idaho Congressional delegation from January,
1989 through June 1995 totalled $169,800. Center for Responsive Politics, Contributions
from Timber Industry to Idaho Delegation (Nov. 27, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author). A biographical sketch faxed from the Senator's office indicates that
"The Senator believes in staying close to the people of Idaho, and he maintains eight of-
fices around the state." That grass roots touch should come in handy when Senator
Kempthorne leaves the Senate to run for Governor of Idaho in November, 1998. Cam-
paign contributions from the timber industry to Congress was also noted by the United
Paperworkers International Union in a press release. In a special report, the union de-
tailed "the political activity of the U.S. timber and paper industry. Analyzing political
contributions, the union identified a highly partisan pattern of giving and increasing lob-
bying sophistication by an industry that is not often mentioned as a major Washington
player." 'Union Probes Forest Industry's Politics: Investigation Finds Bundles to Western
Republicans, Covert Lobbying', October 11, 1995.
26. G.J. Harad, Chairman and CEO, Boise Cascade Corporation, received salary of
$719,382 in 1996 and bonuses of $129,941 for total compensation of $849,323. That rep-
resented a salary increase of over 7% from 1995. Top Executive Compensation, IDAHO
BUS. REV., Jan. 5, 1998, at 14. This figure is more than 715 times the projected annual
earnings of the Papanoa mill workers, even using the unlikely but generous assumption
that they could be employed for a full 50 weeks each year. See infra notes 87-92 and ac-
companying material. This assumption is unlikely due to the rainy season from June to
October and the mud roads that become impassable, thereby causing a shortage of logs.
CEO Harad and spouse are building a massive new home in the Boise Foothills near an
up-scale development named Quail Hollow. The address is 4700 W. Quail Heights; and
the site encompasses four acres which were leveled thereby eliminating a hilltop and cre-
ating a scar on the land visible for miles. The projected improvement is at 3105 feet of
elevation which will allow the Harads to look down on the working class people in the
valley. The gross square footage of the improvement is listed on the building permit as
12,277 and estimated cost is $702,000 - not including the land. A local contractor said
that the going rate for homes is $75 per square foot; and homes in Quail Hollow run $100
per square foot and up. "Low-balling" the cost of construction is not uncommon in Ada
County since it keeps the building permit fee down. Harads paid $4000 for the permit.
Interview by William Wines with Jim Allen, Building Contractor, in Boise Idaho (Feb. 2,
1998).
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silence all coverage of the event by local media as well as telephone the
president of Boise State University in a futile attempt to get the talk
canceled. 27 Such an approach is heavy-handed even by BCC standards
and out of all proportion to what was happening. Yet, in 1989 when the
dispute with the building trades at International Falls was really hot,
BCC leaned on the Minneapolis Star-Tribune to get it to refuse to pub-
lish a paid advertisement from the Minnesota AFL-CIO. 28 This refusal
prompted a news conference and picketing by the AFL-CIO. 29 Wher-
ever BCC does business there seems to be an inevitable pattern and
practice of use and abuse of its vast economic power.
In November 1996, our graduate research assistant (GA) attempted
to get permission to access the BCC library and gather background in-
formation on the company's early history.30 The GA first contacted the
corporate librarian and asked if it would be possible to conduct research
at the facility. In the past, BCC had been very cooperative in allowing
students from Idaho universities research access to its library. The li-
brarian indicated that she would have to look into this possibility and
call him back. The GA left several voice messages for the librarian, but
his calls were not returned. Three weeks passed and the GA initiated
another contact with the librarian, who indicated that the GA would
need to gain permission from the corporate legal department to use the
BCC library, an odd arrangement; but he did. The legal department
granted permission by phone, and the GA let the librarian know this.
The librarian then indicated that she would have to check on this and
call him back. On November 18th, the librarian left a message for the
GA indicating that BCC was no longer allowing students to use the li-
brary and said that under no circumstance could he get historical data
on BCC from them.
31
BCC has "circled the wagons." Is BCC afraid someone might find
something incriminating? Could there still be a smoking gun from the
June 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre in the BCC archives? John Ross
declared that his search had not turned up a smoking gun. 32 Did BCC
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by slipping cash to then Gov-
ernor Ruben Figuerro? Who are the undisclosed principals in the
holding company that owns the mills in Guerrero?33 Could it include
27. Interview with John Ross (June 6, 1996), supra, note 15.
28. Unions Picket Star-Tribune Over Boise Ad, THE UNION ADVOCATE, Aug. 21, 1989.
29. Id.
30. See supra text accompanying note 21 for a brief synopsis of BCC origins.
31. Interview by William Wines of Todd Hill, MBA, research assistant, in Boise,
Idaho (November 19, 1996.
32. Stephen Stuebner, Critic Raps B-C Mexican Operations, THE STAR-NEWS, June
13, 1996, at 2.
33. "In February 1995, Boise Cascade was contacted by NDG, Inc., a company looking
for a timber industry manufacturer that might be interested in a wood products venture
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Mexican political powers? Such speculation may not be as far-fetched
as it seems.
To analyze the possibilities, we need to examine the corporate cul-
ture in which senior BCC officers act and react and speculate on how
that culture influences their attitudes and ideologies.
Corporate Climate at BCC and Interactions with Local Citizens.
BCC sits in an ultra-modern headquarters office on One Jefferson
Square a few blocks west of the state capitol in Boise, Idaho, an inter-
mountain right-to-work state that one political scientist compared to a
third world country.34 Some Idahoans are backward and proud of it;
their paragon of success is multi-billionaire J. R. Simplot,35 a crusty
twentieth century captain of industry with an eighth grade education
who made his fortune in the potato processing business through some
legendary escapades, including activities that earned him a six-year
ban from trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange and fines for
federal income tax evasion. 36 Incidentally, "old J.R." - as Simplot is
sometimes known in Boise - increased his holdings in BCC by ap-
proximately 30 million dollars in December, 1995.
3 7
Labor strife is nothing new to BCC, and neither is a management
style that has an "in-your-face" approach to labor relations. In 1978 in
the Pacific Northwest, the Association of Western Pulp and Paper
in Guererro, Mexico. Boise Cascade formed a wholly-owned subsidiary, Costa Grande
Forest Products, which leases and operates a government-owned sawmill at Papanoa. It
also built a lumber planing and drying facility at Cocopa and have an agreement to pur-
chase the production from a government-owned sawmill at Tecpan. [citations omitted.]" A.
Waters, A Study of the Timber Industry in British Columbia, Idaho, and Guererro 14
(Apr. 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
34. Gregory A. Raymond, Idaho: A Third World Country? (1986) (unpublished confer-
ence paper on file with authors).
35. Ironically, Jack Simplot was born in Iowa not Idaho. Simplot born January 4,
1909 near Dubuque, Iowa first moved to Idaho with his parents in 1911 but soon left for
California and did not permanently settle in Idaho until J.R was 13 years old. At 14 years
of age, Simplot set out on his own and took his first job, sorting potatoes. HAROLD. R.
BUNDERSON, IDAHO ENTREPRENEURS: PROFILES IN BUSINESS 10-14 (1992).
36. BUNDERSON, supra note 35, at 31-32. For an uncritical but informative essay on
Simplot's contribution to potato agriculture and processing, see James W. Davis & Nikki
Balch Stillwell, JR. Simplot Builds a Potato "Empire," in ARISTOCRAT IN BURLAP: A
HISTORY OF THE POTATO IN IDAHO 62-84 (1977).
37. Paul Beebe, Simplot Trust Buys Boise Cascade Stock, IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 20,
1995, at la. The Simplot Trust acquired 820,000 shares of Boise Cascade between Octo-
ber 6 and December 11, 1995 to bring its total holdings to 3.17 million shares, represent-
ing 6.6 per cent of the outstanding BCC's common stock. Beebe indicated that "he [Sim-
plot] was not trying to take over the company. Boise Cascade was simply a cheap
investment, he said."
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Workers struck BCC and other mills over economic issues. 38 For the
first time in the modern era, BCC and several other producers contin-
ued to operate their mills. In 1980 in Rumsford, Maine, BCC took a
strike over economic issues and continued to operate its mill. 39 Michael
Harrington, Director of Labor Relations for BCC declared of this deci-
sion: "Labor has a right to strike. We have a right to operate our mill."
40 Four years later in DeRidder, Louisiana, BCC provoked a strike over
work rules by bringing to the table an entirely new labor agenda and
continued to operate during the strike.4 1 BCC prevailed and Harring-
ton said of the strike: "We viewed it as who was going to run the mill."
42
In 1986 at the Rumsford, Maine facility, BCC took a hard-line posi-
tion on work rules and pay for time not worked. After lengthy negotia-
tions, the union struck, and BCC continued operations, warning strik-
ers that they would be permanently replaced. BCC delivered on this
threat and permanently replaced 346 workers, about one-third of the
work force.43 It then unilaterally implemented its proposed contract
terms. 44
Half a continent away from Boise lies the small town of Interna-
tional Falls, Minnesota. BCC owns the mill in that town, and the mill
sits on the banks of the Rainy River that divides International Falls
from Fort Frances, Ontario. In June, 1988, BCC announced it was go-
ing to build a $525 million plant expansion in International Falls after
using the threat of canceling the project as a club to get union contracts
with nine unions that had bargained to impasse with BCC in 1985 and
had been working without contracts in the interim. 45 This threat of
economic devastation had turned brother against brother and divided
families as the residents of the Falls tried to grasp the enormity of a
BCC pull-out.46
The people who live in International Falls, Minnesota take their
38. Paul Beebe, Boise Cascade's Labor Woes Raise Question of Bias; Boise Cascade:
Latest Labor Woes are Extention of 1978 Plan to Modernize Labor Accords, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Sept. 24, 1989, El, E4. Boise Cascade took the strike in an effort to "end
what Chairman John Fery has said were years of concessions by the industry to labor
unions." Id.
39. Wines and Learned, supra note 5, at 216.
40. See id.
41. Mike Draper, executive director of the Western Council of Industrial Workers,





45. Wines & Learned, supra note 5, at 206-07.




families, their religion, and their unionism seriously. 47 Into the raw
and angry climate of the Falls where the "cram-down" of the contracts
had not been either forgiven or forgotten, BCC introduced another po-
tentially incendiary element: the choice of BE & K Construction Com-
pany of Alabama as the general contractor on the massive expansion
project. 48 This decision to use a competent but notoriously non-union, if
not union busting, southern outfit to build one of the largest private
construction projects in Minnesota State history49 was little short of
spitting in the Chalice at High Mass. Violence followed.
BE&K began the job in July, 1989 even though BCC top manage-
ment knew that its choice for general contractor was unpopular and had
already heard rumors of trouble if BCC proceeded. 50 Of the initial
twenty subcontracts that BE&K let, eighteen were with union contrac-
tors. However, when non-union subcontractors began work at the same
time, a wild cat strike by building tradesmen erupted. According to
BCC, BE&K continued to work with the union subcontractors whose
employees had walked off the job.
51
Another observer wrote about the wildcat strike and its significance
in these words:
[T]he wildcat strike had as its genuine architect the passions of the
Iron Range building tradesmen who simply wanted to do 'something,'
whether that 'something' was well-thought out and strategically sound
or not. At any rate, whether deliberately or by being pushed through
47. See Dave Hage, BE&K Troubles With State Unions Part of Wider War, STAR-
TRIB., Aug. 6, 1989, at A12, available in 1989 WL 3808301. Hage states "The unions did-
n't waste any time declaring war once Boise announced its choice of BE&K last February.
The United Brotherhood of Carpenters, which represents 60,000 paper mill workers as
well as thousands of construction workers, has launched a national campaign against
BE&K that includes bumper stickers, T-shirts, and a 13 minute videotape documentary
on BE&K. The Viking Bar, a union watering hole in International Falls, has been screen-
ing the video for patrons." Id. (emphasis added). In an earlier piece, we described I. Falls
in the following terms: "International Falls prides itself on being the 'ice-box of the nation'
in a state known for its union activism. In the Falls, almost everyone is organized.
Democrats belong to the DFL (Democrat, Farm, Labor) Party." Wines & Learned, supra
note 5, at 203. According to a participant in the picnic, BCC leased a local resort in the
International Falls area for a day and threw a picnic with free champagne to celebrate its
new "labor contract" in the summer of 1989 and "not one union member showed up."
Telephone interview by William A. Wines with W.S. Scheela, Ph.D, an International Falls
native and management professor, Minnesota State Universities (Oct. 6, 1989).
48. See Wines & Learned, supra note 5, at 207-08. BCC Officers knew BE & K would
be unpopular in International Falls but cited figures they claimed showed that its bid was
$40 million below the lowest unionized general contractor, Fru-Con out of St. Louis, Mo.
Id.
49. Larry Oakes, Perpich Hopes Competitors Can Change Boise Stance,
MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Aug. 6, 1989, at 17A.
50. See Wines & Learned, supra note 5, at 207.
51. See id.
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the back door, the Minnesota Building and Construction Trades Coun-
cil had made its decision: the wildcat strike signaled that the dispute
would take the form of distributive bargaining.
Distributive bargaining suggests that two parties have no overriding
structure or common language by which conflict can be resolved by rea-
son. Rather, power, sometimes raw, undisguised power, becomes the
only valid syllogism. The relationship between the two parties be-
comes a zero-sum game, and in distributive bargaining's most extreme
manifestations, give-and-take and compromise become impossible.
Ideological polarization occurs, and coercion becomes the only tool by
which the two parties influence each other . 52
Eventually, BE&K elected to cancel the union subcontractors for
failure to perform and replaced them with non-union subcontractors.
5 3
On September 9, 1989, the situation in the Falls blew up and hundreds
of people rioted over the use of sub-contractors on-union construction
trades labor by BE&K.54 The rioters overpowered the local police force,
flipped cars over, and burned a temporary housing camp that BE&K
had constructed for its workers - complete with barbed wire fencing
and obviously inadequate security.5 5 The damages were estimated to
be $1.3 million.5 6 Throughout the wildcat strike and the other labor
problems, the BCC mill employees operated the existing mill without
interruption. Eventually, the new expansion was completed and came
on line. Some former BCC workers served time for rioting, lost their
jobs, and many continue to live in the Falls. Some of them commute
hundreds of miles each way to jobs in the Twin City metro area and are
only home on weekends. 57 Members of some families are still not on
52. Michael V. Woodhouse, Union Strategies to Prevent Non-Union Construction: The
Case of International Falls, Minnesota 35-36 (1990) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Oxford
Universtiy) (on file with authors).
53. The dispute generated litigation that ended in a U.S. Supreme Court decision,
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995). In a rare re-
view of a case involving the National Labor Relations Act, the court in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Breyer held that the termination of an electrician by the employer for being a paid
union organizer was an unfair labor practice.
54. See Wines & Learned, supra note 5, at 208.
55. Union Flap Sparks Riot in Midwest,_IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 10, 1989, at 1A.
56. Boise Protest Erupts Into Riot, DAILY J., Sept. 11, 1989, at 1, 6-9. For sake of per-
spective, BCC recorded sales of $4.3 billion in 1989 and posted record high profits of
$289.1 million for calendar year 1988. Jim Bowers, Boise Cascade Sets Profit Record,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 23, 1989, at 1A. Thus, for less than 14% of its previous year's
profits, Boise Cascade Corporation could have employed a unionized general contractor
and avoided the bloody conflict and property destruction in Minnesota as well as the con-
frontation with then Minnesota Governor Rudy Perpich. Clearly, Yankee dollars took
precedence over people and social welfare.
57. Ironically, a Boise Cascade Corporation publication entitled "Directions for Boise
Cascade," dated June, 1988, summarizes the BCC mission statement and declares that
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speaking terms as a result of the choices and positions they took in
1989.
In an interview at BCC Headquarters on February 1, 1990, Jon H.
Miller, then President and Chief Operating Officer, said "...What we
did [at International Falls] was legal as hell, morally right, logical, and
what any businessman would do. . .. "58 Moreover, Miller declared that
BCC was not anti-union but believed in the free market theory of labor.
"The economic power in a mill town [of the mill owner] is such that it's
Boise Cascade's way or you can go pump gas.... ,, 59 Ironically, Miller
who claimed the moral high ground left BCC suddenly less than nine
months later "to pursue personal interests."60 Even after Miller's de-
parture, the issue of whether BCC is anti-union continues to be debated
both in and out of the press. One carpenter's union official described
BCC's top management as ".. .leaders in a willingness to break strikes"
and BCC as a company embracing a "hard-line anti-union atti-
tude .. ."61
The latest labor conflict was a walk-out at the Salem, Oregon cor-
rugated container plant where hourly workers struck to protest the
breakdown of negotiations with BCC on April 21, 1997. More than one
year after workers voted to be represented by Association of Western
Pulp and Paper Workers based in Portland, the workers had not been
able to negotiate a contract with the company. 62
Council, Idaho.
In March, 1995, BCC closed its mill in Council, Idaho (pop. 831). In
November, 1995, news reports indicated that the some of the equipment
from the Council mill had been shipped to Papanoa, a small town on the
Coast of Guerrero, Mexico where BCC had leased an inactive saw mill.
BCC plans to log millions of board feet of old-growth forests, over a five-
year period, and ship the logs to its processing mill. In August, 1996,
BCC purchased a new planer and had it shipped to the Papanoa mill
site. BCC had opened another mill further down the coast in Guerrero,
according to local sources, at year's end.
"Boise Cascade Strives to value the individual dignity, worth , and rights of employees
and maintain the highest ethical standards in dealing with them." (copy in possession of
authors).
58. Interview of Jon H. Miller, President and Chief Operating Officer, by Kevin E.
Learned and William A. Wines, faculty at Boise State University, in Boise Idaho (Feb. 1,
1990).
59. Id.
60. IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 19, 1990, at 1A.
61. IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 24, 1989, at 1E.
62. James Sinks, Boise Cascade Workers Strike Oregon Stoppage May Idle Nampa
Plant Too, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 22, 1997, at 10B, available in 1997 WL 10199294.
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Rumors continued to swirl during 1997 at the BCC mills in Cas-
cade, Emmett, and Horseshoe Bend, Idaho and in LaGrande, Oregon
that similar fates awaited those mills. Among characteristics that
Emmett and LaGrande share with Council, Idaho are that the mills in
all three places are unionized and that workers had rejected BCC con-
tract offers in 1994.63 The rejection of the BCC offers followed three
straight years of financial losses. There seems to be a climate of dis-
trust, at least among significant portions of those communities. In ad-
dition to the Council, Idaho mill, BCC has also closed its sawmills in
Yakima, Washington and Joseph, Oregon - also citing shrinking tim-
ber supplies. 64 Let us turn to the situation in the State of Guerrero be-
fore generating any further analysis.
State of Guerrero, Mexico.
Richard Parrish, senior vice president of BCC's building products
division, in a local interview, declared that "diminishing timber sup-
plies, brought on in large part by the ground swell of endangered spe-
cies designations, starting with the white spotted owl in 1992, is drying
up local and regional supplies ... ,"65 However, BCC did not close the
Council mill last spring with the intention of moving it to Mexico; and
the BCC move to Mexico does not foreshadow the inevitable end of tim-
ber operations in Idaho. All of these statements were designed to "set
the record straight" according to Parrish who further declaimed that
"the environmental watchdogs down south are just as diligent as they
are in the United States ... ."66 But according to freelance journalist
John Ross, who has lived and worked in Mexico for many years, envi-
ronmental regulation varies a great deal between the two countries. In
a recent article published in Sierra Magazine, Ross states "even at its
most vigorous, environmental regulation in Costa Grande can be best
described as lax .... 67
Parrish's declaration of environmental parity strikes us as counter-
intuitive as well as incompatible with any knowledge of the different
cultures in the two countries. In particular, it sounds disingenuous
when one examines the events that led up to the BCC logging contro-
versy. On June 28, 1995, two pickup trucks loaded with Mexican peas-
ants were ambushed by state police at Aguas Blancas; this massacre
63. The Idaho Statesman, 1994.
64. The Star-News, 1996.
65. Mark Carnopis, Mexico Sawmill Said Just Global Stragegy: Boise Cascade Says
Company Looking for Timber Reserves, Not Cheap Labor, IDAHO BUS. REV., Jan. 1, 1996,
at 1, available in 1996 WL 8420972.
66. Id.
67. Ross, Treasure, supra note 10, at 22.
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did not "occur in a vacuum . . ."68 The Minnesota Advocates' report de-
clares "Guerrero is one of Mexico's bloodiest states ...... Even though
this mountainous state is saturated with a "dangerous mixture.. ." of
poverty, political violence, illegal drug trafficking, abusive police forces,
and other elements, the Minnesota Human Rights group found that the
Aguas Blancas massacre did not appear to be related in any way to
armed insurrection activity.
69
Rather, the report of the Minnesota investigation states that
months of tension between the Governor Ruben Figueroa Alcocer and
the OCSS (a Southern Sierra Peasant Organization) over the expropria-
tion of timber on communal land erupted into the murderous assault on
OCSS members that morning. 70 Prior to the massacre, the OCSS,
founded in early 1994 to represent poor compensinos, had aggressively
and sometimes illegally opposed logging. In one instance, it disabled a
crane and in another, it hijacked a logging truck. Not all of its methods
involved physical confrontation. On May 3, 1995, representatives of the
OCSS met with Governor Figueroa in Tepetixla to press demands for
agricultural supplies which had become hard to get as a result of the
devaluation of the Peso in December 1994 and the ensuing economic
crisis. The two sides reportedly reached agreement.
But on May 18th, just a little over two weeks later, the OCSS
staged a demonstration in Atoyac de Alvarez to protest the governor's
apparent default on the agreement, to denounce recent human rights
violations, and to celebrate the anniversary of the guerrilla insurgency
commenced by Lucio Cabanas in 1967.71 Hundreds of OCSS members,
some carrying machetes and others armed only with clubs, blockaded
the city hall overnight and effectively held captive the municipal presi-
dent. In the following weeks, more demonstrations were held and
planned and one OCSS member "disappeared" from Atoyac de Alvarez.
The OCSS complained of police surveillance of its office in Tepetixla,
and the Governor reportedly met with various law enforcement person-
nel at the Governmental Palace on June 26 to make plans to stop an-
other OCSS demonstration planned for Atoyac de Alvarez on June 28th.
The actual number of police agents present at the massacre is dis-
puted; OCSS survivors claim the number is in the hundreds but the po-
lice claim only thirty agents were present. When the shooting ended,
seventeen peasants were dead, twenty four peasants were wounded,
and two policemen were hurt. The dead included men and women be-
tween the ages of 20 and 75 years; and the wounded included men and
68. Massacres in Mexico, CITATION, at 4 (Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
1995).
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id.
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women between the ages of 17 and 73 years. Some of the dead were
shot at point-blank range; some were shot in the back from a distance of
under three feet. Only the police had firearms. 72 There followed clumsy
attempts by the government to cover up the massacre accompanied by
threats to both witnesses and victims.
73
John Ross Speaks in Boise, Idaho.
John Ross, a journalist and author from Mexico City, traveled to
Idaho's capitol city to address the deadly conflict over logging in the
Guerrero region. According to Ross, BCC is logging in the vicinity of
the June 1995 Aguas Blancas massacre, a massacre spurred by conflicts
over logging. 74 As Ross sees it, BCC logging runs a high risk of intensi-
fying the social tensions that have historically led to human rights
abuses.
Ross visited BCC's mill in the state of Guerrero, Mexico, in Febru-
ary, 1996. He also researched and inspected the site of the June massa-
cre of 17 civilians. The massacre, which took place after BCC had
signed a contract with the now disgraced governor of Guerrero, demon-
strated the explosive social conditions in the region and revealed that
social conflict and political assassinations in Guerrero often spring from
struggles over land and natural resources.Some of those executed had
warrants for their arrest dated the day after the contract with BCC was
signed.7 5 On August 1, 1996, guerrillas attacked a Mexican Army con-
voy less than 10 miles from Papanoa, the site of BCC's mill.7 6
Holding a press conference and lecture, Ross took BCC to task,
72. Id. at 9-32.
73. Id. at 15-21.
74. "In the months prior to the massacre, the OCSS had engaged in a dispute with
local leaders in Tepetixla, involving the expropriation of timber on communal lands. The
OCSS employed aggressive, and at times illegal methods to achieve its goals, such as dis-
abling a crane and commandeering a timber-hauling truck." Id. at 5. 'Two weeks later
the logging was renewed and the first response of the farmers of the OCSS was to destroy
two cranes belonging to the logging company, on the 10th of May, and the confiscation of a
truck loaded with wood, property of Epifanio Rodriquez, Friday the 12th, according to Be-
ningo Guzman, one of the representatives of the Organization." On the position of the
OCSS: "It is the non-exploitation of the wood, because we see that with logging the water
goes away, there are droughts, and also that when the wood is exploited, those who bene-
fit are only a few, and for these reasons we don't harbor ambitions of exploiting the wood,
not even if we were in power." "What they want is for us farmers to kill each other," says
a leader of the OCSS about the wood problem. ACAPULCO WEEKLY, May 15-21, 1995.
75. Donald J. Smith, Boise Cascade Corporation in the State of Guererro, Mexico:
Environmental Impacts of Logging & Political Turmoil iii (unpublished manuscript on file
with authors).
76. John Ross, Logging Guerrero's Forest: Bloodshed Casts Doubts on Boise Cascade




claiming that it was either ignorant of the social and environmental
consequences of logging in the region or was indifferent to it. 77 In either
case, the company has displayed a lack of social responsibility, disre-
garding possible human rights implications for the people of Guerrero,
Mexico. Ross' visit was sponsored by the Alliance for the Wild Rockies,
the history department of Boise State University, and the Idaho Con-
servation League. His press conference, lecture and slide show before
150 people at Boise State University, threw BCC into a frenzy. BCC's
strong arm tactics caused a public "blackout" of Ross' talk, demon-
strating that one TNC can effectively suppress media coverage even in
a state capital in the U.S.A., where the press is supposedly free and vig-
orous.
Ross' press conference was attended by three TV stations, the Asso-
ciated Press, and a free lance writer. A fourth TV station, one that ini-
tially broke the story on BCC's Mexico logging operations, and the
shipment of mill equipment from its closed mill in Council, Idaho, to
Mexico, failed to show. This TV station, a few weeks after breaking the
first story, also covered the Alliance's December, 1995, press conference,
where Alliance for the Wild Rockies ("AWR") challenged BCC to come
clean on its Mexico investment. The day following that press confer-
ence, BCC pulled all of its advertising from the station.
78
The decision on the part of two of the three TV stations not to cover
the issue on the nightly news may also be attributed to BCC's success at
intimidation. The company went out of its way to discredit Ross and
the Alliance in press releases and phone conversations, both singled out
by the company for being "extremists." The Idaho Statesman Environ-
mental Reporter, after a lengthy interview with Ross, also filed a news
article. But the paper chose not to publish it. The AP apparently found
the issue too complex, too controversial, or simply did not want to be
hassled. This experience demonstrates the lengths to which BCC will
go to discredit activists and to prevent critical views from being aired.
79
That John Ross had struck a nerve with BCC, however, was beyond
doubt. The president of the region's major timber company personally
called the president of BSU to complain about the university's sponsor-
ship of Ross' lecture.8 0 Apparently, BCC's Wild West style corporate
77. See BOISE WEEKLY, June 13-19, 1996, at 3.
78. Interview with Donald J. Smith, reporter and News Director of Channel 6 (KIVI-
ABC), in Boise, Idaho (multiple dates between June and Dec. 1996).
79. Boise Cascade Corporation is a founding donor of the Center for the Defense of
Free Enterprise, a think tank that provides direction to "Wise Use" Groups that oppose
local efforts to protect the environment and encourage sustained yield usage. Anita Ker-
ski, Pulp, Paper and Power: How Industry Reshapes the Social Environment, ECOLOGIST,
July-Aug. 1995, at 148 [hereinafter Kerski].
80. The Guerrero Connection, BOISE WEEKLY, June 13, 1996, at 3.
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culture lacks a wholesome respect for an open press, free speech, and a
vital public sphere.
Yet, Ross' message is clear and precise. BCC has thrown itself into
an area where logging exacerbates social tensions. While some within
the local "ejidos" (the communal governing structure that controls re-
gions of the forest) have conceded to the pressure of international capi-
tal and debt, others remain firm in their opposition to foreign logging
operations. Many of the local farmers worry that logging leads to se-
vere erosion and jeopardizes their dependence on water, as past logging
has shown. Others watch with resentment as the locally processed tim-
ber and raw logs are exported north.
BCC is paying locals at the mill $4.75 a day while mill workers
from Montana and Idaho shuttle through on monthly stints, paid the
equivalent of $70,000 a year. Jumping on investment opportunities
brought about by NAFTA, BCC has taken advantage of reforms in the
Mexican Constitution made to accommodate NAFTA, opening the flood-
gates to foreign investment. As often happens in such situations, the
results pit locals against one another, an outcome not unlike the con-
flicts orchestrated in the American Northwest by timber giants such as
BCC.
In August, 1996, BCC, conceding that it intends to further
downsize it's Idaho operations, permanently laid off 40 of its mill work-
ers, representing nearly 15 percent of its labor force in Idaho mills.
BCC gave the same old and tired, but so far successful, explanation for
the layoffs: a lack of federal timber due to environmentalist's appeals
and lawsuits81 The company also complained about a lack of access to
big trees. In Mexico, however, BCC finds a plentiful source, as they say,
of "raw materials."
A week before the layoffs, and at a time when southwest Idaho's
ponderosa forests suffer from over-logging, a timber sale put up for auc-
tion by the Boise National Forest went begging (the third in a row).
The North Gold Green clear cut sale offered up old-growth ponderosa
81. According to Dave VanDeGraff, Idaho Regional Timberlands Manager for Boise
Cascade in Emmett, Idaho: "frivolous administrative appeals and lawsuits against the
U.S. Forest Service programs" have reduced access to trees for companies like BCC. Dave
VanDeGraff, Extreme Environmentalism Often Occludes Path to Good Forest Science,
IDAHO STATESMAN, June 22, 1997, at 15A. However, some of the facts on the public rec-
ord do not seem to completely support these assertions. For instance, between December
31, 1993 and March 31, 1995 (before the Salvage Logging rider to the Congressional Ap-
propriations Bill), 3.3 billion board feet of timber were offered for sale on all National For-
ests; and less than one-third of these were appealed, including the 265 million board feet
Boise River Wildfire Recovery Project. Out of the 1 billion board feet appealed, only 15
mmbf were delayed, Eighty-six million board feet were delayed due to litigation (about
2.6 percent of the total sales).
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pine.82 But BCC knows better. Why purchase some of the remaining
old-growth in Idaho and risk bad publicity when it comes a lot cheaper
in Mexico ... and Russia, South America, etc., where environmental
regulations and environmental activists are virtually non-existent.
Along with other TNC's and some government agencies, BCC per-
petuates the myth that economic well-being is dependent on environ-
mental abuses, and that environmental protections are too costly. It
also seems committed to self-serving justifications for its conduct and
conveniently absent-minded about hard-nosed business rationales that
might inflamme adverse public reactions. By shifting public attention
away from the boom and bust, non-sustainable forestry favored by the
Forest Service and timber industry,8 3 the company successfully pits one
sector of society and the economy against another, a strategy also at
work in Mexico, where the results are even deadlier.
SPIN ANAL YSIS
Corporate Spin #1: BCC denies any relationship between the clo-
sure of its Council, Idaho mill and the opening of operations in Mexico.
In March of 1995, BCC closed its mill in Council, Idaho. The mill,
which was equipped to handle only the largest logs being harvested was
closed rather than being retooled to handle smaller logs. Coinciden-
82. BCC did eventually buy the North Gold timber, 5.6 mmbf, on September 18, 1997
- the third time it was offered for sale. Report of Timber Sale, USDAFS, Sept. 18, 1997.
83. "Loggers are losing their jobs because of technological improvement. One person
can cut in an hour what it took two people to cut in a day ten years ago. These jobs are
temporary. The average timber job now only lasts 5 years (citation omitted). The forests
are not being cut at a sustainable rate (citation omitted). These logging jobs are not sus-
tainable." Michael T, Garrity, Research Fellow, Economics Department, University of
Utah, Economic Analysis of the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act 4 (1997) (un-
published manuscript on file with authors). At a global level, the world's forests are dis-
appearing. In 1960, the world's national forests covered about 3750 million hectares. In
1990, this number had dropped to 3450 million hectares; and the projection for the year
2010 is 3250 million hectares. Concerns on Shrinking Forests (visited Mar. 11, 1997)
<http://www.canadas.net:80/wood/shrinkq.htm>. Mexico is one of the areas in the world
where forests are shrinking the fastest. Approximately 50 percent of the of the labor
force is unemployed; and a majority of the employed work for wages inadequate to care for
a family. U.S. Department of State, Mexico Country Report on Human Rights Practices
for 1996 (visited Mar. 12, 1997) <http://www.usis.usemb.se/humanr97/mexico.html>. A
sawmill in Idaho laided off workers while modernizing its plant in 1995. These job losses
occurred as local jobs increased. "Even with job losses at Potlatch Corp. in Lewiston, the
Lewiston-Clarkson Valley had a net gain of 900 jobs this year through November, ac-
cording to Douglas D. Tweedy of Lewiston, labor analyst for the Idaho Employment De-
partment." "Potlatch management was quick to point out the company has invested $15
million in the sawmill over the last five years, a sure sign it has faith that it can be a
money maker. A new log-processing center at the sawmill, which apparently wasn't quite
right for the job, was replaced again for about $6 million." Growth Amid Timber Turmoil,
LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., Sept. 25, 1995, at 1A.
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tally, within a month of the Council mill's closure, BCC had signed an
agreement to begin a major timber operation in Mexico where old-
growth trees and cheap labor are readily available.
BCC maintains that there is no connection between the mill closure
in Council and the mill opening in Mexico. The company defended its
actions in the Idaho Business Review, where BCC Senior VP Richard
Parrish stated in part:
Between last April and the end of the year [1995], Boise Cascade
reached an agreement with a mill in Ixpata to supply logs and buy the
lumber by a second work shift.
At the same time, the company signed an agreement with the
Mexican government about leasing a government-owned mill in Pa-
panoa that had shut down. 84
The decision to go to Mexico and the decision to close Council were
separable issues. We had never been to Mexico when we announced the
closure of Council. In fact, by the time the mill closed, we still hadn't
been in Mexico or had our first phone call."
The timing of the Mexico timber agreement and the subsequent
events that have transpired since the closing of the Council, Idaho mill
tell a different story. Two independent writers indicate that BCC's con-
tacts in Guererro were initiated at least as early as February 1995.85
One month later, the Council mill was closed; and in April, BCC had
publicly announced its contract with the state of Guerrero.
Last April 24, a brace of U.S. timber-company executives made the
front page of El Sol de Acapulco, the state of Guerrero's most widely cir-
culated newspaper. Along with Governor Ruben Figueroa, they were
shown smiling as they signed the agreement that would bring BCC, one
of the top wood-products producers in the United States, to Guerrero's
Costa Grande, the conflictive, guerrilla-ridden stretch of coastline that
winds between the luxury resorts of Zihuatanejo/Ixtapa and Aca-
pulco .... 86
Given this scenario, BCC's account of the initial contact and sign-
ing of the agreement with Guerrero strains credibility. The corpora-
tion's claims that "by the time the mill closed, we still had not been in
Mexico or had our first phone call. 87 BCC would have us believe that it
had not entered into negotiations for the lease of the Papanoa mill until
after the Council mill closure in March, 1995, but that miraculously
84. Carnopis, supra note 65, at 1.
85. See supra note 29 indicating NDG, Inc. contacted BCC in February 1995 and su-
pra note 80 in which at least one anonymous source suggests contacts dating back to
1992. John Ross points to the February 1992 date.
86. Ross, Treasure, supra note 10.
87. Carnopis, supra note 65, at 15B.
VOL. 26:3
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION
BCC was able to seal the Mexican deal by April 24, 1995, a matter of
only a few weeks.88 Things do not move that fast in Mexico, as almost
anyone who has been there will testify.
Corporate Spin #2: BCC says that it was forced to close the Council
mill due to a shortage of timber in Idaho because of stringent environ-
mental restrictions and the consequences of environmentalists appeals
and lawsuits.
According to BCC, its aggressive international search for trees is
simply a part of its global strategy and attributes the closure of its
Council mill to "timber supply changes taking place in southern
Idaho ... ,,89 However, the amount of timber that has been offered for
sale in southern Idaho forests would suggest otherwise. 90 There have
been a number of below-cost timber sales offered by the Boise National
Forest that BCC refused to bid on, and subsequently went unsold.
For example, the 1995 Boise River Wildfire Recovery Project origi-
nally projected the logging of 265 million board feet of timber. When
this project, which had been covered by a single Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), was sold in a series of smaller auctions, only 203 mil-
lion board feet were ultimately sold. The reduced volume of timber sold
was due to the lack of interest in the timber; many of these sales went
without a bidder when put up for auction. The 17 sales were often the
result of non-competitive bids, i.e., only one company bid on the timber.
BCC's refusal to bid-up these sales, or bid at all on some of them, un-
dercuts the assertion that it cannot acquire the needed logs to sustain
its Idaho operations. The Boise River Wildfire Recovery Project in the
88. Interview by William A. Wines with John Ross in Boise, Id. (June 6, 1996). One
of Ross's sources indicated that Boise Cascade management had "made decision to go [to
Mexico] in February, 1995." even though this timeline has been repeatedly denied by all
BCC spokespersons. One source with family in Guerrero and who for that reason insists
on anonymity says that negotiations for BCC logging in the Costa Grande can be traced to
initial contacts in calendar year 1992. Id.
89. Ross, supra note 76, at 11.
90. "The future of Boise Cascade's Idaho sawmills is in jeopardy. Chairman George
Harad lays the blame squarely on Forest Service policies that he says have severely lim-
ited timber sales. I'm very concerned about the viability of our mills in Idaho. And it's
certainly not based on concerns about the productivity of the work force or the skills that
they bring. But the fact is that the U.S. Forest Service sales program has, in effect, been
brought to a halt." Chairman Says Company Might Have to Close Sawmills in Idaho,
IDAHO STATESMAN, June 6, 1997, at 10B (emphasis added).
However, Boise Cascade Corporation's claim that timber availability has dropped off or
declined or been halted does not square with the data. According to U.S. Forest Service
figures, timber harvest in the Boise National Forest from 1982 through 1989 averaged a
yearly cut of 76.4 mmbf. From 1990 through 1996, the yearly cut average was 105.2
mmbf. From 1982 through 1989, the forest sold a yearly average of 62.6 mmbf. From
1990 through 1996, the forest sold a yearly average of 114.7 mmbf. In the Payette Na-
tional Forests, twenty percent of the 1996 timber offerings went without a bidder.
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Boise National Forest was the largest sale in Idaho's history.91
Also, a search of public records reveals that as of the end of calen-
dar year 1996, BCC owned 154.9 million board feet of timber in the
Boise and Payette National Forests alone that have yet to be logged.
One of these sales that has not been harvested dates back to 1986. One
wonders when the taxpayers can start charging storage?
Corporate Spin #3: BCC denies that its move to Mexico was to take
advantage of the lack of environmental regulations in Mexico, compared
to those in the U.S.
BCC Vice President John Parrish claimed that "the environmental
watchdogs down south are just as diligent as they are in the United
States... [S]o far, since we've been in Mexico, we've had to get 42 per-
mits and we've been inspected twice, and everything's fine. I don't
think that's a lot different then you'll find here .... ,,92
In Mexico, however, others disagree. Vice Minister of Natural Re-
sources, Gonzalo Chapela stated: "I'm worried about the amount of
wood this project will take out of the area ... ." Homero Aridjis, direc-
tor of the prestigious Mexican environmental organization "Group 100"
believes " there is no control over the way our natural resources are
being exploited. Permission is granted to these foreign corporations
without environmental-impact studies. It's all being done silently -
the trees are cut down silently and they are exported silently. No one
knows anything; everything is hidden ....
In an article published in Ecological Economics, the authors stated:
[I]t is concluded that in spite of Mexican environmental legislation
and MDBs' [Multinational Development Banks] environmental policies,
a combination of legal and institutional factors make environmental
analysis irrelevant for megaproject design and implementation in Mex-
ico. Also, misconceptions of the role of ELAs [Environmental Impact As-
sessments] obstruct proper application of environmental analyses .... 94
The authors went on to reveal that "given the way EIAs are being
applied in Mexico, cancellation of projects on the basis of EIAs is un-
likely... In reality, however, the Mexican bureaucracy maintains a re-
ductionist and partisan view toward the environment that hampers en-
vironmental regulations and observance and efficiency. ... "
91. According to Robert Wolf, a retired research analyst with the Congressional Re-
search Service, the Boise River Wildfire Recovery Project amounted to at least $15 million
in below-cost. Robert Wolf, Analysis of Boise River Fire Salvage (August 1995) (unpub-
lished paper, on file with authors).
92. Carnopis, supra note 65, at 1.
93. Ross, supra note 76, at 22.
94. International Lending and Resources Development in Mexico: Can Environ-
mental Quality be Assured? ECOLOGICAL ECONOMIST No. 5 (1992).
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Furthermore, "[D]ecisions are frequently unrelated to the perceived
needs of local communities or implementation differs completely from
whatever was planned.... ,,95
Contrary to the claims of BCC, environmental regulations in Mex-
ico are not as stringent as they are in the U.S.. If environmental policy
and enforcement between the two countries is similar, then how could
BCC reasonably expect to be able to clear cut old growth forests in
Guerrero without facing environmental challenges every step of the way
as it claims to be the case in the United States? Even if the laws were
the same, the commitment to enforcement is significantly different.
The entire budget in 1990 for environmental enforcement by the Secre-
tariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE), the agency charged
with enforcement for the entire country of Mexico, was less than six
percent of the budget of the State of Texas for hazardous waste and wa-
ter pollution cleanup.
96
Corporate Spin #4: BCC denies that its move to Mexico was de-
signed in part to take advantage of the significantly lower wage scale
prevailing there, compared to the wages BCC must pay for labor in the
United States.
According to a BCC spokesman, BCC "currently has production
plants in Tecpan, Papanoa, and Cocopa, where 187 local workers are
employed at rates ranging from $1 to $1.25 per hour when converted to
U.S. rates."97 'It sounds very low, but to those folks it is very welcome,'
Bartels said .... 98 Yet, El Financiero Internation Edition in a story on
logging Guerrero's forests stated that the base pay at the BCC mill in
Papanoa is $4.75 dollars a day.99 Even the $4.75 per day for a ten hour
day is "well above the Mexican minimum wage, but barely a 30th of
what Boise Cascade pays north of the border." 100 And, yet, BCC denies
heatedly that it is in Mexico to take advantage of low labor costs. 10 1 Si-
erra, the magazine of the Sierra Club, stood by its story when chal-
lenged.10
2
Corporate Spin #5: BCC denies that its logging in the State of
Guerrero is a "rip-and-run" operation. In an effort "to set the record
95. Id. at
96. C. Price, The Logging Industry: Environmental Laws, Environmental Issues 14
(Apr. 14, 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors) (citing J. Ward & G. T.
Prickett, Prospects for a Green Trade Agreement, 11 ENV'T., May, 1992, at 2.).
97. David Goins, Boise Cascade Sawmill In Mexico Gets Slow Start Due to Rain,
Roads, IDAHO BUS. REV., June 10, 1996, at 9A.
98. Id.
99. Ross, supra note 76, at 11.
100. Ross, Treasure, supra note 10, at 24.
101. Carnopis, supra note 87, at 1.
102. Richard B. Parrish, Letter to the Editor: Boise in Guerrero, SIERRA, Nov.-Dec.,
1996, at 12.
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straight," Richard Parrish, senior vice president of BCC's building
products division said "[w]e hope we're there (Guerrero) for a long, long
time. We have the wood bought, we think, for the next five years. But
we're hoping for longer than that."10 3 In a letter to the Sierra Club
magazine, Mr. Parrish also declared "[w]e (at BCC) believe that our
presence in Guerrero will be constructive by providing employment,
training, wages, and technical assistance in an otherwise depressed lo-
cal economy."
10 4
As early as June 6, 1996, John Ross, who was thoroughly de-
nounced by BCC spokesmen, claimed the Guerrero logging expansion
by BCC "has all the earmarks of a rip-and-run operation." 10 5 After all,
as Ross pointed out in interviews and in print, BCC had just leased the
production facilities for five years.1° 6 In February, 1998, Doug Bartels,
BCC Timber and Wood Products Division spokesman, disclosed in an
interview with local media that "the company is considering closing its
2-year old lumber operation in Papanoa, Mexico due to lack of adequate
timber supplies and market factors." Bartels said "[a] decision on the
Mexican mill probably will be made this year."10 7 Rumors had been cir-
culating in Guerrero that the Papanoa mill would shut down and not
reopen after the rainy season. 1° 8 Ironically, lack of timber supplies was
the reason BCC gave initially for closing the Council mill and going to
Mexico in the first place.
ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
John Ross's article in Sierra Magazine provoked an unusual writ-
ten response from BCC. In a letter over the signature of Richard B.
Parrish, Senior Vice President, BCC demanded an apology from John
Ross to "the people of Boise Cascade and the members of the Sierra
Club.. ." for "his utter disregard for the truth .... " 109 Ironically, the let-
ter from Parrish mistakes some of Ross's points. The editor of Sierra
Magazine stated that the magazine stood by Ross's report. An element
of dark humor can be found in an assertion that BCC, whose own dis-
tortions are detailed here, might be owed an apology for disregard of
truth.
One of the most respected business ethicists in the USA has seri-
103. Carnopis, Mexico Sawmill said just global strategy? ID. Bus. Rev. (Jan. 1, 1996)
at 1A and 15B.
104. Letters, SIERRA (Nov./Dec. 1996) at 12.
105. Interview with John Ross, in Boise Idaho (June 6, 1996) emphasis in original
statement.
106. Ross, Treasure of the Costa Grande, SIERRA, July/Aug. 1996, at 22.
107. Steven Anderson, BC to Upgrade Cascade Mill, ID Bus. Rev. (Feb. 9, 1998) at 9A.




ously argued that the primary purpose for being of a corporation is to
provide meaningful employment to its workers.11 0 In Guerrero, Mexi-
can laborers turn in 10 hour days in a mill lacking rudimentary safety
equipment11 ' for less than five dollars per day. BCC's "rip and run" ap-
proach to logging ' 12 in lesser developed nations (LDN's)113 is also re-
flected in its attitudes towards labor unions and in its callous disregard
for the damage its abuses of power cause in small communities.
A basic business ethics textbook states that we all have, at a mini-
mum, three moral duties to third parties: (a) non-injury; (b) truthful-
ness; (c) fairness. 114 Let us examine some of BCC's dealings with others
against the three-fold minimalist construct of good citizenship. In
breaking the Pacific Northwest strike (1978), the Rumsford, Maine
strike (1980), and the DeRidder, Louisiana strike (1884), BCC displayed
an eagerness to flex its economic muscle. Again, at Rumsford (1986)
and in International Falls (1988), threatening, coercing, and devastat-
ing small town labor forces was the order of the day. In 1989, not con-
tent with dictating labor contract terms to eight unions inside the mill,
BCC wanted to "turn the knife" in the open wound by having BE&K
run off the construction trade unions on the edge of Minnesota's Iron
Range, historically a bastion of union strength. At the very least, this
history displays a pattern and practice of abuse of economic power and
indifference to either injuring others or being fair. The Miller interview
in 1990 captures the essence of top management's arrogance and moral
blindness. The silencing of the media echoes the strong-arming of the
Minneapolis Star-Tribune in 1989. A mountain of evidence supports
the allegation that BCC has made a habit of abusing its vast economic
power.
Patricia H. Werhane, Dardin Chair in Business Ethics at the Uni-
versity of Virginia, developed the following six question protocol for de-
termining the social responsibilities of a TNC's activities:
How can one test whether a particular set of activities is required,
110. Norman E. Bowie, Challenging the Egoistic Paradigm, 1 BUS. ETHICS Q. 1, 19.
Professor Bowie holds the Anderson Chair in Business Ethics at the University of Minne-
sota, Twin Cities Campus.
111. See Minnesota Advocates, supra note 70, at 6-7. Ross reported seeing Mexican
workers at BCC mill in Papanoa working without hardhats, goggles or gloves around
equipment with open gears and chains. Further, Ross said instead of face
masks/breathing protection the Mexicans were wearing scarfs over their faces for the
dust.
112. The lease of the mill in Papanoa is for a term of five (5) years. See Ross, Treasure,
supra note 10, at 22.
113. Boise Cascade's wholly owned subsidiary, Costa Grande Forest Products, rents
two state-owned sawmills (INOGRO). The first at Papanoa and the second at nearby
Tecpan. See Ross, Logging Guerrero's Forest, supra note 76.
114. William H. Shaw, Business Ethics 290 (2d ed. 1996).
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desirable, or questionable as part of multinational social responsibility?
One might ask the following types of questions:
Is the set of activities necessary? "Necessity" is often defined as:
what is needed in order to do business in that community. But, in order
to justify engaging in allegedly socially responsible activities in a host
country a multinational must consider two other provisos: is the activity
necessary to redress harms created by the company and/or necessary
because of the laws and expectations of that community.[citation deleted.]
With these provisos one should ask:
Can the activity be carried out without interfering with the political
sovereignty or social fabric of the host country?
If this activity requires social change, can it be carried out without
social violence to the acceptable practices of that society? Or, more
simply put, would such a set of activities be acceptable to dispassionate
rational persons in that society, even when performed by "foreigners"?
Does this set of activities pass a "publicity" test? That is, can these
activities be made public in the community in which they occur? Can
they be made public internationally?
Does this set of activities coincide with, or not contradict, common
sense moral principles by which the corporation operates in its home
country?
Can such activities be conducted in cooperation with the host coun-
try or are there conflicts?
The sixth question is very important, because often one can engage
in socially responsible activities (or avoid morally questionable ones) by
making agreements with the host country .... 115
Later in the same article, Professor Werhane observes that in some
settings, not doing business is the morally superior choice:
[P]roblems of paternalism, political and social interference, threats
to national sovereignty, and lack of expertise are such that the moral
responsibility of a multinational corporation may be simply not to inter-
fere or even not to do business in a particular milieu.116
In the case of BCC's decision to log old growth forest in Guerrero
while shutting down the mills in Idaho, Washington, and Oregon, Wer-
hane's advice seems particularly appropriate. Environmental degrada-
tion, aggravation of guerrilla warfare, and trashing the economies of
Pacific Northwest communities can hardly be justified on a scale that is
115. Patricia H. Werhane, The Moral Responsibility of Multinational Corporations to
be Socially Responsible, quoted in JOSEPH R. DESJARDINS & JOHN J. MCCALL,




balanced only by a fistful of Yankee dollars. An issue that must be ad-
dressed by the global community is how to restrain abuses of economic
power such as BCC has demonstrated in the USA and Mexico. Our
analysis section will focus on the international aspects since these are
the most challenging and most serious issues.
PART II. REGULATING OR INFLUENCING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR IN A
GLOBAL MARKET.
Introduction.
An examination of BCC as a company that is assumed to be repre-
sentative of not only its industry but to some degree of US multination-
als raises several distinct issues. Labor rights and relations, environ-
mental concerns, and human rights are among them. Some aspects of
these issues involve legal considerations, some ethical and moral ones.
BCC disputes criticism of the ethics of its corporate practices. 117 It con-
tends that it has ceased some of its activities in the US and initiated
others in Mexico, not to take advantage of cheaper labor and lesser en-
vironmental standards and lax enforcement, but because of inadequate
timber supplies in the US and access to old growth timber in Mexico. It
is clear that labor is cheaper and the environment less protected in
Mexico and these advantages would have clearly been factored into any
decision to exploit Mexican opportunities. In deference to BCC, these
considerations however, may have been less significant, and perhaps
substantially so, when compared to that of access to raw materials.
There are many factors that may effect international location and
investment decisions. These include access to resources such as labor,
raw materials, infrastructure and technology. Access to markets of
products or services is also important, including the need to locate lo-
cally in order to avoid impenetrable or costly trade barriers. Several
factors relate directly to various costs including labor, taxation, trans-
portation and other utilities, and environmental and general govern-
ment regulation. While costs are an important factor, it should be
noted that the majority of foreign investment by US companies is in
117. In a presentation before the International Business Organization at Boise State
University, 18 March 1997, Terry R. Lock, Senior V.P International for BCC, depicted
BCC as a highly ethical corporation in its domestic as well as international activities. He
did acknowledge the difficulty of holding to such standards in the global marketplace
while BCC was committed to doing so. He cited for example, BCC's decision to halt ex-
isting practices of its new paper products joint venture partner in the PRC. After exten-
sive negotiations resulted in the venture in China, BCC learned that it had been the
common practice of its new partner to offer kickbacks in order to secure sales. The prac-
tice was quickly ended as a result of BCC demands resulting in an immediate loss of 90%
of sales, much of which has been since recovered without use of the practice.
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Canada, the European Union and Japan, countries with equivalent or
higher cost structures. Finally, the presence or absence of competition
will also be a factor. In and of itself, basing decisions on any one or
combination of these factors may be neither good, bad, nor condemna-
ble.
This does not, however, allay the fears and suspicions that labor
and environmental costs which would necessarily have been incurred in
the US can and have been avoided by the relocation of activities to
Mexico or elsewhere. BCC is not alone. There continues to be a sub-
stantial relocation of jobs to Mexico by US firms, some accompanied by
or possibly occurring as a result of labor factors. 118 To be sure, to the
extent that cost structures can be reduced, a firm will be more competi-
tive. One view of corporate responsibility is that a firm exists to create
jobs and make money for its investors; some circles dispute the former
and some the latter. 119 If a firm is not competitive, it will do neither
very well unless it enjoys captive or protected markets. The essence of
globalization, however, is that markets are not to be protected. 120 To-
day, US firms whether competing domestically or internationally are
subjected to often fierce competition from foreign firms, not only for in-
puts and markets but also for investment capital. In this environment,
cost structures and return on investment become critical to success. To
the extent then that US firms are governed by mandates or even volun-
tary additions to costs, they will be less competitive. In the domestic
arena, if all competing firms are subject to the same regulatory costs,
this is not a problem. However, even domestically, US firms may be
competing against imports from foreign firms who are not in their home
countries subject to similar levels of, for instance, labor and environ-
mental costs. This is likewise a problem in international markets.
BCC's conduct and that of any TNC should be held up to the light
of public scrutiny. Whether a firm's decision to locate or relocate in any
given country or region is seen to be "legitimate" will depend on how a
118. Early last year, Guess Inc., began moving a majority of its U.S. manufacturing to
Mexico and other countries south of the border following NLRB findings of evidence of
unfair labor practices. Guess' chairman and chief executive was quotes as saying that the
shift was mainly a "commercial decision" to "stay competitive" and "lower costs." He also
said the company saves $1.50 to $2.00 per garment by using foreign labor. Rhonda L.
Rhundle, Guess Shifts Apparel-Making to Mexico From Los Angeles Amid Labor Charges,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997, at A2. As another example, "members of the International
Union of Electrical Workers, stopped work yesterday to protest a steady shifting by the
No. 1 auto maker's Delphi Automotive Systems parts-making unit of labor-intensive work
to Mexico, where labor rates are lower." Gabriella Stern & Nichole M. Christian, GM
Workers Begin Strike At Parts Site, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1997, at A3.
119. See, e.g., Bowie, supra note 110.
120. This opening up of markets and allowing the free flow of capital will have, and to
some extent, already has had profound effects on societies. See, e.g., W. GREIDER, ONE
WORLD, READY OR NOT 333-59 (1997).
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society morally and legally defines the role of corporations. We may le-
gally define certain standards and morally expect other ones.1 21 If the
latter are not met we may decide to replace them with legal standards
to the extent such compulsion is possible and effective. Whether legal
compulsion is possible or effective will depend in part upon the exercise
of jurisdiction but it will also be affected by other constraints that a
corporation sees itself as being subject to. A corporation may perceive,
and perhaps rightly so in some cases, that its continued viability is de-
termined more by the lower cost structures of its competition than by
compliance with home country laws. While this may occur domesti-
cally, it is perhaps more possible when operating outside of the country.
Corporate personnel may be willing and even anxious to meet not only
legal but even higher moral standards in their conduct but in effect feel
that they are forced by the realities of corporate finance to meet the
competition at a lower cost level of behavior. This may also result in
capital or business flight to other countries in order to avoid US regula-
tion altogether, a problem equally as worrying as noncompliance.
Therefore, government attempts to realize minimum standards in labor
and the environment as well as other spheres of corporate activity must
also effectively address issues of competitiveness in the global market-
place.
It is misleading to try to treat this entire area generically. Obvi-
ously, not only do firms compete against each other for market share.
Workers compete against other workers, both in the same and other
countries, for jobs; and countries, or states within countries, compete for
investment and its attendant employment, technology and income gen-
eration. What is of primary concern herein is the efficacy of attempts
by governments to pursue public policies directed at business in a world
where national borders are increasingly less significant in defining cor-
porate conduct due to the effects of globalization. It must also be un-
derstood that this is not only a US versus nations with lower standards
problem. It is generally characterized, especially regarding labor and
environmental issues, as developed or advanced countries versus less
developed countries. However, even the US attracts substantial foreign
investment from other developed countries' multinational corporations
because of its relatively lower wage rates and less demanding workers
rights provisions.1 22
121. See Edmond Cahn, The Moral Decision: Right and Wrong in the Light of Ameri-
can Law (New Midland ed. 1981) (1955).
122. While European companies locate in the U.S. for a variety of the reasons listed
previously, one factor is its less costly and more flexible labor market. See Firm to Sell
US Unit at Center of Labor Flap, (visited June 3, 1997) <http://www.joc.com>, which
highlights the fact that European laws do not allow for the permanent replacement of
striking workers while it is possible in the U.S.
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Possible Spheres of Corporate Conduct and Direct Government Action.
For corporate conduct not likely to be self-generated, regulation
and enforcement are usually thought to be necessary. As discussed,
such voluntariness might be lacking due either to lack of corporate
moral imperative or, in spite of moral inclinations, due to overriding
competitive concerns or constraints. 123 In some instances, competitive-
ness will not be lost but merely diminished. In such cases, it might be
possible or encouraged that such corporations continue to hold to higher
standards whether or not such efforts have the effect of raising the
conduct of other corporate actors by offering competitive products with
the attendant moral, if not economic, advantages.
However, it remains that to the extent that regulatory constraints
impose new costs, e.g. taxes, or internalize previously externalized
costs, e.g. labor or environmental standards, there will be a corre-
sponding effect upon competitiveness. The degree of such effect will de-
pend upon the extent to which any resulting productivity or market
gains are not equivalent to such costs and to the extent that a signifi-
cant number of competitors are not also subject to such costs. 124 Uni-
lateral attempts to level the playing field by the regulatory imposition
of such costs upon foreign corporations in turn raises the issue of juris-
diction. The US has regularly pushed the limits of its own jurisdiction.
It has long been notorious for its extraterritorial reach in antitrust mat-
ters to the extent that many countries have often responded with their
own defensive legislation to impede compliance with US legislation and
procedures.125 This has also happened recently in response to the
123. David Korten, formerly of the Harvard Business School, argues that unless a
corporation is either not subject to competition or is privately owned and very socially
conscious, it is "virtually impossible to manage a corporation in a socially responsible
way." It will either be driven out of the market by less responsible competitors, subjected
to unfriendly takeover attempts or its management replaced by shareholder action seek-
ing quicker and larger returns on investment. Korten, supra note 8, at 26.
124. While it is possible that certain imposed or voluntary standards can have positive
productivity effects, for instance on worker morale and initiative or upon market share,
e.g. "dolphin safe," for the large part the major problems exist in areas where the resul-
tant "good" may be a predominantly public one where the firm is unable to capture suffi-
cient amounts of the social gain in order to fully offset its costs. This is clearly the case
with many environmental standards.
125. For instance, Australia enacted its Foreign Proceedings Act (1976) to prohibit co-
operation with foreign antitrust proceedings unless it has been determined that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction is consistent with international law, and its Foreign Antitrust Judg-
ments Act (1979) to restrict the enforcement of foreign judgments if such jurisdiction has
been exceeded and to allow a "clawback" judgment in Australia against any foreign firm
receiving satisfaction in whole or in part of such a foreign judgment against an Australian
firm. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & A.O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1086-89 (1995).
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Helms-Burton Law enacted by Congress in 1996.126
As it pertains to the area of commercial activity, jurisdiction under
international law usually rests upon either or both of the two most ac-
cepted principles of territoriality and nationality. Territoriality would
subject persons and things within a country's national territory to its
rule-making authority. Under the nationality principle, US jurisdiction
extends to US nationals, whether legal or natural persons, wherever
they may be. Under this principle, however, it has been contested
whether US jurisdiction applies to the conduct of foreign subsidiaries of
US corporations and less so for non-controlling US shareholder inter-
ests in foreign corporations.
127
Another basis for jurisdiction, the "effects doctrine," has not
achieved general acceptance in customary international law. 128 This
doctrine would bring conduct occurring outside the US but which causes
direct, foreseeable and substantial effects within US territory under the
jurisdiction of US authority. 129 The doctrine has been accepted by both
the US and the EU but, as might be expected, it is more broadly inter-
preted and applied by the US.130
The scope of commercial activity that might be the target of US or
other national legislation can be divided into several sectors. Activities
can include trade in goods, trade in services, technology transfers, in-
vestment (both active and passive), and cross border movement of per-
sons. For jurisdictional purposes, activity can also be divided as fol-
lows:
1. Activity within the US of US and Foreign Corporations;
126. Canada, Mexico and the EU have all enacted counter statutes in response to
Helms-Burton. See EU to Allow Countersuits to Foil U.S. Anti-Cuban Law, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 29, 1996, at A18; John Urquhart, Wall-Mart Pulls Cuban Pajamas from Canada,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1997, at A3.
127. See European Communities, Comments on the U.S. regulations concerning trade
with the U.S.S.R., 21 I.L.M. 891, 893 (1982) [hereinafter EC Comments].
128. Id.
129. The Supreme Court's most recent statement on the extraterritorial reach of anti-
trust law was in Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) where the Court
deemed it "well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that
was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States." Id. at 796. More recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals extended Hartford
to include criminal antitrust laws as well as civil actions. See United States v. Nippon Pa-
per Indus., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
130. In Wood Pulp, 1985 O.J. (L85) 1; Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 654 (1985), the
European Court of Justice appeared to add the requirement that a defendant must par-
ticipate in the implementation of the restrictive agreement, meaning actual activity
within the EC, in addition to such implementation having effects within the EC. The
ruling therefore fell short of the extent of jurisdiction exercised by U.S. courts. See An-
drew N. Volmer and John Byron Sandage, The Wood Pulp Case, 23 INT'L LAW. 721 (Fall
1989).
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2. Activity outside the US of US Corporations;
3. Activity outside the US of Foreign Corporations with direct eco-
nomic effects within the US either upon: competitors, consumers or citi-
zens generally;
4. Activity outside the US of Foreign Corporations with no direct
economic effects within the US.1
31
Categories 1 & 2132 present few problems of jurisdiction, though
both, and particularly #2, present the usual difficulties of detection and
enforcement. Both categories also present the problems of competitive-
ness. In #1, as regards trade in goods, competitiveness of US corpora-
tions vis a vis non-US corporations in US markets, can be effected
where imports from foreign corporations are not subject to similar
home-state cost requirements. 133 In #2, this competitiveness problem
also applies in foreign markets as to all commercial activities. Govern-
ment action in sphere #3134 based upon the "effects" doctrine, will in-
creasingly encroach upon sensitive issues of extraterritoriality, and cor-
respondingly interference with the sovereignty of trading partners.
Also in #3, as referred to above, where the US has applied regulations
to US foreign subsidiaries which are nonetheless foreign legal entities,
the nationality principle of jurisdiction has been contested. Finally, ab-
131. Activity outside the U.S. by U.S. corporations could also be divided into those ac-
tivities with (Category 3) and those without (Category 4) direct economic effects within
the U.S. Given the generally accepted jurisdiction over nationals of a country, however,
regardless of location, such a distinction is not necessary in the present discussion.
132. Examples of legislation under category #2 include the taxation of income derived
overseas by U.S. entities, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and Title VII which prohibits
discrimination by U.S. companies with regard to U.S. citizens under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. Title VII does not apply directly to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies but
does hold the U.S. company itself responsible for conduct engaged in by any foreign corpo-
ration that it "controls," which may be satisfied by a holding of a 25% of stock ownership.
Title VII Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109 , 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-78. This category would also
include the Clinton administration's recent ban on new US corporate investment in
Myanmar (Burma) for its government's harsh treatment of its democratic opposition. See
Eduardo LaChica and Paul M. Sherer, White House Fires Financial Salvo At Junta in
Burma, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997. The sanctions were imposed in May, WALL ST. J., 5-
21-97, page 1, column 1, and may have been effective at harming U.S. business interests
but not at changing Myanmar's government policies. Myanmar Sanctions Work, J. OF
COM., June 16, 1997, at 6A..
133. See infra text accompanying note 141.
134. This would include antitrust where anti-competitive behavior abroad effects con-
sumers in the U.S. through import trade, as well as conduct effecting U.S. exporters in-
jured in foreign markets. The extension to coverage of export trade with or without direct
harm to US consumers was effectuated in 1992 by the Justice Department. The authors
are unaware of any actions yet taken pursuant to the change. This category would also
include product liability actions in the U.S. against foreign producers which are resolved
under the "minimum contacts" test developed under the due process clause of the U.S.
Constitution. For both areas, the focus is upon impacts upon persons or things which
themselves are clearly within U.S. jurisdictional reach.
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sent clear multilateral support andlor clearly defensible human rights
or other jus cogens arguments, and often even with these arguments,
unilateral action under #4135 can be expected to draw strong opposition
from trading partners. 136 In categories #3 and #4, situations involving
U.S. controlling and non-controlling shareholding interests in foreign
corporations are especially difficult to deal with and rife with potential
jurisdictional conflict. This is increasingly true with the advances of
globalization and its attendant corporate structures.1
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Indirect U.S. Action.
To the extent that one country or even several countries acting in-
dependently cannot accomplish desired corporate compliance due to
problems of jurisdiction or due to reluctance resulting from perceived
impacts upon national competitiveness, the better forums would be in-
ternational ones aimed at restraining all or at least a critical mass of
135. An example includes the administration's use in 1982 of authority under the Ex-
port Administration Act to regulate exports produced overseas by US subsidiaries that
were bound for the Soviet Union in protest over its repression of the Solidarity movement
in Poland. The EC responded that this was in excess of US jurisdiction as was the
broader attempt to include less substantial links such as shareholding or licensing
agreement. See EC Comments, supra note 127. In contrast, the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act does not on its face include US controlled subsidiaries incorporated elsewhere.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1997). An example on the state level, would be the State of Massa-
chusetts' government procurement ban regarding firms doing business in Burma, and po-
tentially Indonesia. The EU initiated consultations in the WTO against the U.S. alleging
this constitutes a violation of the Government Procurement Agreement negotiated under
the WTO. See A State's Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997,
at 32; WTO HOMEPAGE at <http://www.wto.org>. Finally, under the Helms-Burton Law,
it is arguable whether "trafficking" within Cuba in property once nationalized by the Cas-
tro regime has a direct effect within the US even where US citizens have claims against
Cuba relative to that property, placing it within this category.
136. The Helms-Burton Act has been unanimously condemned by major US trading
partners in spite of US attempts to portray the central issue as pertaining to the funda-
mental principal of private property rights. An action in the WTO by the EU was sus-
pended only after guarantees by the Clinton administration that EU companies would not
be targeted by the legislation. See Bruce Barnard, EU Approves Accord with U.S. Over
Cuba, but Tensions Remain, J. OF COM., Apr. 17, 1997, at 2A. The jurisdictional reach of
Title VII, see supra note 132, seems a credible compromise solution in #4 situations. It is
1) tied to control which indicates the ability of a parent or shareholding company to effect
corporate conduct and is a justifiable nexus for accountability; and 2) it is enforced only
against the US parent or shareholding company resulting in a lesser extraterritorial im-
pact.
137. For instance, Sun Microsystems recently announced plans to supply advanced
encryption software from its overseas distributors to overseas customers. The software is
licensed from a Russian supplier in which Sun holds a 10% interest. U.S. export controls
prohibit the export of such products. The move illustrates not only corporate desire to
meet customer demands and not lose to foreign competition but also the limits of govern-
mental controls and jurisdiction. See David Bank, Sun's Selling of Encryption To Skirt
Policy, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1997, at A3.
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competitors. In these forums the US can attempt to encourage and/or
coerce other governments to directly regulate corporate activity within
their individual jurisdictions, whether or not such activity is reachable
by US jurisdiction. This would include both unilateral U.S. action, e.g.
granting favorable GSP tariff treatment in return for implementation of
labor and environmental standards, and action within multilateral fo-
rums. Useable multilateral forums might be either directly coercive
against target states where the resulting treaty or organization encom-
passes some sort of sanction powers, e.g. the World Trade Organization
(WTO), or morally (indirectly) coercive where no sanctions are avail-
able, e.g. the International Labor Organization (ILO) for labor issues or
various governmental and non-governmental organizations for human
rights. The balance of this part of the essay will focus on US attempts
to bring about a more level playing field internationally in the area of
labor rights with some reference to initiatives in the environmental and
other fields. U.S. government policies and actions might also be aimed
at changing foreign government's behavior itself and not just how they
regulate commercial activity, such as in the human rights area, how-
ever, this article will not focus on this use of US influence.
As one of the most potent sources of US leverage in international
bargaining is control over access to US markets, a necessary preface to
the following discussion is a brief review of GATTIWTO principles. The
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was an exercise
of sovereignty that bound member countries to an obligation of nondis-
crimination both as between similar products imported from different
GATT members (most favored nation treatment or MFN) and as be-
tween similar domestic and imported foreign products (national treat-
ment). Among the other "pillars" of GATT are a general prohibition of
resort to quantitative restrictions, including zero quotas (bans), trans-
parency with respect to domestic trade rules and processes, and a com-
mitment to certain procedures of dispute resolution. These principles
surround and further the central GATT activity of periodic negotiation
of reciprocal reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. In 1995, the
GATT, following the eight year Uruguay Round negotiations, was ab-
sorbed under the umbrella of the new World Trade Organization (WTO)
but maintained its essential characteristics with improved dispute
resolution procedures. In addition, other economic sectors such as
standards for trade in services and intellectual property protection were
added to the WTO's scope applying principles similar to the GATT.
The GATT provides for various exceptions to its disciplines. 138
138. These include, among others, preferential tariff treatment between members of a
free trade area, e.g. NAFTA, or customs union, e.g. the EU, and several general excep-
tions including actions necessary for the protection of human, animal and plant life and
health and for the conservation of domestic resources.
VOL. 26:3
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION
However, the burden of proving the applicability of any exception used
to justify otherwise GATT inconsistent behavior is on the member state
claiming the exception. If GATT disciplines otherwise apply and an ex-
ception to them cannot be sustained, the discriminatory treatment of
certain products for instance, if challenged in the WTO dispute resolu-
tion process, will be held to be in violation of GATTIWTO obligations.
This will lead to either the voluntary cessation of such conduct or the
freedom of injured complainant countries to respond with the removal
of equivalent trade benefits.' 39 As a result, attempts by the US or any
WTO member country to reduce or close existing access to its markets
must either fall outside of GATTIWTO application or be sustainable
under one of the GATT exceptions. With regard to nondiscrimination,
on the key threshold question of the applicability of MFN and national
treatment obligations, the issue of the similarity of products is often
critical. 140 If a rug made by the use of child labor bears no physical
characteristics to distinguish it from any other rug, it cannot be treated
differently absent the application of an exception to the nondiscrimina-
tion obligations. If imported paper is produced by environmentally un-
sustainable practices but such production does not render the paper
physically distinguishable, it cannot be treated differently than paper
produced through environmentally friendly processes. Similarly, if im-
ported tuna is caught by use of dolphin killing purse seine nets, as it is
the same as tuna caught with dolphin friendly techniques, it cannot be
singled out for different treatment. This results in the inability of WTO
members to discriminate on the basis of processes of production unless
physical characteristics of the product are changed as a result and thus
reduces the freedom to institute unilateral sanctions against products
running afoul of domestically determined public policy standards, e.g.
labor and environmental standards.141
139. See generally WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes.
140. The specific language is "like product", employed in Articles 1.1 (regarding MFN),
3.2 and 3.4. (regarding national treatment). The term is not defined except in the Anti-
dumping Code, Art. 2.6, where it is "interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e.
alike in all respects" or in the absence of such a product, one that "has characteristics
closely resembling .. " This definition, and the understanding of the term in other con-
texts, such as MFN and national treatment, prohibits treating products or producers of
those products differently unless a distinction between the products can be made on the
basis of physical characteristics.
141. Therefore, while domestically, the US can regulate and control a) "products," e.g.
safety and health standards for both domestic and imported products, and b) domestically
occurring "processes," e.g. sustainable logging, pollution abatement, and labor standards,
it cannot, under its WTO obligations, control processes used to produce imports in foreign
countries, e.g. dolphin unfriendly tuna fishing, turtle unfriendly shrimping, clearcut lum-
ber practices, and production of refrigerators with uncontained CFCs. While the US does
continue to maintain certain indirect controls on foreign processes by way of controlling
the access of resulting products to US markets, e.g. regarding dolphins and tuna caught
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
It should be stressed that GATT/WTO obligations do not directly
prevent a country, such as the US, from acting in a manner inconsistent
with such obligations. The US, for instance, currently maintains GATT
inconsistent bans on tuna. 142 It does mean, however, that there is a
price that attaches to such exercises of sovereignty, namely that coun-
tries denied market access benefits as a result of such practices may ul-
timately, through resort to WTO procedures, be allowed to retaliate
with the removal of equivalent market access benefits enjoyed by US
products. Due to the fact that the US has for a long time been one of
the world's most accessible markets, this quite often hampers U.S. at-
tempts to take action.
This reinforces the position that multilaterally agreed upon solu-
tions consistent with or overriding GATTIWTO obligations, for control-
ling corporate behavior are again the better approach. It must be added
that the clear trend is towards expanding the scope of internationally
agreed solutions to trade and other problems, both through the WTO
and other forums. The WTO, as mentioned, has substantially expanded
the application of GATT principles to include trade in services, agricul-
tural products and intellectual property. Current initiatives would see
global agreements on investment barriers, competition policy, corrup-
tion and labor standards, though clearly not all of these are aimed at
controlling corporate behavior.
with purse seine nets, such controls have twice been held to be in violation of pre-WTO
US GATT obligations. See United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna From Mixico,
39th Supp. BISD 155 (1993); General Agreement On Tariffs & Trade: Dispute Settlement
Panel Report On United States Restrictions On Imports Of Tuna 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
While these two GATT panel decisions were never adopted by the body as a whole, they
do establish strong precedent. The U.S. currently maintains import bans on shrimp har-
vested in the wild without the use of "turtle excluder devices." This is now the subject of a
WTO dispute panel proceeding on a complaint by Thailand and others against the U.S.
Given the different procedures under the WTO agreement as opposed to its weaker prede-
cessor, the GATT, any panel report holding the U.S. attempt to control such production
processes as a violation of WTO obligations will be binding. The panel decision is ex-
pected in late 1997. On the other hand, the US has threatened WTO action to oppose
French barriers to US and Canadian fur goods where the animals have been caught by
the use of leghold traps, also a "process" problem. EU demands new talks on trapping, 1,
No. 5 BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE DIGEST NEWS (INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE &
DEVELOPMENT), Mar. 4, 1997, <http//www.ictsd.org>. In all these cases, the products
themselves bear no physical characteristics indicating the manner of processing and
hence are indistinguishable from other like products. It is this factor that, under the
GATT/WTO agreements, prevents discrimination based upon the origin of the goods, the
processes used to make them and their producers.
142. In February 1998, the US reached an agreement with 12 other countries under
which it would lift its ban on tuna for any country that ratifies the new agreement. The
agreement seeks to limit annual dolphin mortality incurred during tuna fishing in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. U.S. trading partners reach tuna-dolphin agreement, 2,




Efforts to "level" the playing field (influencing foreign corporations
indirectly through encouragement or agreement among national gov-
ernments to regulate them) include the following tools and/or forums:
Unilateral
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) [US, EU and most devel-
oped countries]
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) [US]
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) [US] and Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) [World Bank]
U.S. Trade Act of 1974, Section 301
Antidumping/countervailing duties
Unilateral imposition of sanctions based upon other statutory
authority
Multilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
EU Social Charter
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
World Bank
World Trade Organization (WTO)
International Labour Organization (ILO)
Other





Labeling Schemes (e.g. "dolphin safe", "global social label")
As similarly reflected in the exercise of jurisdiction, the U.S., is far
and away the most active in these areas. It has tied various preferen-
tial benefits, primarily directed at developing countries, to compliance
with certain minimum labor standards. Access to lower tariffs through
the US Generalized System of Preferences 143 or the Caribbean Basin
143. For instance, so far in 1997, the USTR has initiated GSP eligibility reviews for
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Recovery Act, or subsidized investment insurance through the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation or the Multilateral Investment Guar-
antee Agency44 is made conditional 4 5 upon the extension of "interna-
tionally recognized worker's rights" by the target country.
As of 1994, the EC has also conditioned its GSP benefits upon the
absence of the use of forced labor and the export of goods made by
prison labor. Mayanmar is currently under GSP denial for the use of
forced labor in road and irrigation works construction and other mili-
tary projects. 146 In 1998, the EC GSP scheme will provide additional
preferences to beneficiary countries adopting and applying the equiva-
lent of ILO standards for specified worker's rights. 14
7
Additionally, the US has added to its Section 301 trade weapon by
recognizing the systematic denial of such rights as an unfair trade prac-
tice subject to countermeasures where US commerce is burdened or re-
stricted irrespective of whether it would be justified under the
GATT/WTO. There has been no action under this section to date with
regard to worker's rights.148 Also, by some analyses in theory but not
yet attempted in practice, antidumping and countervailing duties might
be applied to imports where those products are under-priced as a result
of the non-inclusion of adequate labor or environment-related costs due
to inadequately mandated or enforced standards. 49 Notable among
Guatemala, Belarus and Swaziland due to allegations of worker's rights abuses. Press
Releases, United States Trade Representatives Homepage (visited May 1997)
<http://www.ustr.gov/>.
144. With regard to MIGA benefits, this is accomplished through the US implementing
legislation where US agents are required to exert such pressure and influence as possible
to deny benefits to countries not recognizing such rights. MIGA itself, as part of the
World Bank institutions, does not tie the provision of insurance to respect for labor stan-
dards. 22 U.S.C. § 290k-2(1) (1994)
145. The "worker's rights" conditions are discretionary with the President who may
waive them in regard to any country if he determines it to be in the national economic in-
terest of the US. 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1994).
146. Michael Vatikiotis, Grim Reaping, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 8, 1996, at 48, avail-
able in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Abi File; William Barnes, Burma on Knife Edge, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 27, 1996, at 7, available in LEXIS, Topnws Library, Schina File.
147. These include freedom of association, collective bargaining and child labor. "The
actual implementation of these incentives, as well as the level of the supplementary pref-
erential margin, will depend on a 1997 Commission report on the results of work on trade
and labour standards carried out in the ILO, the WTO, and the present OECD study."
COM/DEELSArD(96)8, on OLIS: January, 19, 1996, para. 296 [hereinafter OECD Re-
port].
148. Exec. Order No. 12661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (1988) [hereinafter Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act]. It is questionable in any event whether sanctions imposed under
Section 301 for labor standards reasons would be consistent with GATTIWTO obligations
if challenged under its dispute resolution procedures as there is no clearly applicable ex-
ception.
149. See Mark A. Buchanan, The WTO and Labour Standards: A Marriage Made in
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other statutorily mandated sanctions is a ban on the importation of
prison made goods'50 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act under
which the US has banned importation of both dolphin unfriendly tuna
and turtle unfriendly shrimp.
1 51
The labor and environmental side agreements to NAFTA require
each member country to enforce its own domestic labor and environ-
mental laws. These agreements were specifically intended to discour-
age US businesses from moving to Mexico to take advantage of Mexico's
lax enforcement of its labor and environmental laws but the effective-
ness of these agreements is widely criticized.1 52 Anticipated extension
of NAFTA to other Latin American countries, notably Chile, has been
held up by the expiration of the Clinton administration's fast track ne-
gotiating authority. The non-renewal of fast track authority has been
due to the insistence on the part of the administration that such
authority include the power to negotiate labor and environmental obli-
gations as part of any new agreements. This has been strongly resisted
by Republicans. 153 Democratic factions within the House led by Con-
gressman Gephardt have resisted extension of NAFTA, and therefore
fast track authority, and strongly resisted the grant of any fast track
authority that did not make specific reference to labor and environ-
mental issues. Furthermore, acceptance by unions, an important
Clinton ally, of any fast track provision without labor and environment
authority, is unlikely. 154
Indications are that Clinton might be willing to risk alienation of
the unions as well as some within his own party in return for being able
to work toward the expansion of NAFTA.155
Singapore, in THE ASIA-PACIFIC AND THE EXPANDING BORDERS OF THE WTO:
IMPLICATIONS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 190-92 (Mark A Buchanan ed., 1996)
[hereinafter LABOUR STANDARDS].
150. Recent press over imports from China made by prison labor highlights the diffi-
culty of enforcing this ban. J. OF COM. (May23, 1997) <http://www.joc.com>. Restrictions
on import of products of prison labor are permissible under GATT, Art. XX(e).
151. See supra note 141.
152. See NAFTA Labor Accord Not Working Well, 4, No. 4 NAFTA AND INTER-AM.
TRADE MONITOR, Feb. 21, 1997, <http://www.sustain.orglbulletins>. There has, however,
recently been evidence that the Agreement is having some indirect effect. Tom Shorrock,
Mexico Approves Union at Taiwan-Owned Firm, J. OF COM., Apr. 18, 1997, available
in1997 WL 8547444.
153. Helen Cooper, Clinton Seeks More Leeway in Trade Pacts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1,
1997, at A3.
154. AFL-CIO, Green Groups Call for Stricter Conditions on Fast Track, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 21, 1997.
155. See Mexico Approves Union at Taiwan-Owned Firm, J. OF COM., Apr. 18, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 8547444; Belo Horizonte, Pan-American Free Trade: Slow, but
Ahead, ECONOMIST, May 24, 1997 at 35, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library. The Presi-
dent has offered to accept fast track authority that allows labor and environmental issues
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Impacting upon all other forums is the debate that has proceeded
within the WTO. For many years, the U.S. has attempted to bring a
trade and labor standards linkage into the world's leading trade asso-
ciation. 156 In December, 1996, at the first biannual Ministerial Meeting
following the establishment of the WTO, the U.S. mounted a campaign
to create a formal role for the institution in the enforcement of core la-
bor standards. 157 This move envisioned the possible resort to trade
sanctions where a country could show injury as a result of the disregard
of core labor standards by exporting countries. The move was widely
opposed by developing countries as well as by many developed countries
as a protectionist attempt to remove comparative advantages in low
cost labor and as an intrusion into their national sovereignty. The
Ministerial Declaration that resulted from the meeting appears on its
face to preclude the establishment of any formal linkage between trade
and labor standards within the WTO framework and recognized the
ILO as the appropriate forum for the discussion and for the formulation
of appropriate responses.15s
As a result, the ILO, established in 1919, has been given a new
lease on life. 159 Long before the Singapore meeting, while doing credible
work, it was regarded by many as a toothless tiger. US objections were
generally twofold. First, ILO conventions were too numerous as well as
too inflexible. The US, while maintaining that its own laws and labor
regulations were consistent with recognized human and worker rights
and even exceeded ILO standards, could ratify only a few of the ILO
conventions, stating that many of the rest were in some part inconsis-
to be dealt with in side agreements similar to the arrangement in NAFTA. Robert S.
Greenberger, Clinton to Delay Fast-Track Trade Bill Until Fall, WALL ST. J., May 23,
1997, at A2. This however would not go well with Vice President Gore's presidential am-
bitions for 1998. Id. As of January, 1998, there were indications that the President might
seek fast track authority to negotiate on sectoral-specific agreements and/or to drop
NAFFA accessions from the authority sought. Fast Track Maneuvers Continue, 5, NO. 1
NAFTA AND INTER-AM. TRADE MONITOR, (Jan. 9, 1998) <http://trade-news@igc.apc.org>.
156. LABOUR STANDARDS, supra note 149, at 180-82.
157. Core labor standards are fairly well accepted to include freedom of association,
rights to organize and collectively bargain, prohibition of child labor, forced labor and dis-
crimination in employment.
158. The Declaration did, however, provide for the continued "collaboration" of the
WTO and ILO secretariats, an ambiguous statement that appears to validate some WTO
involvement in the future. Ministerial Declaration (visited Feb. 28, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org>.
159. "However, since the final Declaration of Singapore has turned over the whole
question almost exclusively to the ILO, this particular debate [in the WTO] would now
seem to be closed for the foreseeable future. So what exactly are we going to do?" Address
at the Conference on Social Policy and Economic Performance by Michael Hansenne, Di-




tent with US law and practice. 160 Second, the ILO had no mechanism to
hold even signatory countries to the standards required. The US
sought greater accountability and therefore believed that the WTO
would provide a more useful mechanism to directly link labor standards
and trade sanctions.
As the debate within the context of the WTO escalated, the ILO be-
gan to deliberate on how it might meet the stated concerns and raise its
game. The ILO Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liber-
alization of International Trade had been constituted in 1995 in part to
examine the relationship between trade and labor standards. In 1996,
it resolved to continue to monitor and interact with other international
organizations working in the field and to examine the report of the
OECD on trade and labor standards. 161 This OECD report was primar-
ily focused on analyzing current economic data on the link between core
labor standards, comparative advantage and impacts on employment
and investment. 162
Following the 1996 WTO Ministerial Meeting, the ILO has resolved
to focus stepped up efforts begun in 1995 on increasing the number of
signatories to the seven ILO Conventions relating to core labor stan-
dards. 163 An initiative taken up at the annual meeting of the ILO Gov-
erning Body in March, 1997, proposed the extension of the ILO's sur-
veillance mechanism, currently authorized only in the area of freedom
of association rights, to the other core labor standard conventions.164
This mechanism would verify the application of core conventions in sig-
natory countries, whether having ratified them or not. 165 As recognized
by the ILO, these initiatives will test the sincerity of those nations who
opposed WTO involvement claiming that the ILO was the appropriate
160. Because of this, the US suffers from a credibility gap. It leads the ILO in drafting
and signing conventions but then fails to lead the way in ratification. A similar credibility
gap exists in the area of international environmental conventions. See Carmelo Ruiz,
WTO Singapore '96 Conference Report, (Feb. 8, 1997) <http://www.trade-
strategy@igc.apc.org>; see also Chakravarthi Raghavan, Barking Up the Wrong Tree:
Trade and Social Clause Links (visited Feb. 28, 1998)
<http://www/twnside.org.sglsouths/twn/title/tree-ch.htm>.
161. The ILO Working Party had released its own report on trade and labor standards
but had failed to reach an internal consensus on how the issue should be dealt with. See
The Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of World Trade, International Labour Office,
GB.261.WP/SLD/1, Nov. 1994.
162. See OECD REPORT, supra note 147. The Report later failed to receive ministerial
acceptance but was issued under the authority of the Secretariat.
163. Hansenne, supra note 159. The seven conventions relate to freedom of associa-
tion, rights to organize and collective bargaining, prohibition of child and forced labor and
discrimination in employment.
164. Michael Hansenne, Report of the Director-General, The ILO, Standard Setting
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forum.166 They may also dissuade the US from pushing the issue in the
WTO as long as the initiatives seem to be well received by other coun-
tries. If the ILO is not successful in gaining widespread acceptance of
core labor standards, then a return to the WTO will depend upon the
strength of sponsorship in the U.S., France, the U.K.167 and elsewhere.
Another move has been separately taken by the U.S. within the
WTO framework. The USTR has begun to raise labor standards as an
issue within the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Under this
procedure, the trade policies and practices of WTO member countries
are periodically reviewed for consistency with WTO obligations. 168 La-
bor standards were first raised by the US in April of 1997, in the review
of Fiji 169 and indications are that it will be raised by the U.S. whenever
it is deemed appropriate. The TPRM is not intended to be an enforce-
ment mechanism but does serve to highlight troublesome areas in the
international forum.
Codes of Conduct.
Corporate codes of conduct, although not a new phenomenon, have
regained public attention lately. We examine them here only briefly
due to their voluntary and non-binding nature. Voluntary codes of
conduct, such as product labeling schemes, are often designed to ad-
dress consumer demands for more product information as well as im-
proved standards of business conduct. Codes exist somewhere between
binding legislation and internal corporate guidelines. They carry
varying degrees of public accountability, corporate commitment, and
rarely sanctions.
Codes of conduct can also issue from international organizations,
such as the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations 170 and the OECD
166. Hansenne, supra note 159.
167. At the same time that the US Administration appears to be cooling relative to the
trade and labor standards linkage, Tony Blair, Britain's new Prime Minister, has indi-
cated that signing on to the EU's Social Charter, a decidedly pro-worker agreement, will
be a priority for the new government. George Melloan, Tony and Bill: Oxford's Gift to the
211' Century, WALL ST. J., Apr.28, 1997, at A19. This could also indicate future U.K. sup-
port for a more global workers rights agreement.
168. While the TPRM's purpose is to "contribute to improved adherence.. to [WTO]
rules, disciplines and commitments," within which labor standards would not currently
fall, the function of the mechanism is to evaluate "the full range" of a member's trade poli-
cies and practices and "their impacts" on the multilatereal trading system. WTO Trade
Policy Review Mechanism, Paragraph A(i).
169. See, e.g., Review of Fiji: Concluding Remarks by the Chairperson, TPRB, Oct. 4,
1997, available in WTO Homepage, <http://www.wto.org>.
170. The UNCTAD Code has been in draft form since 1980. It was part of the move
within the United Nations towards a new international economic order (NIEO) and
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Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 171 They can exist on national
levels, such as in the U.S., e.g., the Sullivan Principles, related to the
anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa, the MacBride Principles for
doing business in Northern Ireland, and the Macquiladora Principles
for manufacturing processes across the Mexican border.
The Clinton Administration issued its voluntary Model Business
Principles which encourage business in "upholding and promoting ad-
herence to universal standards of human rights." The Principles relate
to workers rights, the environment, corruption and fair competition.
They specifically encourage U.S. companies to serve as models, influ-
encing partners, suppliers and subcontractors, and to develop appropri-
ate internal codes of conduct in supplement.
Codes sometimes are promulgated by industries. In April, 1997, a
White House task force comprised of labor unions, human and con-
sumer rights groups and apparel industry leaders, concluded a tenta-
tive draft of a code of conduct on workers rights and child labor. The
code also addresses the issue of minimum wage and would apply to
clothing firms and their contractors, whether producing in the U.S. or
elsewhere. Companies adopting the code would be able to use a "no
sweat[shop]" label on products. Substantial disagreement continues
over implementation, enforcement and whether the code would call for
a "living wage" rather than meeting each location's prevailing minimum
wage. Enforcement options range from a newly created association to
monitor compliance to internal audits. Actual monitoring of the hun-
dreds of contractors in other countries will be very difficult. Companies
signing the agreement include Nike, Phillips Van Huesen and Reebok,
each of which have faced allegations of human and workers rights
abuses in recent months. 172
Finally, like many companies, BCC has its own "Standards of
Business Conduct." 173 These standards cover employee compliance with
laws and regulations regarding health and safety, equal opportunity
gained little momentum outside of the Group of 77 countries. Perhaps its languish fol-
lowing the relative height of the NIEO movement reflects the simultaneous shift of eco-
nomic leverage to capital interests.
171. The OECD Guidelines include statements of principle regarding MNE behavior in
disclosure of information, competition, employment, environment and other areas.
172. See, e.g., Wendy Bounds & Hillary Stout, Sweatshop Pact: Good Fit or Thread-
bare, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1997, at A2; Apparel Groups Find Proper Fit On Labor Rights
(April 14, 1997) <http://www.joc.com>; Dress Code: Stamping out Sweatshops,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 19, 1997.
173. Copy of Boise Cascade Corporation's Standards of Business Conduct (Mar. 21,
1997) (on file with authors and the Communications Department of Boise Cascade Corpo-
ration). The entire document is four (4) pages long and opens with this sentence: "Boise
Cascade's policy is to conduct its business ethically and in compliance with all applicable
laws of the United States and of each jurisdiction where it does business." Id. at 1.
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and minimum wage, the environment, antitrust and foreign payments.
Compliance, monitoring and enforcement are strictly internal affairs.
174
Some research suggests that corporate codes of conduct are frequently
top-down documents designed primarily to protect the corporation if
employees are caught committing white collar crimes. 175 We are not
familiar with any research showing a causation effect between corpo-
rate codes of conduct and better ethical conduct on the part of either
management or employees.
If a corporation needed a guide on how to act in a foreign country, it
could do worse than study the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 and
which became the basis for The International Bill of Human Rights,
ratified by member nations in 1976.176 In 1977, President Carter, on
behalf of the United States, signed the two international covenants on
human rights which, together with the Universal Declaration, make up
the International Bill of Human Rights. 177
The Environment and other Developments.
Similar, and in some cases more extensive, developments are tak-
ing place regarding international environmental issues. This includes
the array of multinational environmental agreements such as the better
known Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(CITIES), the Basil Convention on Transboundary Movements of Haz-
174. The Boise Cascade Standards are available from the Corporate Communications
Department, Boise Cascade Corporate Headquarters, One Jefferson Square, Boise, Idaho
83702 U.S.A. Id.
175. See, e.g., Rick Wartzman, Nature or Nurture? Study Blames Ethical Lapses on
Corporate Goals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1987, at 27. The article states "A Washington State
University survey of ethical codes at 202 Fortune 500 companies found that 75 percent
fail to address the firm's role in civic and community affairs. In addition, three-quarters
of the codes fail even to mention some or all of the following: consumer relations, envi-
ronmental safety and product safety. By contrast, more than three-quarters of the codes
deal with conflicts of interest - which can affect the bottom line." Id.
176. The following three instruments constitute the International Bill of Human
Rights: Universal Declaration of Human Rights; International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and the International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights (ICCPR). See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 211t Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6136 (1966); Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21" Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A16136 (1966).
177. ). See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21 s, Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6136 (1966); International




ardous Wastes, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer. While the efficacy of these and other various interna-
tional agreements is in dispute, the trend discussed above in respect of
labor rights is similarly evident here. Recent events include the nego-
tiation of a global warming treaty178 and the call by Environment Min-
isters from 19 countries for a global convention on forest protection that
would establish a worldwide regulatory framework applying to both de-
veloped and developing countries. 179
Unrelated to labor or the environment but quite relevant to the dis-
cussion of government control of corporate conduct, is recent advances
in the U.S. campaign against bribery. The U.S., of course, has pursued
this to the full extent of its jurisdiction through the 1977 Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act. However, the constraints of this Act have long been
blamed for hindering U.S. competitiveness abroad as other countries do
not seek to limit bribery by their corporations acting abroad and even
facilitate it by allowing the deductibility of payments to foreign officials
against income. In December of 1997, the 29 OECD member countries
and 5 non-member countries signed a binding convention to criminalize
the bribing of foreign officials with domestic implementation to be ac-
complished by the end of 1998.180 Previously, at the request of the U.S.,
corruption had also been on the agenda of the 1996 WTO Ministerial
Meeting in the closely related context of government procurement. The
WTO members agreed to establish a working party to explore transpar-
ency in government procurement which could include the effects of cor-
ruption. A leveling of the playing field in this area is expected to bene-
fit U.S firms. 181
In summary, while the US has clearly led in efforts to regulate cor-
porate and commercial behavior both domestically and internationally,
in an increasingly globalized economy such efforts run aground on is-
sues of jurisdiction, competitiveness and capital flight. International
solutions in international forums are needed. As a caveat, however, it
must be understood that international forums are also being used in ef-
forts to resist local control or regulation of corporate behavior. 182 To
178. See, e.g., John J. Fialka, Global Warming Treaty Faces Host of Political Clouds,
WALL ST. J., May, 27 1997, at A20.
179. International Environmental Report, BNA, 2 April 1997.
180. See, e.g., Paul J. Deveney, 34 Nations Sign Accord to End Bribery in Deals, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 18, 1997, at A16; see also, Nicholas Bray, OECD Ministers Agree to Ban Brib-
ery As Means for Companies to Win Business, WALL ST. J, May 27, 1997, at A2.
181. William M. Daley, The Battle Against Bribery, WALL ST. J, Dec. 17, 1997, at A22.
182. For instance, one of the more recent initiatives in the OECD is the draft of the
OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAJ). Multilateral Agreement on Invest-
ment, OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(97) 114, (1997). Recent drafts are now available at
<http://www.oecd.org/da7/cmis/mai/negtext.htm>. This agreement, which would be open
for signature to both OECD and non-OECD countries (though none are invited to partici-
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this extent, public policy processes are as apparent in these forums as
in domestic ones and actual outcomes are dependent upon the relative
power of various constituencies and interest groups. The battle is
merely being extended to another level where the immediate parties are
nations and where TNCs and non-government organizations are back-
room players. This is perhaps only logical given the nature of globaliza-
tion. However, some observers from the environmental side claim that
in "every case brought before it to date, the WTO has ruled in favour of
corporate interest, striking down national and sub-national legislation
protecting the environment and public health at every turn."18 3
PART III. SUMMARY OF POSSIBLE REFORM ALTERNATIVES.
Our examination of the manner in which TNC's operate, empha-
sizing BCC as prototypical and neither the best nor the worst, causes us
to agree with David Korten's assessment: Corporations have emerged
as the dominant force on the planet earth; and that it is the corporate
interest rather than the human interest that increasingly defines the
agenda of municipal corporations, nation-states, and international
pate in its drafting), is aimed at investment protection and sets standards that protect
traditional investor rights, prohibits discrimination (both through most favored nation
and national treatment obligations), expropriation, investment incentives and perform-
ance requirements. It would also provide for direct action by investors against host coun-
tries through international arbitration or in domestic courts. Even in the US, the primary
proponent of the agreement, it is recognized as having serious implications for sovereignty
and will curtail the powers of both national and subnational governments. See Multilat-
eral Agreement on Investment: Potential Effects on State and Local Government, Western
Governor's Association Rep., (1997) <http://www.westgov.orglwga/publicatmaiweb.htm>.
The draft treaty was originally scheduled for completion for the meeting of the OECD
Ministers in May, 1997, but was extended to due to a "number of political issues: that had
yet to be resolved. Frans Engering, Keynote Address, available in Multilateral Agreement
on Investment: State of Play, at 10, OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(97) 114 (1997). The draft
agreement does not currently contain any language imposing responsibilities on investors,
for instance with regard to fair competition, treatment of workers or environmental pro-
tection. There has been some discussion of including references to the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises in the agreement's preamble but without changing their
voluntary nature. See Barbara Griffiths, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises and Environment and Labour Issues, available in Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment: State of Play, at 42-43, OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(97) 114 (1997). The WTO Minis-
terial Declaration following the December, 1996, WTO meeting resolved to establish a
working group to study the relationship between trade and investment. The working
group first met in June of 1997. The idea of an MAI, both within the OECD and the
WTO, has been seriously challenged as adverse to developing county interests. See Bha-
girath Lal Das, A Critical Analysis of the Proposed Investment Treaty in the WTO, avail-
able in Third World Network, <http://www.twnside.org.sg/souths/twnltitle/ana-ch.htm>;
MAI Homepage of The Preamble Center for Public Policy
<http://www.RTK.NET.80/preamble/mai/maihome.html>.
183. Simon Retallack, The WTO's Record So Far - Corporations: 3, Humanity and the
Environment: 0, ECOLOGY, Jul.-Aug. 1997, at 136.
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bodies.18 4 As William Greider suggested in metaphors, the storm is al-
ready upon us because the machinery of modern capitalism "driven by
the imperatives of a global industrial revolution" is out of control and
promises to spew forth vast changes that will "destabilize" political or-
der in every corner of the planet. 185 Our assessment is that TNC's can-
not be effectively regulated in their activities because the nation-states
lack effective long-arm jurisdiction and that the international law
mechanisms currently in place are ineffective.186 Thus, without reform,
we should expect capital to flow to countries where labor and natural
resources are both abundant, cheap, and not protected by regulation
from abuse or exploitation; or, as is the case in Mexico and most of
Southeast Asia, capital will flow to countries where laws are on the
books but are either unenforced or selectively enforced and where gov-
ernment officials are corrupt. The exporting of jobs and capital will
cause other nation-states to provide tax breaks and amend environ-
mental and labor laws so as to become "competitive," and all of these so-
called reforms will be defended as required by the "forces of the mar-
ketplace." The race to the bottom will be on.
Firms that disregard the welfare of labor also seem to be quite ca-
pable of disregarding the health of the environment; the air we breathe
and the water we drink. BCC has demonstrated a pattern and practice
of abusing its vast economic powers in the pursuit of profits. This ex-
ample suggests that current regulations of TNC's are inadequate and
that some significant legal reforms are desperately needed. While we
do not gainsay the problems of abuse of economic power within the
USA, we believe that any triage-type analysis would mandate that in-
ternational restraints be looked at as well.
An initial step might be to address the power imbalances currently
existing between large corporations and labor. The literature in this
184. See supra note 8.
185. Greider, surpa note 8, at 11-12.
186. Frequently, the jobs versus environmental safeguard dichotomy urged on voters
and consumers by the extractive industries is much too simplistic. The global economy is
extremely complex and generates consequences far beyond the anticipated ones of current
regulations. For example, the two-week shut-down of all the mills owned by Slocan For-
est Products Ltd. Of Vancouver, B.C., Canada's biggest lumber producer, was prompted
by the interaction of the quotas contained in the two-year-old Canada-U.S. softwood lum-
ber agreement and a decline in Japanese housing starts touched off by an increase in the
Japanese consumption tax. Since Japan is by far the biggest Asian market for North
American softwood lumber, a softness in the Yen coupled with a sharp drop in housing
starts sent a ripple across the Pacific causing producers from Chile to New Zealand to in-
crease shipments to the U.S. The quotas on Canada caught the Canadian lumber indus-
try in a bind that other lumber exporters did not face in a situation most likely completely
unanticipated by the Pacific Northwest politicos that wanted to protect U.S. timber from
Canadian import competition. See C.J. Chipello and D.E. Parkinson, Lumber Price Re-
bound May Hinge on Japan, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 1998) at C1 and C19.
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area even within the United States demonstrates that it is cost-effective
to break labor unions by violating the National Labor Relations Act.187
It is also cost-effective, probably far more so, to export jobs to Mexico in
order to avoid meaningful environmental legislation. The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (hereinafter FCPA) has been held to reach overseas
and regulate corporate conduct.188 Congress might consider extending
such a long arm to environmental laws, labor laws, and anti-
discrimination laws. It might make labor laws interactive with em-
ployment discrimination laws. 89 Thus, discrimination and Unfair La-
bor Practices might potentially be merged into a new category such as
Illegal Labor and Employment Practices (ILEP). Penalties and en-
forcement budgets would need to be vastly increased to get the atten-
tion of the new breed of the Robber Barons that the merger binge of the
1980's and 1990's has spawned within the USA.190 Whether one nation
can possibly reach non-resident firms and whether it should make the
attempt unilaterally are significant legal and political issues.
An extension of environmental quality standards for U.S. multina-
tionals and their wholly owned subsidiaries would be another positive
step in preventing the exporting of jobs to poorer countries that are at
the mercy of TNC wealth. In reviewing the history of BCC, we are re-
minded of a judge's dictum made famous by H.L. Mencken: "Corpora-
tions have no pants to kick or soul to damn" and "by God, they ought to
have both."191
187. See, e.g., James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power and Society, 44 MD. L.
REV. 841 (1985) (making the point that labor laws tend to keep a labor dispute localized
by preventing secondary activity, etc. when frequently the employer is a local or national
organization.) The history of BCC and its ability to use its vast economic powers to "cram
down" a labor settlement over the objections of nine unions at International Falls mill
also supports this conclusion. See supra text accompanying notes 9-34; see also, William
A. Wines, The Long March to Bildisco and the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments: Establish-
ment of a Limited Right to Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements, 20 GONZ. L. REV.
187, 188-210 (1985) (documenting the power of corporations to legally and unilaterally
reject labor contracts that were bargained under the NLRA is documented).
188. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., William A. Wines, The Case of the Willmar Eight: Is Leviticus Still Good
Law in Employment Discrimination?, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 214, 215-246 (suggesting reform
based upon the outcome of the employment disputes at Citizens National Bank, Willmar,
MN).
190. See, e.g., William A. Wines, Title VII Interpretation and Enforcement In the
Reagan Years (1980-1989): The Winding Road to The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 77 MARQ
L. REV. 647 (1994) (detailing the impact of budget reductions and policy shifts that virtu-
ally gave the green light to corporations to ignore employment discrimination laws during
the decade of the eighties).
191. H.L. MENCKEN, A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES FROM
ANCIENT AND MODERN SOURCES 223 (1942) (Mencken's reported quip has long historical
roots). Sir Edward Coke in the Case of Sutton's Hospital (1613) declared that corpora-
tions cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, or excommunicated, for they have no souls.
Case of Sutton's Hospital 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B. 1613).
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There are rumors in Guerrero that BCC is already moving to con-
struct a new mill with huge capacity. Such a mill would, if the rumors
are anywhere near accurate, have capacity for many times the logs BCC
has publicly been acknowledged to have authority to cut in the Costa
Grande area. This invites speculation that BCC has much greater log-
ging leases/options in Mexico or may be shipping logs from other sites in
an effort to take advantage of the lax safety standards and extremely
low wages in Mexico. Congress might enact a long-arm statute covering
environmental abuses by U S Corporations, their subsidiaries, and sub-
contractors anywhere on the planet. Treble damages plus actual costs
and attorney fees would be a good start to encourage private Attorney
Generals to bring individual actions to protect the impoverished of this
planet from dealing away their children's inheritance and from pollut-
ing the air and water all living things need to survive.
This is not an appropriate place for an extended discussion of the
details of such regulations, however, some sketching out of the nature
of possible laws might provide the flavor of what we have in mind. Suf-
fice it to say that Crimes Against the Earth (CATE's) should include
clear-cutting and any other logging that is not at a sustainable level;
eliminating wetlands that support waterfowl or provide significant flood
plains; destroying spawning streams for trout and salmon; fishing on a
non-sustainable yield basis; 192 and failure to restore the environment
after any mining activity or toxic chemical spill. This does not begin to
exhaust the possibilities but should demonstrate the scope of the legal
reform we have in mind.
For a TNC such as BCC, it is only a small step from eliminating a
laborer's livelihood to snuffing out biological life itself. The earth be-
longs to all of us, and we to it. The resources of this planet including
the lives and health of its workers should not be sold to the highest bid-
der at fire sales necessitated by the poverty and corruption of some of
its nations. Some will object to these proposals for law reform on the
grounds that morality cannot be legislated. Others may object to what
they see as draconian measures. We do not dispute the inability of law
reform to promote morality or the vast sweep of these proposals. We
would like the U.S. Congress to take the profits out of such abuses of
power as have been practiced over the past two decades by the BCC.
A full scale review of possible reform measures is beyond the scope
of this paper; our purpose here is to encourage vigorous public debate,
intense media attention, and focused social science research on the
coming storm. What alternatives might be explored? We would suggest
192. One need only read about the fishing wars in the Gulf of Thailand to appreciate
how near the edge of disaster this world's oceans have come. See. e.g., Uamdau Noikorn,
Fishing rights in Burmese Waters to be Finalised Soon, BANGKOK POST, June 22, 1997, at
2.
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that the dichotomy between jobs and the health of the planet be deleted
as an operative assumption - that the role of corporations be re-
examined from a populist or progressive stance that vigorously insists
on corporate accountability. After all, society existed for many centu-
ries without business corporations. They were allowed to exist only be-
cause it was thought they might contribute to the improvement of the
quality of life on this planet. Maybe that conclusion needs to be re-
visited. Perhaps, a people and planetary centered accounting system
needs to be implemented so that human costs and other so-called exter-
nalities are reflected on the income sheets of corporations and repara-
tions might be required.
At the very least, some attention needs to be paid to the flaws in
the current attempts at global governing structures. Why does the
United Nations seem to be ineffective when it addresses human welfare
issues? What should be done to make the ILO more relevant to the
lives of working people? Is there another way to impose sanctions for
GATT violations and other trade misdeeds other than the self-defeating
approach of countervailing tariffs? We should approach these issues
with some sense of urgency. This will not be the last wave to sweep the
planet in the coming twenty-first century. Other challenges lie ahead.
Our political and social structures have not yet fully grasped the les-
sons of the nineteenth century and have not fully engaged the chal-
lenges of this century 193 but must be brought up to speed if misery on a
global scale and bloody revolutions are to be averted. Paralleling the
expansion of corporate economic domination is what one authority re-
fers to as a "de facto world government."
It seems to me that several tendencies can be detected. One is the
tendency towards centralization of power in high-level planning and de-
cision-making institutions, as epitomized in the EU executive. More
generally, as the international business press has pointed out, a 'de
facto world government' is taking shape with its own institutions: the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, G-7, the General
Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), et cetera. These are becom-
ing the governing institutions of a 'new imperial age' (Financial
Times).
94
Edward W. Soja provides a description of transnational corpora-
tions and the reach of international capitalism. These factors, that
193. Bruce Catton stated prophetically: "There is no twentieth-century culture; the
twentieth century is simply a time of transition, and the noise of things collapsing is so
loud that we are taking the prodigious step from the nineteenth century to the twenty-
first century without a moment of calm in which we can see where we are going." BRUCE
CATTON, WAITING FOR THE MORNING TRAIN 18-19 (1972).
194. Noam Chomsky: Nationalism and the New World Order: An Interview by Takis
Fotopoulos, 2 SOC'Y & NATURE 1 (1994).
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shed light analytically on BCC operations, are as follows:
One prevailing trend has been the increasing centralization and con-
centration of capital ownership, typified by the formation of huge cor-
porate conglomerates combining diversified industrial production, fi-
nance, real estate, information processing, entertainment and other
service activities.
Added to the corporate conglomeration of ownership has been a more
technologically-based integration of diversified industrial, research,
and service activities that similarly reallocates capital and labour into
sprawling spatial systems of production linking centres of administra-
tive power over capital investment to a constellation of parallel
branches, subsidiaries, subcontracting firms, and specialized public
and private services.
Linked to increased capital concentration and oligopoly has been a
more pronounced internationalization and global involvement of pro-
ductive and finance capital, sustained by new arrangements for credit
and liquidity organized on a world scale.
The weakening of local controls and state regulation over an increas-
ingly 'footloose' and mobile capital has contributed to an extraordinary
global restructuring of industrial production.
In the USA and elsewhere, the accelerated geographical mobility of in-
dustrial and industry-related capital has triggered and intensified ter-
ritorial competition, among government units for new investments
(and for maintaining existing firms in place.)
195
All of the above have resulted in "[t]he self-perpetuating spiral of
economic and ecological decline.., rooted in a fundamental and grow-
ing contradiction between an imbalanced system of production, veering
towards chaos, and an increasingly fragile biosphere. An abundance of
scientific evidence suggests that the natural habitat, from oceans to
rain forests to the atmosphere, cannot sustain for long a capitalist in-
dustrialism driven toward endless material expansion, generalized
domination, and the conversion of human beings and nature into com-
modities." 195A
According to the same observer, other consequences include the ex-
clusion of 90 percent of the Earth's population from the material bene-
fits of the globalizing economy, in which the "search for integrated mar-
195. Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical
Social Theory 185-86 (1989).
195A Id.
1998
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
kets rooted in easy access to raw materials, cheap labor, and stable
high-tech infrastructure is expected to give rise to nearly one billion af-
fluent consumers by the year 2020; the rest will be consigned to under-
class status."'196 The effects of this rapid and overwhelming evolution of
a global economic and integrated system can be seen not only as it ef-
fects the sustainability of the biosphere but also to that of labor. The
mobility of capital leads to "restructuring processes" that "derigidify
long-established spatial divisions of labour at virtually every geographi-
cal scale," according to Soja. 197 He provides the following descriptive
analysis:
Paralleling what has been happening at the global scale, the regional
division of labour within countries has been changing more dramati-
cally than it has over the past hundred years.
Accompanying these processes are major changes in the structure of
urban labour markets. Deeper segmentation and fragmentation is oc-
curring, with a more pronounced polarization of occupations between
high pay/high skill and low pay low/skill workers, and an increasingly
specialized residential segregation based on occupation, race, ethnicity,
immigrant status, income, lifestyle, and other employment related
variables.
Job growth tends to be concentrated in those sectors which can most
easily avail themselves of comparatively cheap, weakly organized, and
easily manipulated labour pools and which are thus better able to com-
pete within an international market (or obtain significant protection
against international competition from the local or national state.)198
Under these prevailing circumstances, "few governments seem
willing to step forward, to take initiatives that might challenge corpo-
rate power, frighten capital markets, or undermine competitive advan-
tage. Governments of diverse ideological labels, from Britain to China,
from Italy to Brazil, remain captive to both the logic of transnational
growth as well as the ideology of a self-correcting market."'199
According to principles established in GATT, the best means to ad-
dress environmental damages that transcend national boundaries is
through domestic policies, rather than trade policies, for instance. But,
as Paul Ekins points out, this approach is probably not politically feasi-
ble as long as it has serious negative implications for the competitive-
196. Carl Boggs, The New World Order and Social Movements, 2 SOC'v & NATURE 91,
96 (1994).
197. SOJA, supra note 195, at 125.
198. Id. at 186-87.
199. Boggs, supra note 196, at 124-25.
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ness of domestic industry. Failure to protect domestic industry from
competitors who do not do so would permit only the countries with the
strongest economies to maintain domestic environmental protections,
which would then be under "continual siege from [parties] concerned
with international competitiveness.
200
In effect, whether in Mexico or elsewhere in less developed coun-
tries, domestic environmental protections are unlikely due to the conse-
quences for competition on the international level both in respect of ex-
ported products and services and in the attraction of foreign
investment. Undoubtedly, such is the case with BCC and Mexico. One
informed observer has called for "an environmental nationalism which
can harness the legitimate anger against global capitalism to carry out
the massive transformations necessary to create an environmentally
sustainable civilization. '" 201 We believe that such a step would work
only if accompanied by an international cooperative effort, such as in
the WTO, that would both establish global environmental standards
and share the necessary resources to make enforcement a reality. Note
that this approach would couple nationalism with global cooperation
rather than the global competition that now characterizes the race to-
ward the bottom.
Since no international corporate juridicial framework exists, and
since international economic competition supercedes domestic environ-
mental protection, Ekins calls for "environmentally orientated trade re-
strictions."202 The situation is all the worse in that domestic environ-
mental (and labor) protections are hampered by the growing
transcendence of such nation-states by a globalizing economy.
203
Furthermore, nations, in seeking a comparative advantage on the
international market, are pressured to reduce environmental protection
or refrain from implementing or enforcing it in order to secure that ad-
vantage. 20 4 The same is true for labor standards, human rights and the
200. Paul Ekins, The Future of the World Trade Organization: Proposals for Fair and
Environmentally Sustainable Trade, 3 SOC'Y & NATURE 57, 81 (1997).
201. ARRAN E. GARE, POSTMODERNISM AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 145 (1995).
Gare makes this argument, in part, because he believes that "only by cultivating nation-
alist sentiments will it be possible to mobilize people to bear the costs of the struggle..
to regain control over their economies and their environments. Id.
202. EKINS, supra note 200, at 69.
203. As one authority notes: "[t]his transnational or global capital is able to explore
and exploit commodity, financial, consumer, and labour markets all over the world with
fewer territorial constraints (especially from direct state control) than ever before. As a
result, purely domestic capital has been playing a decreasing role in the local and national
economies of the advanced industrial countries as these economies increasingly interna-
tionalize." SOJA, supra note 195, at 185. For a dark vision of what the global economy
will mean to U.S. workers, See Walter Russell Mean, At Your Service: The New Global
Economy Takes Your Order, Mother Jones (March/April 1998) at 32-41.
204. For a brief application of Habermas' theory of the public sphere to the recovery of
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gamut of controls on corporate and commercial behavior. The results
include the unraveling of the prevailing theory of "comparative advan-
tage," a trademark of international trade. Among other things, the the-
ory of comparative advantage ignores environmental externalities, in
which prices do not reflect the full social cost of production.
The theory also rests on the assumption that capital and labor re-
main immobile, producing for the country's advantage. "With free mo-
bility of factors of production, comparative advantage becomes a much
less relevant concept because factors from different countries will in-
stead flow across borders according to the logic of absolute advantage or
simple price competitiveness. Countries without such advantage will
experience pressure on wage rates, working conditions, environmental
regulations and anything else perceived to hinder competitiveness. '205
Under such conditions, reform of the system of production, domes-
tically and internationally, appears all the more insurmountable. The
environmental movement has fallen drastically short, both nationally
as well as internationally, in confronting these conditions and providing
workable structures for the resolution of the various environmental cri-
ses on the planet. The movement has virtually missed the need to
transform traditional liberal and democratic approaches to a new sys-
tem in which "the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of
individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is deliberation
itself.... A legitimate decision does not represent the will of all, but is
one that results from the deliberation of all."20 6 Another writer claims
that "action in the public sphere [should be] based more on the rework-
ing of existing, mainstream settings and institutions than on the crea-
tion of counter-institutions on the one hand or protest groups and new
social movements on the other."20
7
grizzly bears, see Steven A. Primm, A Pragmatic Approach to Grizzly Bear Conservation,
10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY (no. 4, August 1996) at 1030-32. Primm suggests that a
third way must be found between reliance on either government or markets to offer solu-
tions to conflicts over conservation of large predators. "The purpose of forming reason-
based opinions in a non-governmental process is not to direct the affairs of government
explicitly but to develop reasoned and less-conflictual [sic] demands for government ac-
tions." For an example of how things currently work in this arena, See Associated Press,
Commissioners Defy Federal Law, Pass Ordinance dateline Challis, I.D., January 29, 1998
at 3:15 a.m. That AP news story details how the Custer County Commissioners passed an
ordinance titled the "unacceptable Species Ordinance" that outlaws grizzly bears moving
into Custer County, ID. A further resolution in support of this ordinance called for killing
the federally protected grizzlies to keep them out of the county. (Copy of wire-service re-
port in authors' possession).
205. Id. at 60.
206. B. Manin, On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation, in Jurgen Habermas, Futher
Reflections on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 446 (Craig Cal-
houn ed., M.I.T. Press 1992).
207. Harry C. Boyte, The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics, in HABERMAS AND THE
VOL. 26:3
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According to another observer, there has been " a striking absence
of alternative models and designs for macro restructuring processes
that could give concrete shape to sustainable development - and to a
fully democratized social order." Likewise, the same reporter notes that
proponents of significant change are confronted by a system "that, for
the most part, closes off real alternatives from serious discussion.
'" 208
This may explain why the so-called "mainstream" environmental groups
that are national in scope often fail to promote such alternatives. 209
PUBLIC SPHERE 353 (Craig Calhoun ed., M.I.T. Press 1992). Boyte continues with a call
for the deliberative citizenry of Habermas in the following words: "development of a wide-
spread sensibility and experience of citizen agency and authority, with the responsibilities
and capacities those entail, is the key to any significant democratization of the everyday,
large-scale, direct, and indirect relationships of the modern world. For this to occur, we
need a different sort of political education, one especially attentive to the pragmatic foun-
dations for a sustainable public sphere." Id. at 353.
208. Boggs, supra note 196, at 127. To illustrate one such model that has received this
type of treatment: legislation before Congress called the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Pro-
tection Act would designate over 14 million acres of currently unprotected roadless land
in the Northern Rocky Mountains as wilderness and establish two National Parks and
provide for Wild and Scenic Rivers Protection while generating jobs for heavy equipment
operators. These areas would be connected by biological corridors (over 4 million acres)
composed of currently roadless areas. Such biological corridors or bridges, if you will,
would permit migration and genetic interchange between currently isolated plants and
animals, such as the Yellowstone grizzly bears that are not a genetically viable popula-
tion. This and similar legislation would provide for recovery areas in which people would
be employed to re-establish native vegetation, reduce erosion, close and re-vegetate un-
necessary roads, and re-establish native fisheries. Such legislation would benefit not only
the ecosystem but also the local peoples, some of whom have been hard hit by timber
company layoffs, by providing jobs for heavy equipment operators, laborers, botanists and
others. Funding for such recovery efforts could be derived from the savings realized by
elimination of taxpayer subsidies for road building and below-cost timber sales. See, e.g.,
A Bill Before Congress to Protect the Wild Rockies, H.R. 1425. C&S Note that Custer
County (Idaho) commissioners passed an ordinance outlawing Grizzly Bears from moving
there, in defiance of the federal government. Morning News Report (KOOL FM 104.3,
Boise, Idaho, radio broadcast, Jan. 29, 1998). Enforcement apparently was not addressed
in the "Unacceptable Species Ordinance" passed in Challis on Tuesday, January 27, 1998.
(AP Wire Service).
Unfortunately, very rational proposals, such as H.R. 1425, have been obstructed by poli-
tics as usual wedded to maintaining non-sustainable resource uses. Successful legislation
under current conditions can be achieved only by bills that are viewed as non-threatening
to the status quo for timber and mineral extraction conglomerates that maintain a highly
visible and effective lobbying presence in the Nation's Capitol. Clearly, Idaho's Congres-
sional delegation is only one of several from the West who are motivated more by timber
and mining industry needs than by environmental and species preservation concerns.
Some (Rep. Hanson, R. Utah) would, for instance, log the National Parks if they had the
votes. See also Chomsky, supra note 194, at 2 for similar discussion.
209. Even modest administrative reforms often fail in Congress. See, e.g., Erin Kelly,
House Barely Misses Axing Federal Funds for Timber Roads, IDAHO STATESMAN, July 12,
1997, at 4A. Late on July 101h , the U. S. House of Representatives rejected by two votes a
bi-partisan effort by Reps. Joe Kennedy, D. Mass. And John Porter, R. Ill., to kill a $41.5
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Local and regional environmental groups often succeed in stimu-
lating and expanding public debate. On the other side, some environ-
mental groups simply defend "local space and identity, where these val-
ues are threatened by economic, political, and cultural incursions of all
sorts." According to the same observer, these movements can be largely
defensive. Actions may be:
designed to avoid the public sphere; they not only fear taking on
the power structure, but change of any type.... Local 'knowledge' is a
vital ingredient of this equation [strategic planning for both change and
the use of political and economic power], but without strategic form it
becomes dissipated in the manner of enclave consciousness. While dis-
persion seems appropriate to the postmodern mood of contemporary in-
tellectuals and others, it works against the imperatives of political
strategy and organizing, which is the terrain upon which the global cri-
sis must be contested.
210
More to the point and much more succinctly, one writer simply de-
clared: "If market forces are global in scope, any effective political re-
sponse has to be global."
2 1
On the other hand, citizen participation can legitimize administra-
tive rationality on the part of transnational firms and government bu-
reaucracies, in the same way that faculty senates elected by a small
percentage of the total faculty can be used for "faculty input" by univer-
million federal road construction program in the public forests. This was the second time
in two years that critics of the logging road program, which also includes a $50 million
program under which the U.S. Forest Service gives trees to timber companies for building
logging roads, narrowly missed eliminating this subsidy. The American Forest & Paper
Association defends the program on the ground that groups other than timber companies
also use logging roads. From 1991-1997, Boise Cascade Corporation received $19 million
in road purchaser credits, making it the second largest corporate beneficiary under the
program. HEADWATERS FOREST NEWS, Winter 1997-98, at 10.
In order to determine the further scope of taxpayer subsidies, and especially subsidies
granted BCC, the authors studied six timber sales to Boise Cascade Corporation from the
Boise National Forest over a six-month period in 1995 (May 22 to Nov.20). These six tim-
ber sales were subsidized by U.S. taxpayers to the tune of $3,365,673. Put another way,
taxpayers gave BCC over half a million dollars each time it bought trees to harvest in the
Boise National Forest. These costs of corporate welfare include administration, sales
planning, design, sales preparation, reforestation, county taxes, new roads, and road re-
construction. We believe these numbers are conservative. Our. figures were obtained
from the Boise National Forest through Freedom of Information Act requests. The analy-
sis is based upon the same methodology used in a report by the General Accounting Office
entitled "Forest Service Distribution of Timber Sales Receipts Fiscal Years 1992-94."
G.A.O. REP. NO. 95-237FS (1995). In that report, the GAO found that over the three
years studies that the U.S. Forest Service lost $995 million in below-cost timber sales na-
tionally. Id.
210. Boggs, supra note 196, at 113.
211. Nicholas Garnham, The Media and the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE
PUBLIC SPHERE 372 (Craig Calhoun ed., M.I.T. Press 1992).
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sity administrators when it suits their purposes. These groups can be
"purposely stimulated to provide much needed administrative rational-
ity."212 Furthermore, through public hearings required by the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act,21 3 a cloak of rational decision-making can be
tailored thereby giving the appearance of legitimacy to proposed gov-
ernmental actions masking transnational corporate interests. Even in
opposition, citizens can unintentionally through their participation
sanction governmental or business actions that have been functionally
pre-selected or choreographed, in effect, by large power brokers.
To illustrate: a well-meaning environmental push for pollution con-
trols over the local pulp mill to remove chlorine paper production that
fouls air and waterways can be turned to corporate advantage by sub-
stituting one environmental abuse for another. For instance, the suc-
cessful campaign for chlorine-free paper production might necessitate a
massive plant modernization, a capital-intensive option available only
to large conglomerates. In order to pay off the resulting heavy invest-
ment in high technology paper production, the conglomerate will then
increase logging to allow it to run the modernized mill at maximum ca-
pacity. Reduction of chlorine paper production may then have the unin-
tended, at least to the environmentalists, result of short-term deforesta-
tion of the area as the price of modernization. 2 14 Any final or real
environmental problem solving must address reduced consumption and
waste of natural resources and not merely the shifting of environmental
burdens.
215
212. Harry C. Boyte, The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen
Movement 100-02 (1980).
213. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
214. Kerski, supra note 79, at 144.
215. "Thus, growth in capitalist relations is inevitably associated with growth in con-
sumption of natural resources and production of waste .... " Blair Sandier, Grow or Die:
Marxist Theories of Capitalism and the Environment, 7 RETHINKING MARXISM 38, 40
(1994). For Sandler, advanced capitalist societies are successfully assimilating a form of
"green" economics. As he sees it, the production of "ecologically friendly commodities" -
designed to met the demands of consumers for products that lessen environmental conse-
quences ("internalizing environmental externalities"), results in increased profits by cre-
ating and expanding into new markets to meet these demands. Id. at 49-51. Conse-
quently, he refutes the argument that capitalism and its intrinsic need to increase
commodity production in expanding the reach and penetration of markets, conflicts with
biospheric limits. Id. at 48. Sandier refers to the move towards chlorine free paper as an
example of such an assimilation of environmental demands into the productive capacities
of capital. Id. at 38. However, Sandler fails to mention the shift of environmental im-
pacts. e.g. removing chlorine from paper production to eliminate pollution by increasing,
even if relatively temporary, logging to cover capital investments in technological mod-
ernization. While a "green environmental regime" may postpone the clash between capi-
tal growth and ecological limits, we view it unlikely that such a "regime" effectively, even
in the short-term, eliminates this conflict. Id. at 44. Nor do we believe it likely, as San-
dler asserts, that "The vast and far-reaching ecological reconstruction of material infra-
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Similarly and also inadvertently, local environmental activism may
lead to more centralized government. In western states such as
Idaho216 where the state legislature is funded by and zealously disposed
to be solicitous of the welfare of the cattle, lumber and mining indus-
tries, environmental activists may turn in desperation to the national
government where their concerns have a chance of being heard. Turn-
ing to the federal government, administrative agencies or courts for en-
vironmental relief will bring federal intervention and may necessitate a
larger federal presence. The result, inevitably, in sagebrush rebellion
territory will be an increased backlash from westerners who seek less
federal control over their affairs. Unfortunately, the resulting debates
over centralized versus decentralized government are too frequently
shaped in simplistic and naive terms. Even though such debates are
crucial to a society where environmental problems are democratic di-
lemmas, the environmental perspective "tends to be long on ecological
critiques and polemic and short on understanding of the political proc-
ess."2
17
A more sophisticated approach would, when delineating possible
political change, look increasingly to "civil society" as the agent of such
change and towards the revitalization of the public sphere on all levels
(local, national, and international) as an essential element in such
change. 218 One writer
structure and production technologies" "will help constitute the next capitalist restruc-
turing." Id. at 55. On the other hand, Sandier is correct in asserting the inherent limits
to the ability of state regulations or market instruments to enforce restraints on economic
effects on the biosphere. Id. at 55.
216. Idaho currently (January 1998) has the most Republican legislature of the 50
states; the GOP has a 6 to 1 majority in both houses and a Republican Governor, Phil
Batt.
217. Daniel Press, Democratic Dilemmas in the Age of Ecology: Trees and Toxics in the
American West 6 (1994).
218. "[The institutional core of 'civil society' is constituted by voluntary unions outside
the realm of the state and the economy." Jurgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the
Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 453 (Craig Calhoun ed., M.I.T.
Press 1992). The public sphere refers both to a theoretical and normative ideal and to
practical actualities. As a theoretical ideal, the public sphere, for Habermas, generates
the justification of norms through reasoned discourse and rational will formation. Practi-
cally speaking, the public sphere refers also to the institutionalized will of ever expanding
public spheres, in which citizen participation is the motor that fuels authentic democratic
processes. However, as Calhoun states, Habermas recognizes that "parties, parastatal
agencies, and bureaucracies of all sorts must themselves be internally democratized and
subjected to critical publicity." Craig Calhoun, Introduction, to HABERMAS AND THE
PUBLIC SPHERE 1, 28 (Craig Calhoun ed., M.I.T. Press 1992). Recognizing that complex
societies cannot do without markets and administrative bureaucracies, Habermas notes
that with the integration of the economy with the state brings new conditions requiring a
broadening of democratic constituencies. Id. at 1-42. However, rather than "vying for
state power", democratic constituencies must instead direct state power. Yet obstacles
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distinguishes the public sphere from both state and market and can
thus pose the question of the threats to democracy and the public dis-
courses upon which it depends coming both from the development of an
oligopolistic capitalist market and from the development of the modern
interventionist welfare state.... [T]he development of an increasingly
integrated global market and centers of private economic power with
global reach are steadily undermining the nation-state, and it is within
the political structure of the nation-state that the question of citizen-
ship and of the relationship between communication and politics has
been traditionally posed.219 We are thus being forced to rethink this
relationship and the nature of citizenship in the modern society.
220
Conclusion.
In light of the above, how can government effectively regulate
global corporate conduct in the face of increasing competitiveness and
the highly mobile nature of capital? How do non-governmental organi-
zations formulate proposals and design strategies for effective govern-
ment action? The answer increasingly takes us beyond our borders and
necessitates the agreement and cooperation of at least major U.S.
trading partners.
The looming crisis of widespread ecological degradation poses ethi-
cal dilemmas that must be considered along with the legal and political
issues. For instance, the extension of technological and industrial ef-
fects on nature bring with them "increased responsibility for the natu-
confront such structural and institutional democracy, where no clear agent(s) e.g. social
movements, exists for the democratization of society. Id. As Calhoun notes, "The public
sphere becomes a setting for states and corporate actors to develop legitimacy not by re-
sponding appropriately to an independent and critical public but by seeking to instill in
social actors motivations that conform to the needs of the overall system dominated by
those states and corporate actors." Id.
219. This is not to deny the impact that large corporations are having within the na-
tion-states. See, e.g., DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, AMERICA: WHO REALLY
PAYS THE TAXES? 313 (1994), for a discussion of taxpayers subsidizing Northwestern Air-
lines after a huge "leveraged buy-out" that netted the chief architect "a personal fortune
estimated at $50 million...." The Northwestern Airlines deal is discussed in detail by
Barlett and Steele and summarized in these words: " Corporate-takeover artists, who ac-
quired an airline and transformed it from a moneymaker to a money loser, pit state
against state to see which will finally hand over the most tax subsidies." Id. at 318. Min-
nesota beat out Louisiana with a controversial $740 million package of tax breaks, gov-
ernment-backed loans, and cash in May 1991. Id. at 314. Between 1990 and the end of
1992, Northwest Airlines, the company that had racked up thirty-nine straight profitable
years through 1988 under its prior owners, had run up $1.7 billion in losses under its new
ownership, the take-over artists that seized control in 1989. Id. at 312, 317.
220. Garnham, supra note 210, at 361-62; see also GARE, supra note 201; Boyte, supra
note 206; Manin, supra note 205.
1998
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ral process set in motion by such intervention. '" 221 In other words,
greater alterations of nature bring with them greater responsibility for
coordinated actions to redress the consequences. The ecological conse-
quences of our collective actions present problems in which solutions
must address immense degrees of complexity. The complexity involved
may exceed "biologically programmed thresholds of sense perception
and the limits of our historically developed cognitive capacities, such as
those for anticipated time, for personal identity, or for the extent to
which moral responsibility can be attached to consequences of ac-
tion."2
22
A British economist who spent decades living and working in the
Indian sub-continent wrote that "[firom a Buddhist point of view, this
[measuring economic health by production alone] is standing the truth
on its head by considering goods as more important than people and
consumption as more important than creative activity. It means shift-
ing the emphasis from the worker to the product of work, that is, from
the human to the sub-human, a surrender to the forces of evil. '223 We
may need to resurrect such currently unfashionable notions of good and
evil to discuss the current direction of global capitalism; it may be evil
to allow legal fictions to dominate humankind and the planet.224 Effi-
ciency is not necessarily good; we need to talk about the goal towards
which efficiency is taking us before we can or should praise it." Sim-
plicity and non-violence are closely related. 225 As one writer noted
many years ago, economics without compassion is merely "a highly de-
veloped form of violence." 226 The father of modern economics knew that
221. Jurgen Habermas, Reply to My Critics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES 247
(John B. Thompson & David Held eds., M.I.T. Press 1982).
222. Jurgen Habermas, Introduction to OBSERVATIONS ON "THE SPIRITUAL SITUATION
OF THE AGE" 18 (M.I.T. Press 1984).
223. E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered 56 (1973).
224. S.ee, e.g, GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES 159-60
(1936), for a parallel discussion of the absence of moral condemnation over a century ago
when "persons of the highest character" was the term used to describe New York City
tenement owners in a Metropolitan Board of Health Report (1866). The author goes on to
condemn the Astors and other slum landlords of the 191h century in these words: "it is not
deliberate, premeditated murder which is meant, in the sense covered by statute, but that
much more insidious kind ensuing from grinding exploitation; in herding human beings
into habitations unfit even for animals which need air and sunshine, and then in stub-
bornly resisting any attempt to improve living conditions in these houses. In this respect,
it cannot be too strongly pointed out, the Astors were in nowise different from the general
run of landlords. Is it not murder when, compelled by want, people are forced to fester in
squalid, germ-filled tenements, where the sunlight never enters and where disease finds a
prolific breeding-place? Untold thousands went to their deaths in these unspeakable
places. Yet, so far as the Law was concerned, the rents collected by the Astors, as well as
other landlords, were honestly made." Id. at 165-66.
225. SCHUMACHER, supra note 222, at 58.
226. Matthew Fox, A Spirituality Named Compassion and the Healing of the Global
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well enough. Adam Smith believed that self-interest could drive a pro-
ductive free market if, and only if, that force was contained by human
sympathy, competitive forces, and legal regulation. 227 There might yet
be time for many of us to revisit the fundamental principles of econom-
ics, restrain our fondness for mathematical modeling, and search out
the moral roots of political economics 228 and the general welfare that
drive legal regulation of markets.
The vision of the problems global society may face if substantial re-
form is not forthcoming on a timely basis is dark, indeed. In the
twenty-first century, the so-called "Killing Fields" might resemble shoe
factories similar to those operated currently in Indonesia by subcontrac-
tors for Nike or the mines of South Africa or the sweatshops of Hong
Kong or the forests of Mexico. The mania of global capitalism has al-
ready outdistanced all the social institutions, laws and customs that
this century maintained or erected; now, the challenge is to reform or
reinvent them before the Earth becomes virtually uninhabitable. 229
Village, Humpty Dumpty and Us 177 (1979).
227. See, e.g., James B. Zimarowski et al., An Institutional Perspective on Law and
Economics (Chicago Style) in the Context of United States Labor Law, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
397, 400-03 (1993).
228. Some economists seem to forget that Adam Smith was first and foremost a moral
philosopher. His first book was the THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1756), and this work
forms the foundation upon which his economic theory rests. See, e.g., PATRICIA H.
WERHANE, ADAM SMITH AND HIS LEGACY FOR MODERN CAPITALISM 7-15 (1991).
229. There are numerous Native American legends that one of the last creatures on
the planet Earth will be Brother Coyote. See, e.g., WILLIAM BRIGHT, A COYOTE READER
175-76 (1993). In Navajo legend, Coyote is more than a trickster/hunter; Navajo folklore
credits Coyote with several resurrections. KARL W. LUCKERT, COYOTEWAY: A NAVAJO
HOLYWAY HEALING CEREMONIAL 11 (1979). The Coyote of Coyoteway takes the form of a
deity that can punish or help the People. Id. We doubt that given the planet's regenera-
tive capacities that mankind could make all life forms disappear, but we fear that without
significant reform the Earth might come to resemble the end time legends of the Native
Americans.
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